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In my doctoral dissertation, I examine theoretical and empirical questions
related to the international macroeconomic e¤ects of o¤shore production,
labor migration and remittances.
In Chapter 1, "O¤shore Production and Business Cycle Dynamics with
Heterogeneous Firms," I analyze the cross-country transmission of business
cycles when rms relocate production abroad at locations with relatively
lower labor costs, an action which I refer to as o¤shoring. In the model, I
distinguish between uctuations in the number of rms producing o¤shore
(the extensive margin) and the value added per o¤shoring rm (the intensive
margin) as separate transmission mechanisms. Firms are heterogeneous in
labor productivity; they face a sunk entry cost in the domestic market and an
additional xed cost to produce o¤shore. The incentive to relocate produc-
tion abroad increases with the di¤erence between the domestic and foreign
cost of e¤ective labor, and with rm-specic productivity. The key results
are: (1) The model replicates the procyclical pattern of o¤shoring, as well
as the extensive and intensive margin dynamics that I document using data
from Mexicos maquiladora sector; (2) O¤shoring enhances the co-movement
of output between the countries involved; and (3) O¤shoring reduces price
dispersion across countries, because it dampens the real exchange rate ap-
preciation that follows a productivity increase in the parent country.
In Chapter 2, "O¤shore Production to Mexico: The Intensive and Exten-
sive Margin Responses to U.S. Technology Shocks," I estimate the conditional
correlations and impulse responses of three indicators of o¤shoring to Mex-
ico (total value added, value added per plant, and the number of plants)
associated with U.S. permanent technology shocks. Using data from U.S.
manufacturing and Mexicos maquiladora sector, I identify U.S. permanent
technology shocks in an open-economy, structural VAR model with long-run
restrictions. I nd that: (1) O¤shore production in Mexico exhibits an imme-
diate increase along its intensive margin (value added per plant) in response
to a positive U.S. technology shock, but returns to its initial level over time.
In contrast, the extensive margin (the number of plants) does not adjust on
impact, but increases gradually over time and stabilizes at a permanently
higher level. (2) In the presence of country-specic technology shocks, the
model of o¤shoring with heterogeneous rms in Chapter 1 matches qualita-
tively the business cycle dynamics of o¤shoring from the U.S. to Mexico.
In Chapter 3, "Immigration and the Macroeconomy" (co-authored with
Federico Mandelman), we analyze the dynamics of labor migration and the
insurance role of remittances in a two-country, real business cycle framework.
Emigration increases with the expected stream of future wage gains, and is
dampened by the sunk cost reecting the intensity of border enforcement.
During booms in the destination economy, the scarcity of established immi-
grants lessens capital accumulation, and enhances the volatility of the immi-
grant wage and remittances. The welfare gain from the inow of unskilled
labor increases with the complementarity between skilled and unskilled labor,
and with the share of the skilled among native labor. The model matches
the cyclical dynamics of both the unskilled immigration into the U.S. and
remittances sent back to Mexico.
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Chapter 1
O¤shore Production and Business
Cycle Dynamics with
Heterogeneous Firms
Job Market Paper, November 2008 1
1.1 Introduction
Firms often follow strategies that involve the fragmentation of production chains and the
establishment of foreign a¢ liates at locations with relatively lower labor costs, an activity
known in the international trade literature as o¤shoring through vertical foreign direct
investment (FDI) (Helpman, 1984).2 Unlike production under horizontal FDI - which means
that foreign a¢ liates attempt to gain market access by replicating the operations of their
parent rms in the country where nal consumption takes place - the type of vertically-
integrated production that I model is primarily motivated by lower production costs, as
1JEL classication: F41, F23; Keywords: o¤shore production, extensive and intensive margins, business
cycle dynamics, vertical FDI, heterogeneous rms, rm entry, terms of labor, real exchange rate.
2The term "o¤shoring" refers to the activity of rms that relocate certain stages of their production to
foreign countries. To this end, rms become integrated across borders through vertical or/and horizontal
FDI, or purchase intermediate goods and services from una¢ liated foreign suppliers. In contrast, "outsourc-
ing" applies to situations when rms purchase intermediates from una¢ liated suppliers - either at home or
abroad - rather than producing them in house. See Helpman (2006) for a discussion of the related literature.
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foreign a¢ liates add value to the nal goods that are ultimately sold for consumption in
the multinationalscountry of origin or in third countries.3 The number of o¤shoring rms
(which I refer to as the extensive margin of o¤shore production) and the real value added
per o¤shoring rm (the intensive margin) uctuate over the business cycle, and thus a¤ect
output, prices and wages in both the parent and the host countries.4
This paper contributes to the international macroeconomics literature by analyzing the
extensive and intensive margins of o¤shoring as separate transmission mechanisms of busi-
ness cycles between the parent and the host country. I model o¤shoring as an endogenous,
rm-level decision that depends on the di¤erence between the domestic and the foreign
cost per unit of e¤ective labor, the xed cost of o¤shore production, and the trade cost
of shipping output back to the parent country. Fluctuations in the number of o¤shoring
rms are linked to domestic rm entry and to the resulting changes in the relative cost
of e¤ective labor. Thus, an increase in aggregate productivity in the parent country en-
courages domestic rm entry and causes domestic wages to rise faster than productivity, as
labor demand increases to cover entry requirements. In turn, the increase in the domestic
cost of e¤ective labor causes more rms to relocate production o¤shore (i.e. an increase in
o¤shoring along its extensive margin).5 The increase in the number of o¤shoring rms is
gradual, as it mirrors the gradual appreciation of the cost of e¤ective labor generated by
3Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) model horizontal FDI and exports as alternative internationalization
strategies for multinational rms; Contessi (2006) analyzes this tradeo¤ in a dynamic framework.
4Bergin, Feenstra and Hanson (2008) analyze the extent to which uctuations in the extensive margin
of o¤shoring account for variations in Mexicos maquiladora employment. They show that more than one
third of the adjustment in industry-level employment and nearly half of the adjustment in maquiladoras
total employment occur at the extensive margin, i.e. through variation in the number of plants over time.
5 I maintain a one-to-one identication between an o¤shoring rm, a nal good variety, and an o¤shore
plant. Under this assumption, the extensive margin of o¤shoring can also be interpreted as the number of
o¤shore plants every period; the intensive margin can be regarded as the value added per o¤shore plant.
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domestic rm entry.
I document a set of stylized facts that characterize the cyclicality of o¤shoring from
U.S. manufacturing to Mexicos maquiladora sector.6 Using the number of maquiladora
establishments as an empirical proxy for the extensive margin, I nd that the value added
o¤shore is procyclical with U.S. manufacturing output, and also that the extensive margin
varies notably over the business cycle (Figure 6). In particular, I show that expansions
in U.S. output precede increases in the number of maquiladora establishments by at least
three quarters, a result that highlights the inter-temporal link between U.S. manufacturing
and the extensive margin of o¤shoring.
Despite the empirical evidence, the theoretical macroeconomic literature does not fully
capture the business cycle dynamics of o¤shoring along its extensive and intensive margins.
For instance, Burstein, Kurz, and Tesar (2008) examine the role of production sharing in
the transmission of business cycles in a two-country model in which the location of plants
is xed over time.7 Bergin, Feenstra, and Hanson (2007) also focus on the importance of
o¤shore production in amplifying the transmission of shocks across countries, but they do
so with a model in which the number of o¤shoring rms makes an abrupt shift rather than
a gradual adjustment over time (as I nd in the data) in response to aggregate shocks.
I address these deciencies by incorporating the endogenous determination of the num-
6Mexicos maquiladora sector consists of manufacturing plants that import intermediate goods, process
them, and export the resulting output (Gruben, 2001). Although not entirely owned by U.S. multinationals,
most of the maquiladora plants accomodate the o¤shoring oprations of U.S. rms: They import most of
their inputs (82 percent) and send most of their gross output (90 percent) from/to the U.S. (Hausman and
Kaytko, 2003; Burstein, Kurtz and Tesar, 2008). The maquiladora sector accounts for 20 percent of the
Mexicos manufacturing value added (INEGI), nearly 50 percent of the Mexicos exports, and approximately
25 percent of Mexicos employment (Bergin, Feenstra, Hanson, 2007, 2008).
7 In Burstein, Kurtz and Tesar (2008), the low elasticity of substitution between the domestic and foreign
varieties in an Armington composite enhances the cross-country co-movement of output.
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ber of o¤shoring rms in a two-country (North and South), dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model with rm entry and rm heterogeneity, along the lines of Melitz
(2003) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005). Firm entry is subject to a sunk cost reecting the
regulation of starting a business in the country of origin. Following entry, each rm can
use either domestic or foreign inputs in the production of a di¤erent variety of nal goods.
The use of foreign inputs involves the establishment of an o¤shore production plant and
is subject to a xed o¤shoring cost every period. Also, o¤shoring involves the so-called
iceberg trade costs that reect transportation, insurance, and trade barriers, costs incurred
in the shipping of nal good varieties produced o¤shore back to the country of origin. Thus,
when deciding on where to locate production (domestically vs. o¤shore), each rm balances
the lower foreign costs of e¤ective labor against the xed and trade costs associated with
o¤shore production.8 Since rms are heterogeneous in productivity, the decision to produce
o¤shore is rm-specic: Only the more productive rms can a¤ord the xed costs of o¤-
shoring, and their number varies over time. The model also implies that the relocation of
production o¤shore takes place one-way: Since the cost of e¤ective labor is relatively lower
in the South, only Northern rms have the incentive to relocate production o¤shore. All
Southern rms produce domestically.9
The implications of the model are consistent with the empirical evidence provided by
recent studies on the determinants of vertical production networks. For instance, Hanson,
Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005) show that U.S. multinational rms import more interme-
8 I dene the cost of e¤ective labor as the ratio between the real wage and aggregate productivity (wt=Zt
in the North and wt =Z

t in the South).
9 I derive an asymmetric steady state in which di¤erences in the regulation of rm entry in the country
of origin are translated in di¤erences in real e¤ective wages across countries. In the model, I set rm entry
costs to be higher in the South; in turn, since the more regulated economy attracts a smaller number of
rms, labor demand and the cost of e¤ective labor are lower in the South.
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diate inputs when their foreign a¢ liates benet from lower wages and lower trade costs
in the host economy. Kurz (2006) shows that U.S. rms choosing to o¤shore are ex-ante
larger and more productive than their domestic counterparts, as their higher idiosyncratic
productivity levels allow them to cover the xed costs of o¤shoring.
The key results of the paper are as follows. First, the model generates a procyclical
pattern of o¤shoring that is consistent with the stylized facts from Mexicos maquiladora
industry. In particular, following an economic expansion in the parent country, the value
added per o¤shoring rm (the intensive margin) spikes on impact. Domestic rm entry
leads to a gradual appreciation of the terms of labor, which in turn generates a gradual
increase in the number of o¤shoring rms over time (the extensive margin).10 Second, o¤-
shoring enhances the co-movement of output relative to the benchmark model with exports
developed in Ghironi and Melitz (2005). As rm entry places upward pressure on the do-
mestic e¤ective wage and causes more rms to relocate production o¤shore, higher demand
for domestic labor (due to rm entry) and sequentially higher demand for o¤shore labor
(due to the relocation of production) enhance the co-movement of wages and aggregate
incomes.11 The result is consistent with the empirical regularity documented by Burstein,
Kurz, and Tesar (2007) that countries with stronger o¤shoring-related trade links tend to
exhibit higher correlations of manufacturing output. Third, o¤shoring narrows the price
dispersion across countries, as it dampens the appreciation of the real exchange rate that
follows an increase in aggregate productivity in the parent country (the Harrod-Balassa-
10The terms of labor is dened as the ratio between the Southern and Northern real cost of e¤ective labor
expressed in units of the same consumption basket, TOLt =
Qtw

t =Z

t
wt=Zt
, as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005). An
increase in the cost of e¤ective labor in the North would cause the terms of labor to appreciate (i.e. TOL
decreases).
11 In contrast, in the traditional IRBC literature, a domestic increase in aggregate productivity leads to
increased production at home but not o¤shore, such as in Backus, Kehoe, Kydland (1992).
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Samuelson e¤ect). This result is driven by several channels, including the upward pressure
on the foreign wage, the decrease in size of the domestic non-traded sector, and the decline
in import prices that occurs as o¤shoring crowds out the less productive foreign exporters.
Fourth, o¤shoring enhances the procyclicality of investment and rm entry in the parent
country relative to the benchmark model with exports only, as the lower-cost alternative of
producing o¤shore increases the protability of domestic rms. In turn, the employment
loss caused by o¤shoring is partially o¤set by the employment gain generated by greater
domestic rm entry.
This paper is related to a growing body of macroeconomic literature that focuses on
endogenous rm entry and adjustments along the extensive margin of exports (but not
of o¤shoring).12 For example, Ghironi and Melitz (2005) study the export decision of
rms in the presence of xed exporting costs, in a framework with rm entry and rm
heterogeneity. Alessandria and Choi (2007) analyze the extensive margin of exports in
a model with sunk and continuation xed costs that explains the "exporter hysteresis"
behavior.13 Corsetti, Martin, and Pesenti (2007) examine the terms-of-trade implications of
productivity improvements a¤ecting the entry of rms and the production sector, in a model
in which the extensive margin of exports is endogenous. And Mejean (2006) emphasizes
the implications of endogenous rm entry in the tradable sector for the real exchange rate
12Recent empirical literature highlights the role of the extensive margin in international trade in the
presence of xed exporting costs: Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) show that the number of traded goods (the
extensive margin) decreases with distance and increases with the size of the importing country. Besedes and
Prusa (2006) nd that the survival rate of exports for di¤erentiated good varieties increases with the initial
transaction size and also with the length of the relationship. Hummels and Klenow (2005) show that larger
economies have larger exports, and that the extensive margin accounts for as much as 60 percent of this
di¤erence.
13"Exporter hysteresis" refers to the behavior of rms that continue to serve the foreign market even after
a real exchange rate appreciation reduces their export competitiveness.
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dynamics and the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect.
The study of the macroeconomic implications of o¤shoring through vertical FDI is par-
ticularly relevant for pairs of countries and for economic areas that are separated by persis-
tent di¤erences in the cost of e¤ective labor. For instance, o¤shoring through vertical FDI
has been important for the U.S. multinational rms acting within the NAFTA region, and
also within Central and South America: As much as 50 percent of the manufacturing sales
of U.S. a¢ liates in Mexico (and 26 percent of the sales of U.S. a¢ liates in Latin America as
a whole) were directed towards their U.S. parent rms in 2005 (as opposed to only 3 percent
for the U.S. a¢ liates in Europe, and 5 percent for those in the Asia-Pacic region; BEA,
2007). A similar pattern exists between Western Europe and the new member countries of
the European Union (Marin, 2006; Meyer, 2006).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a DSGE model of
o¤shoring that allows for uctuations in o¤shoring at both the extensive and the inten-
sive margins; Section 3 denes the average productivity levels of the representative rms
producing domestically and o¤shore; Section 4 discusses the model calibration; Section 5
presents the results, including the macroeconomic dynamics in the presence of aggregate
productivity shocks, as well as a comparison between the empirical moments of o¤shoring
to Mexico and their model counterparts; Section 6 concludes with a summary and proposed
extensions of the model.
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1.2 Model of O¤shoring with Heterogeneous Firms
1.2.1 Model Setup: Markets and Production Strategies
This section summarizes the two-stage model of rm entry and o¤shore production, which I
illustrate in Figure 1. In the rst stage, an unbounded pool of potential entrant rms face a
trade-o¤ between the sunk entry cost (reecting the cost of starting a business in the rms
country of origin), the expected stream of future monopolistic prots, and the probability
of exit very period, as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005, henceforth GM2005). Only after paying
the sunk entry cost, each rm is assigned an idiosyncratic labor productivity factor that
is drawn independently from a common distribution over a support interval, and that the
rm keeps for the entire duration of its life.
Figure 1. Destination markets and production strategies of rms
In the second stage, post-entry rms are monopolistically competitive and heterogeneous
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in labor productivity. Every period after entry, rms choose the destination market(s) that
they serve as well as the location of production, as follows: (1) Firms serving their domestic
market can use either domestic or foreign inputs in production. The use of foreign labor
involves the establishment of o¤shore production plants (o¤shoring through vertical FDI).
It o¤ers the advantage of a lower production cost, but is subject to a per-period xed
o¤shoring cost, and to an iceberg trade cost that a¤ects the nal goods shipped back to
the country of origin for nal consumption. (2) Some of the rms can also serve the foreign
market. To this end, they use domestic labor as the only input in the production of nal
goods which they export subject to a per-period xed exporting cost, as in GM2005. Thus,
I nest the model of GM2005 (exports only, no o¤shoring) as a special case in my model
with o¤shoring.14
Next I describe in detail the model with rm entry and o¤shore production.
1.2.2 Firms Serving the Domestic Market: Domestic vs. O¤shore Pro-
duction
This section outlines the mechanisms of domestic and o¤shore production for the Northern
rms. It does not concern the Southern rms, as o¤shoring takes place one-way, from the
Northern economy to the low-wage South.
In the North, a continuum of monopolistically-competitive rms produce nal goods for
14 I abstract from the possibility of o¤shoring through horizontal FDI: As an alternative to exports, rms
serving the foreign market may produce abroad using the local labor of the country whose market they target,
thus engaging in o¤shoring through horizontal FDI as in Contessi (2006). Production under horizontal FDI
is motivated by improved access to the foreign market, and involves the simultaneous production of the same
nal good variety both at home (to be sold in the home market) and o¤shore (to be sold in the host market).
In contrast to horizontal FDI, rms engaging in vertical FDI shift part of the production chain o¤shore in
order to take advantage of the relatively lower cost of e¤ective labor. They relocate downstream production
activities o¤shore (e.g. manufacturing, assembly and packaging) while continuing to perform the upstream
operations (e.g. research, marketing and sales) at home.
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the domestic market. Firms are heterogeneous in productivity, with each rm producing
a di¤erent variety of nal goods. Since each rm produces one variety, the rm-specic
labor productivity z also serves as an index for the existing varieties of nal goods. Every
period, rms producing for the domestic market can choose one of two possible locations of
production:
(1) Domestic production: The Northern rm with idiosyncratic labor productivity
z employs labor lt to obtain an amount of nal goods:
yD;t(z) = Ztzlt; (1.1)
where Zt is the aggregate productivity of labor in the North and z is the rm-specic labor
productivity;
(2) O¤shore production: Alternatively, the rm with idiosyncratic labor productiv-
ity z may choose to relocate production o¤shore using Southern labor lt as the only input
in production:
yV;t(z) = Z

t zl

t : (1.2)
Thus, I assume that each o¤shoring rm becomes subject to the Southern aggregate la-
bor productivity Z; but is able to carry its own idiosyncratic labor productivity z to
the Southern economy.15 Given the demand for nal good varieties produced domestically,
yD;t(z) = D;t(z)
 Ct, and also the demand for varieties produced o¤shore by the vertically-
15Strategies 1.1 and 1.2 are extreme cases of a broader framework of o¤shoring, in which I allow for the
o¤shoring rm with idiosyncratic labor productivity z to use a mix of Northern and Southern labor, lt and
lt . Following the specication in Antras and Helpman (2004), the production of nal good variety z is a
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integrated rms, yV;t(z) = V;t(z)
 Ct,16 the monopolistically-competitive rms solve their
prot-maximization problem:
max
fD;t(z)g
dD(z) = D;t(z)yD;t(z) 
wt
Ztz
yD;t(z); (1.3)
max
fV;t(z)g
dV (z) = V;t(z)yV;t(z)  
wtQt
Zt z
yV;t(z)  fV w

tQt
Zt
: (1.4)
The cost of producing one unit of output either domestically or o¤shore varies not only
with the cost of e¤ective labor wtZt and
wtQt
Zt
across countries, but also with the level of
idiosyncratic labor productivity z across rms.17 I dene the real exchange rateQt =
P t "t
Pt
as
the ratio between the price indexes in the South and North expressed in the same currency,
where "t is the nominal exchange rate. In addition to the marginal cost, the Northern
rms producing o¤shore incur a period-by-period xed o¤shoring cost equal to fV units of
Southern e¤ective labor, a cost that reects the building and maintenance of the o¤shore
production facility.18 They also face an iceberg trade cost ( > 1) associated with the
Cobb-Douglas function of domestic and foreign inputs:
yV;t(z) =

Ztzlt

 
Zt zl

t
1  
1 
:
In this paper, I explore the implications of o¤shoring under two extreme scenarios: At one extreme, I
set  = 1 to shut down o¤shoring under vertical FDI, in which case rms use exclusively domestic in-
puts in production (in this case I revisit GM2005). At the other extreme, I set  = 0 so that the o¤-
shoring rms use exclusively foreign inputs in the production of nal goods. The smaller , the larger
the range of operations that the o¤shoring rms relocate abroad (e.g. manufacturing, assembly, pack-
aging, customer service). For the two extreme cases, I use the lHôpital rule to obtain: lim
!0
 
1


=
lim
!1
1= = lim
!1
e(1=) ln  = e
lim
!1

ln 


l0Ho^pital
= e
lim
!1
(1=)
= e0 = 1:
16 I provide their derivation in the Appendix.
17Given the domestic and o¤shore real wages, wt and wt respectively, the marginal cost of producing
one unit of variety z domestically is wt
Ztz
, and the marginal cost of producing it o¤shore is w

tQt
Zt z
. The real
wage wt =Wt=Pt in North is expressed in units of the domestic consumption basket; the o¤shore real wage
wt =W

t =P

t is expressed in units of the consumption basket in South.
18The cost of fV units of Southern e¤ective labor is equivalent to fV wt =Z

t units of the Southern con-
sumption basket.
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shipping of goods produced o¤shore back to the parent country: For every  units produced
o¤shore, only one unit reaches the Northern consumers, as the di¤erence is lost due to
costs associated with trade barriers, transportation, insurance, and di¤erences in the legal
systems, as discussed in Anderson and Wincoop (2004).
The prot-maximization problem under monopolistic competition implies the following
equilibrium prices per unit of output produced domestically and o¤shore, respectively:19
D;t(z) =

   1
wt
Ztz
(1.5)
V;t(z) =

   1
wtQt
Zt z
: (1.6)
The resulting prots from domestic and o¤shore production, both expressed in units of the
Northern consumption basket Ct, are:20
dD;t(z) =
1

D;t(z)
1 Ct; (1.7)
dV;t(z) =
1

V;t(z)
1 Ct   fV w

tQt
Zt
: (1.8)
To summarize the above, the prots associated with domestic and o¤shore production
depend on the cost of e¤ective labor in the North and South, the xed o¤shoring cost, the
iceberg trade cost, as well as the rm-specic labor productivity. Firms producing o¤shore
benet from the relatively lower cost of e¤ective labor, but their prots decline with the
per-period xed o¤shoring cost, and also with the iceberg trade cost. Thus, when deciding
19The derivations are provided in the Appendix.
20Using the demand yD(z) = D(z)
 C and the price D(z) =

 1
w
Zz
for domestic production, the
corresponding prot is dD(z) = 1D(z)yD(z): The prot from o¤shore production is analogous.
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upon the location of production every period, the rm with productivity z compares the
prot dD;t(z) it would obtain from domestic production with the prot dV;t(z) it would
obtain from producing the same variety o¤shore.
The model implies that only the relatively more productive Northern rms nd it prof-
itable to locate production o¤shore every period. Despite the lower cost of e¤ective labor
in South relative to North, only rms with idiosyncratic productivity above a certain cuto¤
(z > zV;t) obtain prots that are large enough to cover the xed o¤shoring cost and the
iceberg trade cost. This implication of the model is consistent with the empirical evidence
provided by Kurz (2006) that rms choosing to produce o¤shore are ex-ante larger and
more productive than their domestic counterparts, as the larger idiosyncratic productivity
levels allow them to cover the xed costs of o¤shoring.21
As a particular case, the rm with labor productivity equal to the cuto¤ zV;t is indi¤erent
between producing domestically or o¤shore. After accounting for the xed o¤shoring cost
and the iceberg trade cost, the rm at the cuto¤ obtains equal prots from domestic and
o¤shore production, a property which I use to solve for the endogenous productivity cuto¤
zV;t that governs the location decision of production:
zV;t = fz j dD;t(zV;t) = dV;t(zV;t)g : (1.9)
21A useful implication of rm heterogeneity along the lines of Melitz (2003) is that the more productive
rms have larger output and revenue. Given two rms with idyodyncratic productivity z2 > z1, the ratios
of output and prots are y(z2)
y(z1)
=

z2
z1

> 1; r(z2)
r(z1)
=

z2
z1
 1
> 1: Empirical studies show that rms using
imported inputs in production not only are more productive, but also are larger and employ more workers
(Kurz, 2006; Yasar and Morrison Paul, 2006).
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Existence of the equilibrium productivity cuto¤ Next I show that the existence
of the equilibrium productivity cuto¤ zV;t requires a cross-country asymmetry in the cost
of e¤ective labor, so that some of the Northern rms will always maintain an incentive to
produce o¤shore.
I begin by re-writing the expressions for prots obtained from domestic and o¤shore
production as dD;t(z) = Bt

wt
Zt
1 
z 1 and dV;t(z) = Bt


wtQt
Zt
1 
z 1, respectively,
where Bt  1


1 
1 
Ct is a measure of the market size in the North. In Figure 2, I plot
the corresponding prots as functions of the idiosyncratic productivity parameter z 1 over
the support interval [zmin;1). The vertical intercepts represent the annualized value of the
sunk entry cost for the case of domestic production ( fE wtZt ), and the annualized value of
the sunk entry cost plus the period-by-period xed cost for the case of o¤shore production
( fE wtZt   fV
wtQt
Zt
), where parameter   1 (1 )(1 ) .
The existence of equilibrium productivity cuto¤ zV;t requires that the following con-
dition holds every period: The prot function for o¤shoring must be steeper than that
for domestic production, i.e. slope fdV;t(z)g > slope fdD;t(z)g. When the condition is
met, o¤shoring generates greater prots than domestic production for the Northern rms
with idiosyncratic productivity z along the upper range of the support interval. The slope
inequality is equivalent to:

wtQt=Zt
wt=Zt
< 1; (1.10)
which implies that the e¤ective wage in the South must be su¢ ciently lower than that in
the North, so that the di¤erence covers the iceberg trade cost ( > 1) and thus provides an
14
incentive for some of the Northern rms to produce o¤shore every period.22
Figure 2. Existence of equilibrium productivity cuto¤ zV ; t.
1.2.3 Firms Serving the Foreign Market: Exports
In this section I describe the problem of the exporting rms originating in the North. The
equations for the Southern rms are similar unless indicated otherwise. Variables for the
Southern economy are marked with the (*) superscript.
Firms in each economy have the option to serve the foreign market through exports, as
in GM2005. Thus, the Northern exporting rm with idiosyncratic productivity z uses an
amount of domestic labor lt in the production of its nal good variety yH;t(z) exported the
22See Appendix 9. A second condion, necessary to avoid the corner solution when all rms would pro-
duce o¤shore, is that the productivity cuto¤ must be larger than the lower bound of the support interval:
zV;t > zmin: This condition is equivalent to dD;t(zmin) < fE wtZt + fV
wtQt
Zt
; which shows that the rm
with idiosyncratic productivity equal to the lower-bound level zmin would obtain zero prots from domestic
production and negative prots from o¤shore production.
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Southern market:23
yH;t(z) = Ztzlt: (1.11)
Serving the foreign market involves a period-by-period xed exporting cost equal to fH
units of Northern e¤ective labor as well as the iceberg trade cost . The prot maximization
problem of the Northern exporting rms generates the following price and prot functions:
H;t(z) =

   1
wtQ
 1
t
Ztz
; (1.12)
dH;t(z) =
1

H;t(z)
1 CtQt   fH
wt
Zt
: (1.13)
The model implies that every period t, the Northern rms with idiosyncratic labor produc-
tivity above a certain cuto¤ (z > zH;t) nd it protable to export to the Southern market
at the same time with serving their domestic market (North). They obtain prots that are
large enough to cover both the xed cost and the iceberg trade cost of exporting. As in
GM2005, the rm with the idiosyncratic labor productivity equal to the cuto¤ obtains zero
23 I view exporting as a special case within a broader framework, in which I allow for rms to serve the
foreign market by using a mix of domestic and foreign inputs in production. In this framework, production
is described by the following Cobb-Douglas specication:
yH;t(z) =

Ztzlt

 
Zt zl

t
1  
1 
;
where a larger  accounts for a smaller content of Southern inputs used in the production of nal goods
sold for consumption in the Southern market. In this paper I nest the special case with endogenous exports
in GM2005 under the calibration  = 1. Alternatively, I would nest the case in which rms serving the
Southern market produce exclusively through their foreign a¢ liates (as in Contessi, 2006) by setting  = 0.
In the latter case, production in the South through horizontal FDI allows rms to avoid the trade cost  by
using local inputs. Using the lHôpital rule, lim
!0

1


= lim
!1
1= = lim
!1
e(1=) ln  = e
lim
!1

ln 


l0Ho^pital
=
e
lim
!1
(1=)
= e0 = 1: The corresponding price and prot functions are H;t(z) =

 1

 wtQ
 1
t
Ztz
 
wt
Zt z
1 
and dH;t(z) = 1H;t(z)
1 CtQt   fH

wt
Zt
 
wtQt
Zt
1 
:
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prots from exporting. Thus, the time-variant productivity cuto¤ zH;t is obtained as:
zH;t = inf fz j dH;t(zV;t) > 0g : (1.14)
1.2.4 Households
Financial autarky Households in each country maximize the expected lifetime utility
(as a function of consumption) and provide labor inelastically:
max
fBt+1; xt+1g
"
Et
1X
s=t
s t
C1 s
1  
#
; (1.15)
subject to the budget constraint:
(evt + edt)Ntxt + (1 + rt)Bt + wtL > evt (Nt +NE;t)xt+1 +Bt+1 + Ct; (1.16)
where  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, Ct is the consumption basket, and  > 0
is the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.
The representative Northern household starts every period t with mutual fund share
holdings xt (whose market value is evtNt) and real bond holdings Bt. It receives dividend
income edtNt on the mutual fund stocks (equal to the prot of the average rm times the
number of rms) in proportion with its stock holdings xt. It also receives interest rtBt on
bond holdings, and labor income equal to the real wage wt for the amount of labor L = 1
that it supplies inelastically. The Northern household purchases two types of assets every
period. First, it purchases xt+1 shares in a mutual fund of Northern rms that includes:
(i) Nt rms already producing at time t, either domestically or o¤shore, and (ii) NE;t new
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rms that enter the domestic market in period t. Each share is worth its market value evt,
equal to the net present value of the expected stream of future prots of the average rm.
Second, the household buys the risk-free bond Bt+1 denominated in units of the Northern
consumption basket. (Bond holdings play a role in the extended model with international
trade in bonds, which I present in the Appendix.)24
In addition, households purchase the consumption basket Ct, which includes varieties of
nal goods produced by Northern rms (! 2 
NNt ) either domestically or o¤shore; it also
includes the imports of nal good varieties produced by the Southern rms (! 2 
SNt ):
Ct =
266666664
zV;tZ
zmin
yD;t(!)
 1
 d!
| {z }
Domestic production
+
1Z
zV;t
yV;t(!)
 1
 d!
| {z }
O¤shore production
+
1Z
zH;t
yH;t(!)
 1
 d!
| {z }

SNt
377777775

 1
; (1.17)
where  > 1 is the symmetric elasticity of substitution across nal good varieties. I use the
home consumption basket Ct as the numeraire good, and dene the real price of variety z in
units of the Northern consumption basket as t(z) = pt(z)=Pt. Thus, the the consumption-
based price index in the North is:25
1 =
Z
t(!)
1 d!
 1
1 
; ! 2 
NNt [ 
SNt : (1.18)
24 In the model with complete nancial autarky (i.e. stocks in the mutual fund and bonds are not traded
across countries), the equilibrium conditions for stock and bond holdings are xt = xt+1 = 1 and Bt = Bt+1 =
0.
25 If pt(z) denotes the price of each variety z, the price index of the home consumption basket is
Pt =
R
pt(!)
1 d!
 1
1  for ! 2 
NNt [ 
SNt . The demand for each variety of nal goods z is
yt(z) = (pt(z)=Pt)
  Ct.
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The rst-order conditions generate the Euler equations for bonds and stocks:
C t =  (1 + rt+1)Et
h
C t+1
i
; (1.19)
evt = (1  )Et "Ct+1
Ct
 
(edt+1 + evt+1)# : (1.20)
1.2.5 Firm Entry and Exit
Following GM2005, rm entry takes place every period. In the North, rm entry requires
a sunk entry cost equal to fE units of Northern e¤ective labor, which reects the cost of
starting a business in the rmscountry of origin.26 Potential entrants become aware of
their idiosyncratic labor productivity z only after entering the market. After paying the
sunk entry cost, each rm is randomly assigned an idiosyncratic labor productivity z which
is drawn independently from a common distribution G(z) with support over the interval
[zmin;1), and which the rm keeps for the entire duration of its life.
The potential entrant rms are forward looking and correctly anticipate their expected
post-entry value evt, which is given by the expected stream of future prots edt and by the
exogenous probability  with which they receive an exit-inducing shock every period. The
forward iteration of the Euler equation for stocks (1.20) generates the expression for the
expected post-entry value of potential entrants:
evt = Et( 1X
s=t+1
[(1  )]s t

Cs
Ct
  eds) : (1.21)
In equilibrium, rm entry takes place until the value of the average rm evt equals the sunk
26Or fEwt=Zt units of the consumption basket in the North.
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entry cost fE wtZt , both expressed in units of the Northern consumption basket:
evt = fEwt
Zt
: (1.22)
The NE;t rms entering at time t do not produce until period t+1. Irrespective of their
idiosyncratic productivity, all rms - including the new entrants - are subject to a random
exit shock that occurs with probability  at the end of every period after production has
taken place. Thus, the law of motion for the number of producing rms is:
Nt+1 = (1  )(Nt +NE;t); (1.23)
where Nt = Nt;D + Nt;V consists of rms producing either domestically or o¤shore every
period.
1.3 Solving the Model with Firm Heterogeneity
A necessary step in solving the model with rm heterogeneity is to derive analytical solutions
for the average productivity, prices and prots of the representative Northern rms that
produce domestically and o¤shore. This section also provides the expressions for aggregate
accounting and the balance of international payments that close the model with o¤shoring.
1.3.1 Average Firm Productivity Levels
Firms serving the domestic market I dene two average labor productivity levels:
(1) the average productivity ezD;t of the Northern rms producing domestically, and (2)
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the average productivity ezV;t of the Northern rms producing o¤shore. I illustrate them in
Figure 3, in which I plot the density of the rm-specic labor productivity levels z over the
support interval [zmin;1).
Figure 3. Average labor productivities for rms serving the domestic
market through domestic (ezD; t) and o¤shore (ezV ; t) production
Every period t, there are ND;t of the relatively less productive Northern rms (z < zV;t)
that choose to produce domestically; their average productivity is ezD;t. The remaining
NV;t are the relatively more productive Northern rms (z > zV;t) that choose to produce
o¤shore;27 their average productivity is ezV;t.28 Since the rm-specic labor productivities z
are random draws from a common distribution G(z) with density g(z), I write the average
27The total number of Northern rms is Nt = NV;t +ND;t:
28The di¤erence between ezV;t and zV;t is that the former is the average productivity of o¤shoring rms,
whereas the latter is the cuto¤ productivity above which rms produce o¤shore.
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idiosyncratic productivities of the Northern rms producing domestically and o¤shore as:
ezD;t =
24 1
G(zV;t)
zV;tZ
zmin
z 1g(z)dz
35
1
 1
and ezV;t =
264 1
1 G(zV;t)
1Z
zV;t
z 1g(z)dz
375
1
 1
:
(1.24)
Pareto-distributed rm productivity Following Melitz (2003) and GM2005, I as-
sume that the rm-specic labor productivity draws z are Pareto-distributed, with p.d.f.
g(z) = kzmin=z
k+1 and c.d.f. G(z) = 1   (zmin=z)k over the support interval [zmin;1):
Using this assumption, I derive analytical solutions for the average productivities of the
two representative Northern rms producing domestically and o¤shore as functions of the
time-variant productivity cuto¤ zV;t:29
ezD;t = zminzV;t
24zk ( 1)V;t   zk ( 1)min
zkV;t   zkmin
35 1 1 and ezV;t = zV;t; (1.25)
where the productivity cuto¤30 is zV;t = zmin(Nt=NV;t)(1=k), and the parameters are  h
k
k ( 1)
i 1
 1
and k >    1.31 Since o¤shoring takes place one-way, from North to South,
the Southern rms serve their domestic market exclusively through domestic production,
and have a constant average productivity ezD = zmin:
29 I provide their derivation in the Appendix.
30Parameter k reects the dispersion of the productivity draws: A relatively larger k implies a smaller
dispersion and a higher concentration of productivities z towards the lower productivity bound zmin. Also,
the condition k >    1 ensures that the variance of rm size is nite, given the average productivities of
the rms producing domestically and o¤shore.
31The shares of Northern rms producing domestically and o¤shore, respectively, are ND;t=Nt = G (zV;t)
and NV;t=Nt = 1   G (zV;t), where the total number of Northern rms in every period is Nt = ND;t +
NV;t. I use the functional form for the Pareto c.d.f. in order to derive the productivity cuto¤ as zV;t =
zmin(Nt=NV;t)
(1=k):
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Exporting rms Under the assumption of Pareto-distributed productivity draws, I
use the average productivity levels of the exporting rms originating in each economy as
dened in GM2005:
ezH;t = zmin Nt
NH;t
1=k
and ezH;t = zmin
 
ND;t
NH;t
!1=k
: (1.26)
1.3.2 Average Prices and Prots
After deriving the average productivities, I re-write the model in terms of three representa-
tive Northern rms: one producing domestically, another producing o¤shore (each serving
the Northern market), and a third rm producing domestically and exporting to the South-
ern market. Since the Southern rms do not produce o¤shore (due to the wage asymmetry
across countries), there are only two representative Southern rms: one producing domes-
tically for the local market, and the other exporting to the North.
Table 1. Average prices and prots
Production Destination Prices Prots
Domestic Domestic eD;t =  1 wtZ etzD;t edD;t = 1  eD;t1  Ct
eD;t =  1 wtZt ezD;t edD;t = 1  eD;t1  Ct
O¤shore Domestic eV;t =  1 wtQtZt ezV;t edV;t = 1  eV;t1  Ct   fV wtQtZt
Domestic Export eH;t =  1wtQ 1tZtezH;t edH;t = 1  eH;t1  CtQt   fH wtZt
eH;t =  1 wtQtZt ezH;t edH;t = 1  eH;t1  CtQ 1t   fH wtZt
I use the average rm productivities dened above to write the prices and prots asso-
23
ciated with each representative rm, as shown in Table 1.
Endogenous productivity cuto¤ for o¤shoring Using the Pareto assumption and
the property that the Northern rm at the productivity cuto¤ zV;t is indi¤erent about the
location of production, I write the link between the prots of the two representative rms
producing domestically and o¤shore for the Northern market as:32
edV;t = k
k   (   1)

zV;tezD;t
 1 edD;t +    1
k   (   1)fV

wt
Zt
wtQt
Zt
1 
: (1.27)
The productivity cuto¤ for exports is also endogenous, as in GM2005. Using the prop-
erty that the rm at the productivity cuto¤ zH;t obtains zero prots from exporting, the
average prots from exports are:
edH;t =    1
k   (   1)fH
wt
Zt
; and edH;t =    1k   (   1)fH wtZt : (1.28)
Endogenous productivity cuto¤ for o¤shoring The consumption price index in
the Northern economy is an expression of the average prices of goods produced domestically
and o¤shore by the Northern rms, as well as of the average price of goods imported from
the South:
1 = ND;t
 eD;t1  +NV;t  eV;t1  +NH;t  eH;t1  : (1.29)
Due to the relative wage asymmetry, there is no representative Southern rm producing
o¤shore. The consumption price index in the South includes only the average price of goods
32See the Appendix for the derivation.
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produced domestically by Southern rms, and that of goods imported from the North:
1 = ND;t
 eD;t1  +NH;t  eH;t1  : (1.30)
Total prots The total prots of the Northern rms include the average prots from
domestic production, from o¤shore production, and from exporting:
Nt edt = ND;t edD;t +NV;t edV;t +NH;t edH;t: (1.31)
The total prots of the Southern rms combine the prots from domestic production and
from exports:
ND;t edt = ND;t edD;t +NH;t edH;t: (1.32)
1.3.3 Aggregate Accounting and the Balance of International Payments
I use value added as a measure of aggregate income in order to avoid the double-counting
of o¤shore production conducted by the Northern rms in the South. O¤shore production
is measured as the wage bill of Southern workers, and belongs to the aggregate income of
the Southern economy. Thus, aggregate income is the sum of the wage bill and the amount
of stock dividends that households in each economy obtain every period:
Yt = wt +Nt edt and Y t = wt +ND;t edt : (1.33)
Under nancial autarky in the markets for both bonds and stocks (i.e. Bt+1 = Bt = 0
and xt+1 = xt = 1 in equilibrium), aggregate accounting implies that households spend
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their income from labor and stock holdings on consumption and investment in new rms:
Ct +NE;tevt = Yt and Ct +NE;tevt = Y t : (1.34)
Finally, the real exchange rate Qt is determined by the balanced current account condi-
tion for the Northern economy, which reects the corresponding balance for the South:
CAAutarkyt = NH;t
 eH;t1  CtQt| {z }
Exports
+ NV;t edV;t| {z }
Repatriated prots
 NV;t
 eV;t1  Ct| {z }
O¤shore value added
  NH;t
 eH;t1  Ct| {z }
Imports from Southern rms
Under nancial autarky, the balanced current account condition (CAAutarkyt = 0) implies
that the sum of (a) exports by the Northern rms to the South and (b) repatriated prots
of o¤shore a¢ liates must equal the sum of (c) the value of imports from o¤shore a¢ liates
and (d) imports of nal good varieties produced by the Southern rms.
1.3.4 Model Summary
As shown in Appendix A.1, the baseline model with nancial autarky for the Northern
economy can be summarized by 16 equations in 16 endogenous variables: Nt, ND;t, NV;t,
NH;t, NE;t, edt, edD;t, edV;t, edH;t, ezD;t, ezV;t, ezH;t, evt, rt, wt and Ct. As the Southern rms do not
o¤shore to the high-wage North, the Southern economy is described by only 11 equations
in 11 endogenous variables: There are no Southern counterparts for Nt, NV;t, edV;t, ezD;t
and ezV;t. In particular, the average labor productivity of the representative Southern rm
producing for the domestic market (ezD) is constant over time. Variables ND;t, rt, Nt and
rt are predetermined.
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1.4 Calibration
I use a standard quarterly calibration by setting the subjective rate of time discount  = 0:99
to match an average annualized interest rate of 4 percent. The coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion is  = 2. Following GM2005, I set the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution at
 = 3:8, a value which corresponds to the U.S. plant and macro trade data. Although the
resulting markup of 35.71 percent over the marginal cost might appear too large compared
to the standard macroeconomic literature, its magnitude must be considered in the context
of the sunk entry cost that places a wedge between the rmsmarginal and average cost.
I also calibrate the probability of rm exit  = 0:025 to match the annual 10 percent job
destruction in the U.S.
As summarized in Table 2, I calibrate the xed costs of o¤shoring (fV ) and exporting
(fH and fH) as well as the Pareto distribution parameter (k) so that the model matches
the importance of o¤shoring and trade for the Mexican economy, as illustrated by four
empirical moments: (1) Maquiladoras value added represents approximately 20 percent
of Mexicos manufacturing GDP (INEGI, 2008), as compared to 25 percent in the model;
(2) Maquiladoras exports represent approximately half of Mexicos total exports (Bergin,
Feenstra, and Hanson, 2008), as compared to 60 percent in the model; (3) Employment in the
maquiladora sector accounts for approximately 25 percent of Mexicos total manufacturing
employment (Bergin, Feenstra, and Hanson, 2008), as compared to 22 percent in the model;
(4) Total imports represent the equivalent of 33 percent of Mexicos GDP (INEGI, 2008),
as compared to 32 percent in the model. To this end, I set fV = 0:0057 (the xed cost of
o¤shoring for Northern rms), fH = 0:032 and fH = 0:018 (the xed costs of exporting
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for Northern and Southern rms, respectively), as well as k = 4:2 (the Pareto distribution
coe¢ cient).33 Without loss of generality, I set the lower bound of the support interval for
rm-specic productivities in the North and the South at zmin = zmin = 1.
In order to derive an asymmetric steady state in which the cost of e¤ective labor is
relatively lower in the South, I set the sunk entry cost - which reects the regulation of
starting a business in the rms country of origin - to be larger in the South (fE = 4fE ,
while setting fE = 1 without loss of generality).34 In turn, the relatively lower number of
rms in steady state generates a lower labor demand and wage in the South. The calibration
reects the considerable variation in the cost of starting a business across countries: the
monetary cost is 3.3 times higher in Mexico than in the U.S. or Canada; it is 6.2 times
higher in Hungary than in the U.K. (World Bank, 2007; see Appendix 5). The asymmetric
sunk entry costs, along with the trade iceberg cost ( = 1:3) and the values for fV , fH and
fH reported above, generate a steady state value for the terms of labor that is less than one
(TOL = 0:76). Thus, the steady state cost of e¤ective labor in the South, dened as the
real wage divided by the aggregate productivity level, is 76 percent of the corresponding
value in the North. The calibration provides an incentive for the Northern rms to produce
33 In the model with exports only, I set fH = 0:0260 and fH = 0:0226 so that the fraction of Northern
exporting rms (10 percent) and that of Southern exporting rms (63 percent) match the corresponding
steady state values in the model with o¤shoring.
34The asymmetric sunk entry cost is one method that generates di¤erent e¤ective wages across countries.
The same result would be achieved with at least two other modeling devices: (1) Introduce a cross-country
asymmetry in the size of rms (rather than in their number) through the price elasticity of demand. With
identical sunk entry costs and equal average labor productivity levels in the two economies, rms in the
economy with the lower price elasticity of demand charge relatively higher markups and produce relatively
less ouput; in turn, the lower labor demand generates lower wages. (2) Another way to generate di¤erent rm
sizes across countries, similar to the one I use in this paper, would be to allow for multi-product rms and
sunk costs of creating new product varieties. While keeping the sunk rm entry costs equal across countries,
there will be fewer varieties per rm and lower demand for labor in the economy with the higher sunk cost
of creating a new variety.
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o¤shore in steady state.
Table 2. Baseline model with o¤shoring: calibration
fE = 1 Sunk rm entry cost, North k = 4:2 Pareto distribution coe¢ cient
fE = 4fE Sunk rm entry cost, South  = 0:99 Standard quarterly calibration
fV = 0:0057 Fixed cost of o¤shoring  = 2 CRRA coe¢ cient
fH = 0:0320 Fixed cost of exporting, North  = 0:025 Probability of rm exit
fH = 0:0180 Fixed cost of exporting, South  = 3:8 Elasticity of substitution
The resulting steady-state fraction of the Northern rms that use inputs imported from
their o¤shore a¢ liates (NV =N) is 1:4 percent; the fraction of exporting rms (NH=N) is
10:1 percent.35 Since I model o¤shoring in an asymmetric two-country framework that
abstracts from exchanges between U.S. rms and the rest of the world (other than Mexico),
the steady state values reported above are less than their empirical counterparts. In the
data, approximately 14 percent of the U.S. rms (other than domestic wholesalers) used
imports from both Mexico and the rest of the world in 1997 (Bernard, Jensen, Redding and
Schott, 2007),36 out of which intra-rm imports (as opposed to arms length transactions)
represented half of the total (Bardhan and Jafee, 2004). Approximately 21 percent of the
U.S. manufacturing plants were exporters in 1992 (Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum,
2003).
The calibration also implies that the steady-state share of Northern expenditure on the
varieties produced by Northern rms domestically (66.0 percent) - rms which are relatively
35 In the Southern economy, the ratio of exporting rms in the total is 63 percent.
36The value would understate the fraction of plants that use imported inputs if the importing rms tend
to operate multiple plants manufacturing multiple product varieties.
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less productive than the average - is less than their fraction in the total number of varieties
available in the North (89.2 percent). In contrast, since the o¤shore varieties are produced
by the relatively more productive Northern rms, their market share (21.2 percent) is more
than their fraction in the total number of varieties available in the North (1.2 percent).37
1.5 Results
1.5.1 O¤shoring Dynamics
Under nancial autarky, I log-linearize the model with o¤shore production around the steady
state and compute the impulse responses to a transitory 1 percent increase in aggregate
productivity in the North. I assume that productivity is described by the univariate process
logZt+1 =  logZt + ut, with the persistence parameter  = 0:9.
O¤shoring at the intensive margin Figure 4 shows the impulse responses of the
model with o¤shoring (solid line), and contrasts them with the impulse responses of the
benchmark model with endogenous exports and no o¤shoring as in GM2005 (dotted line).
For each variable, the horizontal axis illustrates quarters after the initial shock, and the
vertical axis shows the percent deviations from the original steady state in each quarter.
On impact, the 1 percent increase in aggregate labor productivity in the North generates
an equal increase in the real wage wt. The increased demand for the nal good varieties
already produced o¤shore causes a sudden increase in o¤shoring along its intensive margin.
As a result, the real wage in the South (wt ) and the terms of labor

TOLt =
Qtwt =Zt
wt=Zt

37The market share of Southern varieties - produced by Southern rms that are relatively less productive
than the Northern exporters - is 61.66 percent in the South. This is less than their fraction in the total
number of varieties available in the South (62.77 percent).
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spike upward on impact: Since the increase in aggregate labor productivity in the North
is not replicated in the South, on impact there is excess demand for the Southern units
of e¤ective labor. Therefore, the number of Northern rms that produce o¤shore (NV;t)
declines on impact due to: (1) the increase in the cost of producing o¤shore, and (2) the
increase in the xed cost of relocation, both of which are sensitive to the cost of e¤ective
labor in the South.
O¤shoring at the extensive margin Over the business cycle, as aggregate labor
productivity in the North persists above the initial steady state, the larger market size
encourages rm entry, which causes the number of Northern rms (Nt) to increase gradually
over time (Figure 4). The rising number of incumbent rms causes an increase in labor
demand in the North, and thus leads to a gradual appreciation of the cost of e¤ective labor
in the North relative to that in the South in the medium run (as shown by the decline
of TOLt below the initial steady state). Following the appreciation of the terms of labor,
more of the Northern rms have an incentive to relocate production to the South. Hence,
following the initial drop, the number of Northern rms that relocate production to the
South (NV;t) rises above the original steady state 4 quarters after the shock (i.e. o¤shoring
increases along its extensive margin).
The initial upward spike in the Southern real wage, caused by the increased demand
for nal good varieties that were already produced o¤shore when the shock occurred, is
followed by a hump-shaped increase in the Southern wage which occurs as more Northern
rms relocate production o¤shore over the business cycle. Thus, the gradual increase in
o¤shoring along its extensive margin places additional upward pressure on the Southern
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wage and causes the terms of labor to appreciate by less (TOL to decrease by less) in the
medium run relative to the benchmark model with exports only. As a result, the increase
in labor demand in the North, caused by rm entry, and subsequently the increase in labor
demand in the South, caused by o¤shoring, enhance the cross-country co-movement of wages
and aggregate incomes relative to the benchmark model with exports only.
Figure 4. Endogenous o¤shoring (continuos line) vs. exports only (dotted line),
impulse responses to a transitory 1 percent increase in aggregate productivity in the North
1.5.2 Real Exchange Rate Dynamics
Average prices and product variety In this section I analyze the models predic-
tions for the dynamics of relative prices in response to aggregate shocks. Due to the existence
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of endogenous product variety in the model, I use the consumer price index (CPI)-based real
exchange rate fQt = "tfP t = ePt as the theoretical counterpart to the empirical real exchange
rate, since the average prices ePt and fP t best represent the corresponding empirical CPI
levels, as discussed in Broda and Weinstein (2003) and GM2005. To this end, I break down
the welfare-based price indexes Pt and P t into (a) components reecting average prices ( ePt
and fP t ) and (b) components reecting product variety:38
Pt =
 
ND;t +NV;t +N

H;t
 1
1  ePt and P t =  ND;t +NH;t 11  fP t (1.35)
Thus, I write the CPI-based real exchange rate as:39
fQt1  =  ND;t +NV;t +NH;t
ND;t +NH;t
!
ND;t

TOLtezD;t
1 
+NH;t

tezH;t
1 
ND;t

1ezD;t
1 
+NV;t

 tTOLtezV;t
1 
+NH;t
h
 tTOLtezH;t
i1  ;
(1.36)
where the terms of labor TOLt =
Qtwt =Zt
wt=Zt
measure the cost of e¤ective labor in the South
relative to the North; the iceberg trade costs  t and t (which I allow to vary over time)
a¤ect imports into the North and South, respectively. The expression nests the model with
endogenous exports of GM2005; I shut down o¤shoring and revisit the GM2005 case when
NV;t = 0.
38Variable ND;t represents the number of nal good varieties produced by Northern rms domestically
and sold in the Northern market; NV;t represents varieties produced by Northern rms o¤shore and sold in
the North; and NH;t reects varieties produced by Southern rms and exported to the North. It follows thatfQt1  = ND;t+NV;t+NH;tN
D;t
+N
H;t

Q1 t :
39The CPI-based real exchange rate fQt deviates from the welfare-based real exchange rate Qt = "tP t =Pt
due to cross-country di¤erences in product variety. As discussed in GM2005, an appreciation of the CPI-
based real exchange rate fQt (i.e. an increase in the CPI in North relative to that in South) may be o¤set
by the increase in product variety in North (ND;t + NV;t + N

H;t) relative to South (N

D;t + NH;t), so that
the welfare-based real exchange rate Qt depreciates (i.e. despite the increase in average prices, consumers
derive higher utility due to the larger product variety).
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Analytical results While allowing for o¤shore production and nesting the benchmark
model with exports only as in GM2005, I log-linearize (1.36) to obtain:40
beQt = [sD   sV + sD   1][TOLt + (C1)
+ (sD   sV )bezD;t + sV bezV;t   (1  )sV b t + (C2)
+ (1  sD)
bezH;t   b t  (1  sD)bezH;t   bt+ (C3)
+
1
   1

sV  
NV
ND +NV +N

H
 bNV;t   bNH;t+ (C4)
+
1
   1
2664

ND
ND+NH
  sD
 bND;t   bNH;t 
 

ND
ND+NV +N

H
  (sD   sV )
 bND;t   bNH;t
3775 ; (C5)
where parameter sD is the steady-state share of spending in the North on goods produced by
Northern rms both domestically and o¤shore; sV is the steady-state share of spending in the
North only on goods produced by Northern rms o¤shore (I revisit GM2005 when sV = 0);
sD is the steady-state share of spending in the South on goods produced by Southern
rms domestically. The calibration of the model ensures that: (a) (sD   sV ) + sD > 1,
as the domestically-produced varieties represent more than 50 percent of the consumption
spending in each country; (b)

ND
ND+NV +N

H
  (sD   sV )

> 0 and

ND
ND+NH
  sD

> 0; i.e.
the market shares of varieties produced domestically by the less productive rms are smaller
than their fraction in the total number of varieties; and (c) nally,

sV   NVND+NV +NH

> 0,
i.e. the market share of varieties produced o¤shore by the more productive Northern rms
is larger than their fraction in the total number of varieties available in the North. Thus,
the model implies that the more productive rms are larger and have larger market shares
40See the Appendix for the derivation.
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than their less productive counterparts, which is in line with the empirical evidence in Kurz
(2006).
The log-linearized form of (1.36) outlines ve channels (labeled C1-C5 in the log-
linearized expression above) through which the CPI-based real exchange rate is a¤ected
by: (1) changes in the price of non-tradable goods induced by uctuations in the terms
of labor ([TOLt); (2) changes in the price of o¤shored goods reecting uctuations in the
average productivity of o¤shoring rms
bezV;t and in the magnitude of trade costs (b t); (3)
changes in the relative import prices triggered by uctuations in the average productivity of
Northern exporters (bezH;t) relative to that of their Southern counterparts (bezH;t); (4) changes
in the relative availability of varieties produced by Northern o¤shoring rms ( bNV;t) relative
to that of Southern exported varieties ( bNH;t); and (5) changes in the relative availability of
domestic varieties ( bND;t) relative to that of Southern exported varieties ( bNH;t).
Impulse responses I nd that, relative to the benchmark model with endogenous
exports in GM2005, o¤shoring dampens the appreciation of the real exchange rate following
an aggregate productivity improvement in the North. Specically, the e¤ect occurs through
channels C1 (the price of non-traded goods), C3 (the relative import prices) and C4 (the
availability of o¤shored varieties vs. Southern imported varieties). The impulse responses
for the variables of interest are outlined in Figure 5; their impact on the real exchange rate
is described next.
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Figure 5. Endogenous o¤shoring (continuos line) vs. exports only (dotted line),
impulse responses to a transitory 1 percent increase in aggregate productivity in the North
(C1) Changes in the price of non-traded goods. In the benchmark model with
endogenous exports and no o¤shoring, a productivity increase in the North encourages
rm entry and leads to the appreciation of the terms of labor in the medium run (i.e.
TOLt decreases). In turn, this causes the average price of non-traded goods in the North
to increase relative to that in the South, and thus leads to the appreciation of the real
exchange rate (i.e. fQt decreases).
In my model, o¤shoring dampens the appreciation of the real exchange rate taking e¤ect
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through this channel in two ways: (a) O¤shoring reduces the share of non-traded goods in
total spending (sD   sV ) as sV > 0; (b) O¤shoring also dampens the appreciation of the
terms of labor relative to the benchmark model with exports only (i.e. TOLt decreases by
less), as the relocation of production o¤shore transfers upward pressure from the domestic
wage onto the foreign one.
(C2) Changes in the price of o¤shored goods. On impact, due to the initial spike
in the Southern wage (caused by the increase in o¤shoring along its intensive margin), the
number of o¤shoring rms declines and their average productivity rises. In the medium
run, however, due to the appreciation of the cost of e¤ective labor in the North relative to
the South, o¤shoring becomes a more protable option. Thus, the average productivity ezV;t
of o¤shoring rms declines and their average price increases. O¤shoring contributes to the
appreciation of the real exchange rate through this channel.
Exogenous policy changes can also a¤ect the price of goods produced o¤shore. For
instance, tari¤ cuts for the varieties of nal goods produced o¤shore (i.e. a policy measure
reected by a decrease in  t) would dampen the appreciation of the CPI-based real exchange
rate.
(C3) Changes in relative import prices. In the benchmark model with exports
only, the appreciation of the terms of labor reduces the export protability of the Northern
rms relative to that of their Southern counterparts. In turn, the average productivity of
the surviving Northern exporters (ezH;t) increases relative to that of the Southern exportersezH;t, and the average price of the Southern imports to decline relative to that of the
Northern imports. This causes the real exchange rate to appreciate.
O¤shoring reverses this e¤ect. The upwards pressure on the Southern wage causes
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the export protability of the Southern rms to decline, and thus the productivity of the
surviving Southern exporters to increase by more than that of their Northern counterparts.
In contrast to the benchmark model with exports only, o¤shoring causes the average price
of the Northern imports to decline relative to the average price of the Southern imports, a
result which dampens the appreciation of the real exchange rate through import prices.
(C4) Expenditure switching from imports towards o¤shored goods. Following
an increase in aggregate productivity, o¤shoring puts upward pressure on the Southern
wage and reduces the competitiveness of the Southern exports. Thus, Northern consumers
switch their expenditure away from the increasingly less competitive Southern varieties
(NH;t decreases) and towards the relatively cheaper varieties produced by Northern rms
o¤shore (NV;t increases). The result dampens the appreciation of the real exchange rate in
the medium run. It is consistent with the empirical evidence that FDI inows in Mexico
between 1994 and 2002 were associated with the crowding out of domestic investment,
particulalrly in manufacturing (Gallagher and Zarsky, 2007).
(C5) Expenditure switching from imports towards domestic goods. Firm entry
in the North generates an increase in the number of domestic varieties (ND;t) relative to for-
eign imported varieties (NH;t) available to Northern consumers. In turn, consumers switch
their expenditures from imports towards the nal good varieties produced domestically by
the relatively less productive rms, and which are available at relatively higher average
prices. As in the model with exports only, this channel works towards the appreciation of
the real exchange rate.
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1.5.3 Empirical Moments: The Cyclicality of O¤shoring
In this section I show that o¤shore production in Mexicos maquiladora sector is pro-cyclical
with uctuations in the U.S. manufacturing output. The result is robust across several
indicators of o¤shoring: real value added, hours worked, and the number of establishments
in the maquiladora sector. The nding invites the construction of the model in which
o¤shore production is procyclical with domestic output, and in which the extensive margin
of o¤shoring (proxied empirically by the number of maquiladora establishments) plays a
special role in the cross-country transmission of business cycle uctuations.
The absence of local consumption and the dominant share of the U.S. as the destination
market make Mexicos maquiladora sector an appropriate empirical setup to study the
cyclicality of o¤shoring through vertical FDI. By denition, plants operating under Mexicos
maquiladora program import inputs, process them, and ship the resulting goods back to the
country of origin (Gruben, 2001). Although not all plants in Mexicos maquiladora sector
are owned by U.S. rms, most of the maquiladoras imported inputs (82 percent in 2001)
originate in the U.S. (Hausman and Haytko, 2003), and most of the maquiladoras value
added (roughly 90 percent) is exported to the U.S. (Burstein, Kurz, Tesar, 2007).
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Figure 6. Mexicos maquiladora and U.S. manufacturing industrial production
In panels A-C of Figure 6 (left) I plot the three maquiladora indicators (real value added,
total hours worked, and the number of establishments) against the industrial production
index for U.S. manufacturing.41 I apply the Baxter-King bandpass-lter to the quarterly
data in natural logs for the interval 1990:1-2006:4 in order to eliminate uctuations with
41 I use quarterly data for the interval between 1990:1 and 2006:4. The data for U.S. manufacturing (i.e.
seasonally adjusted real industrial production and the nominal hourly wage in manufacturing) is provided
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data
for Mexicos maquiladora sector (real value added, hours worked and the number of plants), at monthly
frequency and without seasonal adjustment, is provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía
(INEGI), Mexico. Thus, I take the quarterly averages of the Mexican data and perform the seasonal
adjustment using the X-12-ARIMA method of the U.S. Census Bureau.
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periodicity lower than 18 months and greater than eight years. The visual inspection of
the ltered data suggests that the U.S. economic expansion throughout the 1990s, as well
as the recession in 2001, were associated with similar developments in the maquiladora
sector. Also, the unconditional correlations summarized in panels D-F of Figure 6 (right)
suggest that o¤shoring to Mexico is procyclical with uctuations in U.S. manufacturing.
In particular, the correlations of o¤shoring with lags and leads of the U.S. manufacturing
index suggest that U.S. output is contemporaneously correlated with the number of hours
worked in the maquiladora sector, whereas it tends to lead the number of maquiladora
establishments (o¤shoring at the extensive margin) by at least three quarters.42
1.5.4 Theoretical Moments: The Cyclicality of O¤shoring
Theoretical measures of o¤shoring In this section I explore the ability of the
model to replicate the cyclicality of o¤shoring to Mexicos maquiladora industry relative to
uctuations in U.S. manufacturing. Using the usual demand and price functions under mo-
nopolistic competition for the varieties produced o¤shore, the total value added contributed
by o¤shore a¢ liates is:43
VAt = NV;t


   1
wt
Zt
 tTOLtezV;t
1 
Ct; with  > 1: (1.37)
42Although the interval of three quarters may appear too short for the creation of new o¤shore plants, this
nding must be considered in light of the fact that a considerable fraction of the non-U.S. owned maquiladora
plants represent arms length contractors that have the exibility to enter into and exit from outsourcing
relationships with U.S. rms over the business cycle.
43To compute moments, I deate the value added o¤shore by the average CPI in the North economy in
order to eliminate the variety e¤ect, i.e. (V A)R;t = Pt (V At) = ePt, where Pt = N 11 t ePt.
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In particular, I measure the extensive margin as the number of o¤shoring rms every period,
NV;t, and the intensive margin of o¤shoring as the real value added per o¤shoring rm,
VAR;t=NV;t:
The determinants of o¤shoring Using the expression for total value added in
(1.37), and holding xed the cost of e¤ective labor in the North, the following regular-
ities become apparent: (a) The value added o¤shore decreases with the terms of labor
(@VAt=@TOLt < 0): the higher is the cost of e¤ective labor in the South relative to the
North, the lower is the incentive to produce o¤shore; (b) O¤shoring decreases with the
trade cost a¤ecting the shipping of goods produced o¤shore back to the country of origin
(@VAt=@ t < 0), as the trade cost reects the magnitude of tari¤s, trade barriers, trans-
portation and insurance costs; (c) The value added o¤shore increases with the average
productivity of the o¤shoring rms (@VAt=@ezV;t > 0); (d) The value added o¤shore also de-
pends on the number of o¤shoring rms every period (@VAt=@NV;t > 0), which is inversely
related to the xed cost of o¤shoring (fV ). The predictions of the model are in line with the
empirical evidence provided by Hanson, Mataloni and Slaugther (2005) that the demand for
imported inputs by U.S. multinational rms increases when their o¤shore a¢ liates benet
from relatively lower low-skilled foreign wages and face lower trade costs.
The productivity process I introduce elastic labor supply in the baseline model
of o¤shoring under nancial autarky, using the standard calibration described above. I
also assume that aggregate productivity in the North and in the South follow a bivariate
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autoregressive process:
2664 logZt
logZt
3775 =
2664 Z ZZ
ZZ Z
3775
2664 logZt 1
logZt 1
3775+
2664 t
t
3775 ; (1.38)
and that the productivity shocks are the only source of international business cycles in the
model. Following Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992), I set the persistence parameters to
Z = Z = 0:906, and the spillover parameters to ZZ = ZZ = 0:088; the variance of
the shocks is 0:00852 and the covariance is 0:18728  10 4, values which correspond to a
correlation of innovations of 0:258.
Empirical vs. theoretical correlations Table 3 (panel A) provides the empirical
moments of o¤shoring from U.S. manufacturing to Mexicos maquiladora sector. It includes
the empirical correlations of the maquiladora indicators (total value added, the number of
establishments, and the total value added per establishment) with lags and leads of the
industrial production index for U.S. manufacturing.44 In addition, Figure 7 contrasts the
empirical moments with their theoretical counterparts generated by the model.
The model is successful in generating the procyclical variation in the total value added
o¤shore relative to uctuations in U.S. manufacturing output (Table 3). The contempora-
neous correlation between the o¤shore value added and manufacturing output in the North
(0:78) is remarkably close to the corresponding empirical correlation between the value
added in Mexicos maquiladora and U.S. manufacturing output (0:71).
44 I use the number of establishments in the maquiladora sector as an empirical proxy for the extensive
margin of o¤shoring, and the real value added per establishment as an empirical proxy for the intensive
margin.
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Table 3. Correlations of the maquiladora variables at t
with GDP in North (yR) at t+ j
j  8  6  4  2 0 +2 +4 +6 +8
A. Empirical correlations with lags and leads of U.S. manufacturing IP
Total V.A. 0:26 0:36 0:64 0:85 0:71 0:33 0:06  0:04  0:20
Establishments 0:34 0:62 0:82 0:77 0:49 0:22 0:05  0:14  0:37
V.A. per establ.  0:23  0:55  0:51 -0:16 0:08 0:06 0:00 0:16 0:30
B. Model with elastic labor supply under nancial autarky
Total V.A.  0:04 0:09 0:28 0:51 0:78 0:86 0:92 0:93 0:93
Firms 0:28 0:41 0:45 0:31  0:19 -0:16  0:11  0:07  0:03
V.A. per rm  0:29  0:40  0:43  0:26 0:27 0:25 0:20 0:16 0:12
Turning towards the extensive margin (Figure 7, panel A), the data shows a strong and
positive correlation between the number of maquiladora establishments and past U.S. man-
ufacturing output, a result which suggests that U.S. economic expansions tend to lead the
number of establishments by at least three quarters. The model is successful qualitatively
in capturing this pattern: the correlation between the number of o¤shoring rms and past
output in the North is positive (it peaks for Northern output lagged by four quarters). This
theoretical result is caused by the fact that, following a productivity improvement in the
North, o¤shoring increases along its extensive margin gradually over time. This pattern
mirrors the gradual appreciation of the Northern wage caused by domestic rm entry.
The model deviates from the empirical evidence in that the contemporaneous correlation
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between the number of o¤shoring rms and output in the North is negative (rather than
positive as in the data). On impact, the greater demand for Southern varieties causes
the Southern wage to spike upwards, thus reducing the number of o¤shoring rms and
generating a negative contemporaneous correlation between the number of o¤shoring rms
and Northern output. The introduction of a sunk o¤shoring cost in the model (to replace
the xed, per-period o¤shoring cost) would probably help address this issue.
Figure 7. Empirical vs. theoretical moments, nancial autarky with elastic labor supply
Regarding the intensive margin (Figure 7, panel B), the empirical correlation between
value added per maquiladora establishment and the past manufacturing output is negative
and statistically signicant. The model is successful in replicating this pattern as well:
The theoretical correlation between the intensive margin and past output in the North
is negative, as the value added per o¤shoring rm declines below its initial level several
quarters after the increase in aggregate productivity in the North (i.e. the number of
o¤shoring rms increases faster than the total value added o¤shore).
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1.5.5 Theoretical Moments: Cross-Country Co-movement of Output and
Consumption
In this section I examine the cross-country correlations of national income and consumption
generated by the model with o¤shoring relative to those from the model with exports
only. I also conduct sensitivity analysis for a range of possible values of the key model
parameters. Under the baseline framework of o¤shoring with nancial autarky, I assume
that productivity follows the bivariate autoregressive process in (1.38), and that aggregate
productivity shocks are the only sources of business cycle uctuations.
The productivity process For the matrix of persistence and spillover coe¢ cients
describing the bivariate productivity process, I use parameter values that are in line with
the international real business cycle literature. In particular, I focus on three cases: (1) Low
persistence (Z = Z = 0:906) and positive spillover parameters (ZZ = ZZ = 0:088) as
in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992, 1994); (2) Near-unit persistence (Z = Z = 0:999)
and zero spillovers as in Baxter and Farr (2005), with the variance of shocks 0:00852 and
covariance 0:18728  10 4 (correlation 0:26) as in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992); (3)
Asymmetric persistence (Z = 0:996 and Z = 0:951) and zero spillovers, with the shocks
being more volatile in Mexico than in the U.S. (i.e. variances 0:0139570 2 vs. 0:0050939 2)
and covariance 0:189810 4 (correlation 0:27), as estimated in Mandelman and Zlate (2008)
using total factor productivity (TFP) data for the U.S. and Mexico.
Table 4 shows the cross-country correlations of output Corr(YR; Y R) and consumption
Corr(CR; C

R), both for the model with o¤shoring (OFFSH) and for the benchmark model
with exports only as in GM2005 (NO OFFSH), for each of the three productivity speci-
46
cations described above.45 The results show that o¤shoring enhances the cross-country co-
movement of both output and consumption relative to the benchmark model with exports.
In particular, under the specication with near-unit persistence, the model with o¤shoring
under nancial autarky reverses the ranking of correlations (the cross-country correlation of
output exceeds that of consumption), thus addressing the output-consumption correlation
puzzle observed in the international real business cycle literature, as discussed in Backus,
Kehoe, and Kydland (1992, 1994).
Table 4. Output and consumption co-movement, nancial autarky
Calibration: (1) Low persistence, (2) High persistence, (3) Asymm. persistence,
Z = Z = 0:906 Z = Z = 0:999 Z = 0:996, Z = 0:951
Model: OFFSH NO OFFSH OFFSH NO OFFSH OFFSH NO OFFSH
Corr(YR; Y

R) 0.41 0.39 0.33 0.25 0.35 0.27
Corr(CR; C

R) 0.96 0.92 0.32 0.28 0.40 0.28
Sensitivity to ; ;  I also check the sensitivity of the cross-country correlations of
output and consumption to variations in the following parameters: (a) the persistence of the
bivariate autoregressive productivity process Z (with zero spillovers); (b) the elasticity of
substitution between the Northern and Southern nal good varieties ; and (c) the iceberg
trade cost  :
The results in Figure 8 show that the model with o¤shoring under nancial autarky
45 In order to compute the cross-country correlations of national income and consumption, I deate the
corresponding variables by the average price indices in each country. For instance, I deate the national
income in North as YR;t = PtYt= ePt, where Pt =  ND;t +NV;t +NH;t 1 1 ePt, since the empirical price
deators are best represented by the average price index ePt rather than the welfare-based price index Pt, as
discussed in Ghironi and Melitz (2005).
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generates larger cross-country correlations for both output and consumption relative to the
benchmark model with exports, a result which holds for a wide range of values for the
persistence parameter Z 2 [0:9; 1); the elasticity of substitution  2 [2:5; 4:1] and the
iceberg trade cost  2 [1:20; 1:33]. In particular, the cross-country correlation of output
decreases with the iceberg trade cost. Following a positive shock in the North, a larger trade
cost dampens the rms incentive to relocate production o¤shore, which leads to a lower
co-movement of output. The result is in line with the stylized facts documented in Burstein,
Kurz, and Tesar (2007), namely that countries involved in o¤shoring more intensely tend
to display higher correlations of manufacturing output.
Figure 8. O¤shoring under nancial autarky: co-movement sensitivity to Z ,  and  :
1.5.6 Theoretical Moments: O¤shoring and the Macroeconomy
Table 5 compares the theoretical moments generated by the model with o¤shore production
(panel B) and those generated by the model with exports only (and no o¤shoring) as in
GM2005 (panel C), under the baseline framework with inelastic labor supply augmented
with international trade in bonds. (The equations are described in Appendix 2.) The
empirical moments reported in the table are those computed in Mandelman and Zlate
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(2008) based on data for the U.S. and Mexico. I assume that productivity follows the
bivariate productivity process in 1.38, with the persistence parameter Z = Z = 0:906,
positive spillover parameters ZZ = ZZ = 0:088, the variance of shocks 0:00852 and the
covariance 0:18728  10 4; as in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992, 1994).
The results are largely similar to the ones in GM2005, with a couple of exceptions that
I discuss here. First, in the presence of o¤shoring, investment in the North becomes more
pro-cyclical with the Northern output. The correlation between output and investment in
the North (where the latter is measured as both total investment in rm entry and the
number of new entrant rms) is larger in the model with o¤shoring (0.89 for each) than in
the model with exports only (0.86 and 0.87, respectively). The result is due to the fact that,
when o¤shoring is available as a low-cost alternative to domestic production, the expected
protability of potential entrants in the Northern economy increases, and so do investment
and rm entry. In turn, the employment loss caused by o¤shoring is partially o¤set by the
employment gain generated by stronger rm entry in the presence of o¤shoring. (The result
is in line with the employment dynamics discussed in Appendix 3).
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Table 5. O¤shoring and the macroeconomy: empirical vs. theoretical moments
Absolute Relative Correlations Other
std. dev. std. dev. with output in: correlations
(a) Empirical moments
U.S. Mex U.S. Mex U.S. Mex
Output 1:24 2:32 1:00 1:00     yR; yR 0:16
Consumption 0:93 2:84 0:75 1:23 0:83 0:92 CR; CR -0:04
Investment 4:18 9:26 3:36 4:00 0:90 0:90 I; I 0:21
Trade Bal./GDP 0:33 1:47 0:26 1:47 -0:42 -0:72 CRCR
; QCPI -0:47
(b) O¤shoring, nancial integration
North South North South North South
Output 0:95 0:92 1:00 1:00     yR; yR 0:40
Consumption 0:64 0:60 0:67 0:65 0:91 0:87 CR; CR 0:97
Investment 3:23 4:33 3:40 4:71 0:89 0:82 evER ; evER  0:56
Firm entry 3:26 4:40 3:43 4:78 0:89 0:83 yR CRyR ;
evER
yR
0:97
Trade bal./GDP 0:10 0:11 0:11 0:12  0:12 0:20 CRCR ; QCPI 0:14
CPI-based RER 0:06 0:06 CCR ; Q 0:74
TBR; V AR  0:23
(c) No o¤shoring (GM2005), nancial integration
North South North South North South
Output 0:95 0:92 1:00 1:00     yR; yR 0:40
Consumption 0:65 0:61 0:68 0:66 0:91 0:89 CR; CR 0:96
Investment 3:64 3:83 3:83 4:16 0:86 0:84 evER ; evER  0:55
Firm entry 3:66 3:93 3:85 4:27 0:87 0:85 yR CRyR ;
evER
yR
0:97
Trade bal./GDP 0:11 0:11 0:12 0:12  0:10  0:04 CRCR ; QCPI  0:02
CPI-based RER 0:04 0:04 CCR ; Q 0:74
Second, the trade balance for the North becomes more counter-cyclical in the model
with o¤shoring than in the benchmark model with exports only: The correlation between
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the relative trade balance and output in the North is more negative with o¤shoring ( 0:12)
than with exports only ( 0:10). The correlation between the o¤shore value added and
the trade balance is also negative ( 0:23). The result is due to the fact that the imports
of o¤shored varieties contribute to the expanding trade decit that follows a productivity
increase in the North; also, the stronger domestic rm entry in the presence of o¤shoring
increases lending from the South to the North.
Nonetheless, when allowing for international trade in bonds, there is no notable increase
in the co-movement of output in the model with o¤shoring relative to the model with exports
only. The transfer of resources through lending towards the more productive Northern
economy (and the resulting decline in Southern output) o¤sets the enhanced co-movement
generated by o¤shoring.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper I study the way in which the relocation of production to other countries alters
the cross-country transmission of business cycles. In particular, I focus on the uctuations in
the extensive and intensive margins of o¤shoring (the number of rms and the value added
per rm, respectively) as separate transmission mechanisms, and analyze their impact on
output, wages and relative prices in the parent and the host country. Thus, my study adds
to the theoretical literature of macroeconomics and international trade that abstracts from
the business cycle dynamics of o¤shore production along its extensive and intensive margins.
In my model, o¤shore production is determined endogenously in the presence of domestic
rm entry and heterogeneity in labor productivity across rms. O¤shoring depends on the
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di¤erence between the domestic and foreign cost of e¤ective labor, on the rm-specic labor
productivity, as well as on the xed and iceberg trade costs.
The key results of the paper are as follows. First, the model is successful in replicating
the pro-cyclical pattern of o¤shoring as well as the dynamics of o¤shoring along the extensive
and intensive margins, which I document using data from Mexicos maquiladora sector.
Following an aggregate productivity increase in the country of origin, the amount of value
added per o¤shoring rm (the intensive margin) spikes upward on impact, and decreases
afterwards. In the medium run, however, domestic rm entry causes the domestic wage
to increase faster than aggregate productivity, which in turn determines some of the more
productive rms to relocate production o¤shore. The gradual response of the number of
o¤shoring rms (the extensive margin) mirrors the steady appreciation of the cost of e¤ective
labor that follows domestic rm entry. Thus, the model is consistent with the empirical
regularity that expansions in U.S. manufacturing output precede increases in the number
of o¤shore plants in Mexicos maquiladora sector.
Second, o¤shoring enhances the cross-country co-movement of output relative to the
model with endogenous exports. As rm entry in the parent country leads to the apprecia-
tion of the terms of labor, the increasing demand for domestic labor (due to rm entry) and
sequentially the increasing demand for labor o¤shore (due to the relocation of production)
enhance the co-movement of wages and aggregate incomes. The result is consistent with
the stylized fact outlined in Burstein, Kurz, and Tesar (2008), that countries with stronger
production sharing trade links tend to display a closer co-movement of manufacturing out-
put.
Third, o¤shoring reduces the price level gap between the countries involved, because it
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dampens the appreciation of the real exchange rate that follows an aggregate productivity
improvement in the parent country (the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect) through several
channels: In particular, (i) o¤shoring transfers some of the upward pressure from the do-
mestic wage (caused by domestic rm entry) onto the foreign wage (through the relocation
of production), and thus dampens the appreciation of the terms of labor; (ii) o¤shoring
leads to a decrease in the average import prices; and (iii) o¤shoring crowds out the less
competitive foreign exporters.
I recognize the possibility for several interesting extensions to this paper. First, the
model provides a useful framework to analyze the impact of o¤shore production on employ-
ment and wages, both in the parent and in the host countries. The preliminary analysis of
employment dynamics in Appendix 3 shows that, as o¤shoring enhances rm entry in the
parent country, the domestic job loss caused by o¤shoring is partially o¤set by the creation of
new jobs associated with new product varieties. Second, the model allows to study the wel-
fare implications of o¤shoring and trade liberalization, as discussed in Appendix 4. Third,
in an empirical extension of this paper, I study the dynamic response of the extensive and
intensive margins of o¤shore production in Mexicos maquiladora sector to long-run labor
productivity shocks in U.S. manufacturing, which I identify as permanent, country-specic
technology shocks (see Chapter 2 of this Dissertation). Fourth and nally, one extension
with rich policy implications involves the study of interactions between o¤shore production
and labor migration within an integrated framework, in which both o¤shoring and labor
mobility are driven by uctuations in relative wages (for the study of labor migration, see
Chapter 3 of this Dissertation).
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Summary: Model of O¤shoring with Financial Autarky
Table A.1.
Euler equation, bonds C t =  (1 + rt+1)Et
h
C t+1
i
C t = 
 
1 + rt+1

Et
h
C t+1
i
Euler equation, stocks evt = (1  )Et Ct+1Ct   (edt+1 + evt+1)evt = (1  )Et Ct+1Ct   (edt+1 + evt+1)
Free entry evt = fEwtZtevt = fEwtZt
Rule of motion, # rms Nt+1 = (1  )(Nt +NE;t)
ND;t+1 = (1  )(ND;t +NE;t)
Aggregate accounting Ct +NE;tevt = wtL+Nt edt
Ct +NE;tevt = wtL +ND;t edt
Consumption price index 1 = ND;t
 eD;t1  +NV;t  eV;t1  +NH;t  eH;t1 
1 = ND;t
 eD;t1  +NH;t  eH;t1 
Total prots Nt edt = ND;t edD;t +NV;t edV;t +NH;t edH;t
ND;t edt = ND;t edD;t +NH;t edH;t
Number of rms (Home) Nt = ND;t +NV;t
VFDI prots link (Home) edV;t = kk ( 1)  zV;tezD;t 1 edD;t +  1k ( 1)fV wtQtZt
HFDI prots link edH;t =  1k ( 1)fH wtZtedH;t =  1k ( 1)fH wtZt
Dom. productivity (Home) ezD;t = zminzV;t  zk ( 1)V;t  zk ( 1)minzkV;t zkmin
 1
 1
VFDI productivity (Home) ezV;t = zmin  NtNV;t1=k
HFDI productivity ezH;t = zmin  NtNH;t1=kezH;t = zmin ND;tNH;t1=k
Balanced trade NH;t
 eH;t1  CtQt+NV;t edV;t =
= NV;t
 eV;t1  Ct+NH;t  eH;t1  Ct
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The baseline model with nancial autarky for the Northern economy is summarized by
16 equations in 16 endogenous variables: Nt, ND;t, NV;t, NH;t, NE;t, edt, edD;t, edV;t, edH;t, ezD;t,
ezV;t, ezH;t, evt, rt, wt and Ct. As the Southern rms do not o¤shore to the high-wage North,
the Southern economy is described by only 11 equations in 11 endogenous variables: There
are no Southern counterparts for Nt, NV;t, edV;t, ezD;t and ezV;t. In particular, the average
labor productivity of the representative domestic Southern rm (ezD) is constant over time.
Variables ND;t, rt, Nt and rt are predetermined.
1.A.2 O¤shoring with Financial Integration
I allow for trade in international bonds in an extended version of the model with endoge-
nous o¤shoring. Following GM2005, I assume that: (1) International asset markets are
incomplete, as households in each country issue risk-free bonds denominated in their own
currency. (2) Nominal returns are indexed to ination in each economy, so that each type
of bonds provides a real return denominated in units of that countrys consumption basket.
(3) I introduce quadratic costs of adjustment for bond holdings, a tool which allows to pin
down the steady state and ensure stationarity for the net foreign assets in the presence of
temporary shocks.
The innitely-lived representative household in the North maximizes the inter-temporal
utility subject to the constraint:
(edt + evt)Ntxt + wtL+ (1 + rt)Bh;t + (1 + rt )QtBf;t + Tt (1.39)
> Ct + evt (Nt +NE;t)xt+1 +Bh;t+1 + 
2
(Bh;t+1)
2 +QtBf;t+1 +

2
Qt (Bf;t+1)
2 ;
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where rt and rt are the rates of return of the North and South-specic bonds; (1+rt)Bh;t and
(1+rt )QtBf;t denote the principal and interest income from each type of bonds;

2 (Bh;t+1)
2
and 2Qt (Bf;t+1)
2 are the adjustment costs for each type of bond holdings; Tt is the fee
rebate. Setting  = 0:0025, I add the two Euler equations for bonds to the baseline model:
1 + Bh;t+1 = (1 + rt+1)Et

Ct+1
Ct
 
; (1.40)
1 + Bf;t+1 = (1 + r

t+1)Et
Qt+1
Qt

Ct+1
Ct
 
: (1.41)
The budget constraint of the Southern household is similar, and the corresponding Euler
equations for bonds are:
1 + Bh;t+1 = 
(1 + rt+1)Et
Qt
Qt+1

Ct+1
Ct
 
; (1.42)
1 + Bf;t+1 = 
(1 + rt+1)Et

Ct+1
Ct
 
: (1.43)
The market clearing conditions for bonds are:
Bh;t+1 +B

h;t+1 = 0; (1.44)
Bf;t+1 +B

f;t+1 = 0: (1.45)
Thus, nancial integration through trade in bonds adds 4 new variables (Bh;t; Bf;t; Bh;t;
Bf;t) and 6 new equations (1.40, 1.41, 1.42, 1.43, 1.44 and 1.45) while removing the original
two Euler equations from the baseline model with nancial autarky. Trade in bonds also
involves changes in the aggregate accounting equations and in the balanced current account
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condition. I re-write the expressions for aggregate accounting in the North and the South
as:
Ct +NE;tevt +Bh;t+1 +QtBf;t+1 = wtL+Nt edt + (1 + rt)Bh;t + (1 + rt )QtBf;t; (1.46)
Ct +N

E;tevt +Q 1t Bh;t+1 +Bf;t+1 = wtL +ND;t edt + (1 + rt)Q 1t Bh;t + (1 + rt )Bf;t:
(1.47)
I also replace the balanced current account condition from the model with nancial autarky
with the expression for the balance of international payments:
TBt+ NV;t edV;t| {z }
Repatriated prots
+ rtBh;t + r

tQtBf;t| {z }
Income from bonds
= (Bh;t+1  Bh;t) Qt (Bf;t+1  Bf;t)| {z }
Change in bond holdings
(1.48)
which shows that the current account balance (trade balance plus repatriated prots of
foreign a¢ liates plus investment income) must equal the negative of the nancial account
balance (the change in bond holdings).
1.A.3 Employment Dynamics
Theoretical measures of sectoral employment In this section I study the e¤ect
of o¤shoring on employment in both the North and the South. To this end, I focus on the
o¤shoring sector in the Southern economy in addition to the three employment sectors in
each economy (entry, domestic and exporting) described in GM2005.46 The representative
46 In the North, the representative rm serving the domestic labor hires labor for production (elD;t =
 1
wt
edD;t units of labor). The representative rm serving the foreign market through exports hires labor both
for production (elH;t = edH;t  1wt + fH  1Zt ) and for covering the xed cost of exporting ( fHZt units of labor). In
addition, the new rms hire labor to satisfy the entry cost requirements ( fE
Zt
units of labor per new entrant
every period). Thus, the amount of labor hired by each of the three sectors in the North (entry, domestic,
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Northern o¤shoring rm hires Southern labor both for covering the xed cost of o¤shoring
( fVZt units of Southern labor every period) and for production (
elV;t = edV;t  1wtQt + fV  1Zt ).
Thus, I write the total employment in the o¤shoring sector as:
LV;t = NV;t
elV;t + fVZt

: (1.49)
The log-linearized expressions for total employment in each economy are:
bLt = LE
L
bLE;t + LD
L
bLD;t + LH
L
bLH;t; (1.50)
bLt = LVL bLV;t + LEL bLE;t + LDL bLD;t + LHL bLH;t; (1.51)
where the calibration implies that the steady state shares of employment in the North are
22, 53 and 25 percent for the entry, domestic and exporting sectors. In the South, they are
15, 48 and 15 percent respectively, plus the remaining 22 percent in the o¤shoring sector.
Impulse responses for a productivity increase in the North Figure A.1 illus-
trates the employment dynamics in the o¤shoring model in response to a positive produc-
tivity shock in the North, when productivity follows the autoregressive univariate process
logZt+1 =  logZt+ut with persistence parameter  = 0:9. In order to analyze the employ-
ment dynamics, I add elastic labor supply to the framework with o¤shoring under nancial
autarky.47
and export) every period is LE;t = NE;t
fE
Zt
, LD;t = ND;telD;t and LH;t = NH;t elH;t + fHZt , respectively.
47The representative household aiming to maximize the expected inter-temporal utility
max
fBt; xt;Ltg

Et
1P
s=t
s t

lnCs   L
1+1= 
s
1+1= 

consumes and supplies Lt working hours elastically in
a competitive labor market subject to the budget constraint Bt+1 + evt (Nt +NE;t)xt+1 + Ct =
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Figure A.1. Employment dynamics,
impulse responses to a transitory 1 percent productivity shock in North
In the North, on impact, employment rises in the entry sector and declines in the
domestic and exporting sectors. Thus, the reallocation of labor across sectors supports the
(1 + rt)Bt + (edt + evt)Ntxt + wtLt; where  > 0 is the weight of disutility from labor in the period utility
function, and   0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply to wages and the inter-temporal elasticity of
substitution in labor supply. Following King, Plosser and Rebello (1988) and the discussions in Campbell
(1994) and Bilbie et al. (2006), I use log utility for consumption (which is equivalent to setting  = 1 in
the baseline model) in order to obtain constant steady state labor supply in a model in which utility is
additively separable over consumption and hours. I incorporate the usual rst order conditions with respect
to hours worked into the model,  (Lt)
1
 = wtC
 1
t and 
 (Lt)
1
  = wtC
 1
t . Using the baseline model
calibration, I set the weight parameter  = 0:9188 and  = 0:9458; so that the steady-state level of hours
worked is equal to unit, L =
n
1

w
C
o 
= 1. The wage elasticity of labor supply in North and South is  = 3:
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creation of new product varieties following the productivity improvement in the Northern
economy, both in the model with o¤shoring and in the model with exports only.
Important di¤erences in employment dynamics across the two models become visible in
the medium run. First, as the option to produce o¤shore improves the average protability
of prospective entrants, rm entry is more persistent and employment in the entry sector
declines by less in the model with o¤shoring than in the model with exports only. Second,
an aggregate productivity increase stimulates employment in the Northern exporting sector
in the presence of o¤shoring (and reduces it without), as the dampened appreciation of the
terms of labor enhances the competitiveness of the Northern exports relative to the model
with exports only. Third, o¤shoring reduces employment in the Northern domestic sector,
partly due to the relocation of production to the South, and partly due to the within-country
reallocation of employment towards the entry and exporting sectors in the North. Overall,
the employment loss in the North caused by o¤shoring is partially o¤set by the employment
gains generated by enhanced product creation and export competitiveness in the North.
In the Southern economy, the increase in employment in the o¤shoring sector o¤sets
the loss in the domestic and exporting sectors, as well as the loss in the entry sector in the
short run. The result is in line with the empirical evidence that, due to the crowding out of
domestic investment, most of the new jobs in Mexicos manufacturing (96 percent) during
1994-2002 were in the maquiladora sector (Gallagher and Zarsky, 2007, Chapter 2).
1.A.4 Welfare Analysis: O¤shore Production and Trade Costs
In this section I analyze the welfare e¤ect of a sudden and permanent decrease in the iceberg
trade cost that a¤ects o¤shoring from 0 = 1:3 to 1 = 1:2, which occurs in addition to the
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stochastic transitory shocks to aggregate productivity. To this end, I take a second order
approximation around the steady state, and assume that aggregate productivity follows the
bivariate autoregressive process described in expression (1.38), with the persistence, spillover
and variance-covariance matrix of shocks from Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992, 1994).
Figure A.2. Transition paths to new steady states, following a permanent decrease
in the iceberg trade cost of o¤shoring (from 0 = 1:3 to 1 = 1:2)
Figure A.2 plots the transition paths to the new steady state for key variables of the
model. The lower trade cost associated with o¤shoring increases protability and hence
stimulates rm entry in the North. In turn, the total number of Northern rms, the real
wage, output and consumption converge to relatively higher steady state levels, an outcome
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which is welfare-enhancing for the Northern economy. The total value added o¤shore and
the number of o¤shoring rms also converge to higher steady state levels. In the Southern
economy, the real wage, consumption and output decrease to lower steady state values due
to the crowding out of domestic entry by o¤shoring.
In order to compute the consumption-equivalent gain that the Northern economy obtains
from the decline in the xed cost of o¤shoring, I compare the level of welfare that the
Northern household holds in the initial steady state (V0) with the level of welfare that it
holds as of period t0 when the decrease in the trade cost takes place (Vt0):
V0 =
1
1  U
 
C0=1:3

and Vt0 = Et0
1X
v=t0
vU
 
Cv

: (1.52)
The welfare level of period t0 takes into account the discounted stream of utilities that the
Northern household achieves at all future periods during the transition path to the new
steady state. Then I dene the constants C0 and C1 to denote the permanent streams of
consumption necessary to generate the welfare values V0 and Vt0 :
V0 =
1
1  
C0
1 
1   and Vt0 =
1
1  
C1
1 
1   ; (1.53)
and compute the consumption-equivalent welfare gain ( > 0) or loss ( < 0) that corre-
sponds to the permanent decrease of the iceberg trade cost for o¤shored goods as:
 =

C1
C0
  1

 100: (1.54)
Figure A.3 (continuous line) plots the consumption-equivalent welfare gain measured as
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a percentage increase in steady-state consumption (on the vertical axis) associated with the
permanent decrease in the trade cost for o¤shored goods; I allow the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and o¤shored varieties (on the horizontal axis) to vary over  2 [3:1;
3:9]. The results show that the Northern economy obtains a welfare gain that exceeds
the equivalent of 5 percent of initial consumption for the entire range of elasticity values.
Moreover, the gain increases with the degree of complementarity between the domestic and
o¤shored varieties.
Figure A.3. Consumption-equivalent welfare gain/loss, following a permanent decrease
in the iceberg trade cost of o¤shoring (from 0 = 1:3 to 1 = 1:2)
1.A.5 Asymmetric Firm Entry Costs
The World Banks Doing Business report outlines the large variation in the regulation of
starting a business across countries at di¤erent levels of economic development (Table A.2).
For instance, the monetary cost is 3.3 times higher in Mexico than in the U.S. or Canada;
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it is 6.2 times higher in Hungary than in the U.K.
Table A.2. Firm entry costs, selected economies
Economy Procedures Duration Monetary Cost Relative Cost
(number) (days) (USD) (U.S.=1.0)
U.S. 6 6 314:79 1:0
Canada 2 3 325:53 1:0
Mexico 8 27 1; 046:71 3:3
Germany 9 18 2; 087:34 6:6
U.K. 6 13 321:44 1:0
France 5 7 402:05 1:3
Poland 10 31 1; 736:28 5:5
Czech Republic 10 17 1; 344:08 4:3
Hungary 6 16 1; 938:15 6:2
(Source: World Bank, Doing Business Report, 2007)
1.A.6 Solution for the Asymmetric Steady State (TOL < 1)
In this section I provide the steady state solution for the model of o¤shoring in the presence
of cross-country di¤erences in the cost of e¤ective labor (TOL < 1). To this end, I use
an integrated framework that nests both the baseline model of o¤shoring (for calibration
 = 0;  = 1) and the benchmark model with exports only and no o¤shoring in GM2005
(for  = 1;  = 1), as described in footnotes 15 and 23 above.
I obtain a numerical solution for the unique steady state using a non-linear system of
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12 equations in 12 unknowns, listed below. The unknowns are the steady state values of:
zV (the o¤shoring cuto¤ productivity), zH (the exporting cuto¤ productivity in North),
TOL, CCQ , Q,
edD
w ;
edV
w ;
edH
w ; z

H (the exporting cuto¤ productivity in South), eH , eH , and
N
ND
. Subsequently, I use the numerical solution for the initial 12 variables to compute the
steady state values of the remaining variables of the model. A technical appendix providing
their complete derivation is available upon request.
I use the following pricing and prot formulas (in which Z = Z = 1) in order to derive
the steady state solution:
Table A.3.1. Average Prices
Domestic production, North eD =  1 wtezD
Domestic production, South eD =  1 wtezD
O¤shore production (vertical FDI,  = 0) eV =  1 wezV (TOL)1 
Exports ( = 1) or horizontal FDI ( = 0), North eH =  1 wQ 1ezH TOL1 
Exports ( = 1) or horizontal FDI ( = 0), South eH =  1 wQezH   1TOL1 
Table A.3.2. Average Prots
Domestic production, North edD;t = 1  eD;t1  Ct
Domestic production, South edD;t = 1  eD;t1  Ct
O¤shore production (vertical FDI,  = 0) edV;t = 1  eV;t1  Ct   fV wTOL1 
Exports ( = 1) or horiz. FDI ( = 0), North edH;t = 1  eH;t1  CtQt   fHwTOL1 
Exports ( = 1) or horiz. FDI ( = 0), South edH;t = 1  eH;t1  CtQ 1t  
 fHw

wt
Zt
  
1
TOL
1 
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In addition, using that v = (1 )1 (1 )d, NE =

1 N , and v = few in the expression for
total prots in the Northern economy, the rst equation in the system is:
1  (1  )
(1  ) fE =
ND
N
edD
w
+
NV
N
edV
w
+
NH
N
edH
w
; (1.55)
where NHN =

1
zH
k
; NDN = 1 

1
zH
k
; NVN =

1
zV
k
:
Next, the prot formulas for the Northern economy imply:
edD
w
=
k
k   (   1)fHTOL
(1 ) C
CQ
Q1 ( 1)

zV
zH
 1 zk ( 1)V   1
zkV   1
; (1.56)
edV
w
=
k
k   (   1)fHTOL
1 +( ) C
CQ
Q1 

zV
zH
 1 ( 1)
 (1 )( 1)
  fV TOL1 ;
(1.57)
edH
w
=
(   1)
k   (   1)fHwTOL
1 ; (1.58)
edV
w
=
zkV   1
z
k ( 1)
V   1
edD
w
+
(   1)
k   (   1)fV wTOL
1 : (1.59)
The expression for total prots in the Southern economy implies:
1  (1  )
(1  ) f

E =
k
k   (   1)f

HTOL
( 1)
( 1)Q 1z1 H
CQ
C
+ (1.60)
+
   1
k   (   1)

1
zH
k
fHTOL
 1;
Next, the consumption ratio adjusted for the real exchange rate is:
C
CQ
=
fH
fH
TOL(+
 1)Q 1

zH

zH
 1
: (1.61)
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Using the balanced current account condition, I obtain:
(1  ) z kV TOL 
"
(   1) k
k   (   1)f

H

zV
zH
 1 TOL(+ 1)
 ( 1)(1  )
+ fV
#
(1.62)
= 
fH
zkH

N
ND
 1
TOL     f

H
zkH

N
ND
 1
TOL
 1;
where  =

 + (1 )

k
k ( 1)   (1  ) and  =

 + (1 
)


k
k ( 1)   (1  ):
The expression for the real exchange rate in steady state is:
Q1  =
TOL1  +
 
TOL1 
1 
z 1 kH
N
ND
1  z kV

z 1V
z
k ( 1)
V  1
zkV  1
N
ND
+ z 1 kV
N
ND
(TOL)(1 )(1 ) + z 1 kH
N
ND
(TOL)
(1 )
(1.63)
The remaining equations are:
k
k   (   1)fH
e 1H
TOL
= 1 +
1  
 (1  )f

E
e 1H
t
; (1.64)
k
k   (   1)f

HTOL
e 1H = 1 + 1   (1  )fE e 1H
t ; (1.65)
N
ND
eHeH
 1
=
t

t
; (1.66)
where:
t =

1
zH


TOL
 1
+ z kH
N
ND
; (1.67)

t =

1  z kV
 zV
zH
 1 zk ( 1)V   1
zkV   1
(TOL)
( 1)
+ z kV

zV
zH
(TOL)
+ 1
 1
+ z kH

N
ND
 1
: (1.68)
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1.A.7 Demand Functions and the Welfare-Based Price Index
The Northern representative household minimizes the total expenditure associated with the
consumption basket Ct, which includes nal good varieties produced by the Northern rms
domestically (yD;t), o¤shore (yV;t), as well as nal good varieties produced by Southern
rms (yH;t):
min
fyD;t(z); yV;t(z);yH;t(z)g
PtCt =
zV;tZ
zmin
pD;t(z)yD;t(z)dz
| {z }
Produced domestically
+
1Z
zV;t
pV;t(z)yV;t(z)dz
| {z }
Produced o¤shore
+
1Z
zH;t
pH;t(z)y

H;t(z)dz
| {z }
Produced by Southern rms
;
(1.69)
subject to Ct =
24zV;tR
zmin
yD;t(z)
 1
 dz +
1R
zV;t
yV;t(z)
 1
 dz +
1R
zH;t
yH;t(z)
 1
 dz
35  1 : The rst-order
conditions with respect to yD;t(z); yV;t(z) and yH;t(z) imply:
pD;t(z) = tC
1

t yD;t(z)
  1
 ; pV;t(z) = tC
1

t yV;t(z)
  1
 and pH;t(z) = tC
1

t y

H;t(z)
  1
 ; (1.70)
which I use to re-write the total expenditure amount:
PtCt =
zV;tZ
zmin
pD;t(z)yD;t(z)dz +
1Z
zV;t
pV;t(z)yV;t(z)dz +
1Z
zH;t
pH;t(z)y

H;t(z)dz = (1.71)
= tC
1

t
264zV;tZ
zmin
yD;t(z)
 1
 dz +
1Z
zV;t
yV;t(z)
 1
 dz +
1Z
zH;t
yH;t(z)
 1
 dz
375
| {z }
C
 1

t
= tCt: (1.72)
Next I insert the resulting identity t = Pt and the demand functions yD;t(z) =
(pD;t(z)=Pt)
  Ct; yV;t(z) = (pV;t(z)=Pt)  Ct, yH;t(z) =

pH;t(z)=Pt
 
Ct into the expres-
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sion for total expenditure, PtCt =
zV;tR
zmin
pD;t(z)yD;t(z)dz+
1R
zV;t
pV;t(z)yV;t(z)dz+
1R
zH;t
pH;t(z)y

H;t(z)dz,
in order to derive the price index:
Pt =
264zV;tZ
zmin
pD;t(z)
1 dz +
1Z
zV;t
pV;t(z)
1 dz +
1Z
zH;t
pH;t(z)
1 dz
375
1
1 
: (1.73)
Throughout the model I use the consumption basket as the numeraire good in each
economy. Thus, the real prices of nal good varieties expressed in units of the Northern
consumption basket are:
D;t(z) 
pD;t(z)
Pt
; V;t(z) 
pV;t(z)
Pt
and H;t(z) 
pH;t(z)
Pt
; (1.74)
and the demand functions for nal good varieties become:
yD;t(z) = D;t(z)
 Ct; yV;t(z) = V;t(z)
 Ct; and yH;t(z) = 

H;t(z)
 Ct: (1.75)
1.A.8 Prot Maximization with Domestic and O¤shore Production
Northern rms producing domestically Firms set optimal prices by solving the
prot maximization problem:
max
fD;t(z)g
D;t(z)yD;t(z) 
wt
Ztz
yD;t(z): (1.76)
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Using the demand function yD;t(z) = D;t(z)
 Ct, price is equal to the marginal cost plus
the markup:
yD;t(z) + D;t(z)
@yD;t(z)
@D;t(z)
  wt
Ztz
@yD;t(z)
@D;t(z)
= 0) D;t(z) =

   1
wt
Ztz
: (1.77)
Northern rms producing o¤shore The rm with idiosyncratic labor productivity
z that produces nal goods using a mix of domestic and o¤shore inputs solves the following
prot maximizing problem:48
max
fV;tg
V;t(z)yV;t(z) 

wt
Ztz


wtQt
Zt z
1 
yD;t(z)  fV

wt
Zt
wtQt
Zt
1 
: (1.78)
Using the demand function yV;t(z) = V;t(z)
 Ct, the resulting price formula is:
V;t(z) =

   1

wt
Ztz


wtQt
Zt z
1 
: (1.79)
Firms serving the foreign market The pricing formulas for rms originating in the
North and the South, each serving the foreign market through either exports ( =  = 1)
or horizontal FDI ( =  = 0), are obtained in a similar way:
H;t(z) =

   1


wtQ
 1
t
Ztz
 
wt
Zt z
1 
and H;t(z) =

   1


wtQt
Zt z
  wt
Ztz
1 
:
(1.80)
48The cost minimization problem in the broader framework of o¤shoring, min
flt;ltg
wtlt + w

tQtl

t so
that yV;t(z) =
h
Ztzlt

i h
Zt zl

t
1 
i1 
; leads to the following expression for the marginal cost: MCt =
wt
Ztz
 
wtQt
Zt z
1 
:
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1.A.9 Existence of Equilibrium for the O¤shoring Productivity Cuto¤
As discussed in the text, two conditions must hold every period in order to ensure existence
of the equilibrium productivity cuto¤ zV;t: (1) dV;t(z) must be steeper than dD;t(z); and (2)
zmin < zV;t.
The rst condition implies that the e¤ective wage in the South must be low enough
relative to the e¤ective wage in the North (TOLt < 1), so that the more productive Northern
rms nd it protable to relocate production o¤shore despite the iceberg trade cost ( > 1):

wtQt
Zt
<
wt
Ztz
() TOLt < 1: (1.81)
The second condition, zmin < zV;t, requires that:
Slope(dV;t(z)) <
fE
wt
Zt
+ fV
wtQt
Zt
z 1min
;
z 1min
1



   1
wt
Zt
1 
Ct < fE
wt
Zt
+ fV
wtQt
Zt
;
1



   1
wt
Ztzmin
1 
Ct < fE
wt
Zt
+ fV
wtQt
Zt
;
dD;t(zmin) < fE
wt
Zt
+ fV
wtQt
Zt
; (1.82)
where  = 1 (1 )(1 ) : The last inequality shows that the prot obtained by the rm with
the minimum productivity zmin from domestic production must be smaller than the sum of
the per-period value of the sunk entry cost and the xed cost of o¤shoring.
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1.A.10 Average Firm-Specic Productivity Levels under the Pareto Dis-
tribution
Northern rms producing o¤shore
ezV;t =
264 1
1 G(zV;t)
1Z
zV;t
z 1g(z)dz
375
1
 1
=
=
264 zV;t
zmin
k 1Z
zV;t
z 1
kzkmin
zk+1
dz
375
1
 1
=
=
"
zV;t
zmin
k kzkmin
k   (   1)z
 1 k
V;t
# 1
 1
=
= zV;t; (1.83)
where  
h
k
k ( 1)
i 1
 1
:
Northern rms producing domestically
ezD;t =
24 1
G(zV;t)
zV;tZ
zmin
z 1g(z)dz
35
1
 1
=
=
24 zkV;t
zkV;t   zkmin
zV;tZ
zmin
z 1
kzkmin
zk+1
dz
35
1
 1
=
=
"
zkV;t
zkV;t   zkmin
kzkmin
(   k   1)

z 1 kV;t   z 1 kmin
# 1 1
=
= 
24(zminzV;t)k
zkmin   zkV;t
0@ 1
z
k ( 1)
V;t
  1
z
k ( 1)
min
1A35 1 1 =
= zminzV;t
24zk ( 1)V;t   zk ( 1)min
zkV;t   zkmin
35 1 1 : (1.84)
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1.A.11 Average Prots: Domestic and O¤shore Production
The average prot of the Northern rms producing domestically is:
edD;t = dD;t(ezD;t) = 1



   1
wt
ZtezD;t
1 
Ct =
1



   1
wt
Zt
1 
Ctez 1D;t =
=
1



   1
wt
Zt
1 
Ct (zminzV;t)
 1
24zk ( 1)V;t   zk ( 1)min
zkV;t   zkmin
35 =
=
1



   1
wt
ZtzV;t
1 
Ct| {z }
dD;t(zV;t)
(zmin)
 1
24zk ( 1)V;t   zk ( 1)min
zkV;t   zkmin
35 =
= dD;t(zV;t) (zmin)
 1
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The average prot of the Northern rms producing o¤shore through vertical FDI is:
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The Northern rm with productivity equal to the cuto¤ zV;t is indi¤erent between lo-
cating production domestically or o¤shore. Thus, I use the equality of the corresponding
prots at the productivity cuto¤, i.e. dD;t(zV;t) = dV;t(zV;t), along with the expressions 1.85
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and 1.86 above, to derive the link between the two average prots as:
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1.A.12 Real Exchange Rate
Using the denition fQt1  = ND;t+NV;t+NH;tND;t+NH;t Q1 t and the notation eNt  ND;t +NV;t +
NH;t; eNt  ND;t +NH;t; I re-write the CPI-based real exchange rate as:
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In what follows I use the notation sD  ND

w
ZezD
1 
+ NV
h
w
ZezV (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i1 
to
denote the steady-state share of spending in the North on goods produced by the Northern
rms both domestically and o¤shore. Expression sV  NV
h
w
ZezV (TOL)1 
i1 
denotes
the steady-state share of spending in the North on goods produced by the Northern rms
o¤shore only. (Therefore, sV < sD.) Expression s

D  ND

wQ
ZezD
1 
denotes the steady-
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state share of spending in the South on goods produced by the Southern rms domestically. I
also take into account the fact that the average productivity of the Southern rms producing
domestically ezD is constant over time. Using all of the above, I log-linearize the CPI-based
real exchange rate:
(1  )beQt = sD  bND;t   beNt + (1  )[TOLt+
+ (1  sD)
 bNH;t   beNt + (1  )bt + (1  )[TOLt   bezH;t 
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 bNV;t   beN t + (1  )(1  ) (b t +[TOLt)  bezV;t 
  (1  sD)
 bNH;t   beN t + (1  )(b t +[TOLt)  bezH;t : (1.89)
Setting  =  = 1 so that my model of o¤shoring nests the model with endogenous
exports in GM2005, (i.e. in addition to o¤shoring taking place from North to South, rms
in each economy serve the foreign markets through exports), the log-linearized expression
for the CPI-based real exchange rate becomes:
beQt = [sD   (1  )sV + sD   1][TOLt+
+ (sD   sV )bezD;t + sV bezV;t   (1  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79
Chapter 2
O¤shore Production to Mexico:
The Intensive and Extensive
Margin Responses to U.S.
Technology Shocks
Essay, May 2009 1
2.1 Introduction
In this paper I conduct an empirical investigation of the dynamics of o¤shore production
undertaken by U.S. manufacturing rms that, motivated by uctuations in the relative
wage, relocate part of their activities to Mexico at business cycle frequency. The relocation
of production operations (an activity which I refer to as "o¤shoring" in this paper) takes
place either through fully-owned subsidiaries or through arms length relationships with
Mexican contractors. In addition to lower labor costs, o¤shoring is facilitated by Mexicos
maquiladora program that o¤ers a series of advantages to foreign investors.2 Thus, plants in
1JEL classication: F23, F41; Keywords: o¤shore production, intensive and extensive margins, business
cycle dynamics, country-specic technology shocks, long-run identication restrictions, structural VAR,
Mexicos maquiladora sector.
2The maquiladora program, established by Mexico in 1965 in order to address rising unemployment in the
Northern border states, grants a series of advantages to the foreign investors, including full foreign ownership,
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the maquiladora sector import production inputs (mostly from their U.S. parent and client
rms), add value in the form of incorporated domestic materials and labor, and export the
resulting output mostly to the U.S. market (Gruben, 2001).
I study the business cycle dynamics of o¤shore production in Mexico by breaking down
the total maquiladora value added into two margins. I dene the intensive margin of
o¤shoring as the real value added per maquiladora plant. I use the extensive margin concept
to refer to the number of maquiladora plants in Mexico. Using conditional correlations and
impulse response estimates, I examine the timing and magnitude of responses of the two
margins to U.S. permanent technology shocks. Thus, my study highlights the importance of
each of the two margins of o¤shoring as separate transmission mechanisms of business cycle
uctuations from the U.S. to Mexico. This is in line with the existing literature reporting
that uctuations in the extensive margin (the number of plants) have a non-trivial e¤ect
on the Mexican economy: Bergin, Feenstra and Hanson (2008) show that more than one
third of the adjustment in maquiladoras industry-level employment, and nearly half of the
adjustment in maquiladoras total employment are due to uctuations in the number of
plants.
I start by outlining a set of unconditional correlations that describe the cyclicality of
o¤shoring from U.S. manufacturing to Mexicos maquiladora sector. I show that the total
value added in Mexico is pro-cyclical with U.S. manufacturing output, and also that the
extensive margin uctuates notably over the business cycle. In addition, unconditional
duty-free imports of production machinery and materials (which became moot after NAFTAs phase-out of
tari¤s), and operation without ownership of assets. As production machinery and materials are received
on loan from foreign parent rms or outsourcing clients, the maquiladora plants have no inventory or xed
assets, and thus are exempted from most asset taxes. The scal regime applicable to the maquiladora plants
provides a strong incentive for the entire amount of the maquiladoras production to be exported (Sinclair,
1997; Hufbauer and Schott, 2005).
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correlations at various lags and leads show that expansions in U.S. output precede the
adjustment in the extensive margin by three-to-four quarters.
Next I investigate the conditional co-movement between U.S. manufacturing and o¤shore
production in Mexico, as I estimate the conditional correlations and impulse responses of
each of the two o¤shoring margins to U.S. permanent technology shocks. To this end, I
identify U.S.-specic permanent technology shocks using long-run restrictions in a struc-
tural VAR model as in Gali (1999), which I adapt to an open-economy framework. My
identication strategy relies on the following assumptions: (i) Long-run labor productivity
in U.S. manufacturing responds exclusively to U.S.-specic permanent technology shocks;
(ii) Conversely, long-run labor productivity in Mexicos maquiladora sector responds to both
U.S. and Mexico-specic permanent technology shocks. The latter assumption relies on the
fact that the maquiladora plants use exclusively loaned production machinery received from
their foreign parent and client rms, most of which originate in the U.S.
The conditional correlation estimates indicate the following: (1) The intensive margin
of o¤shoring (value added per existing maquiladora plant) adjusts instantaneously when
a permanent technology shock boosts long-run labor productivity in U.S. manufacturing:
The conditional correlation between the intensive margin and U.S. labor productivity is
large and positive, in contrast to the unconditional correlation which is not statistically
signicant. (2) There is no immediate response along the extensive margin (the number
of maquiladora plants) to U.S. technology shocks: The conditional correlation between the
number of maquiladora plants and U.S. labor productivity is small and not statistically
signicant.
The estimated impulse responses for a U.S. permanent technology shock show that: (1)
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The intensive margin of o¤shoring exhibits an immediate jump, which is followed by an
additional hump-shaped increase. The intensive margin then declines below its initial level,
and returns to it over time. (2) The extensive margin does not respond on impact, but
rises above its initial level gradually over time, and stabilizes at a permanently higher level
in the long run. (3) The impulse responses also suggest that a permanent U.S. technology
shock has a disproportionate long-run e¤ect on real output in U.S. manufacturing and in
Mexicos maquiladora sector: The long-run e¤ect on the maquiladora value added is 4.5
times greater than the corresponding e¤ect on U.S. manufacturing.
I then use the estimated conditional correlations and impulse responses for U.S. tech-
nology shocks as empirical benchmarks to assess the implications of the model of o¤shoring
with heterogeneous rms in Zlate (2008), in which the o¤shoring behavior of rms is driven
by technology shocks in their country of origin. The qualitative implications of the model
are consistent with the empirical impulse responses of the intensive and extensive margins
of o¤shoring to Mexico. In the model, following a positive domestic technology shock, there
is an immediate rise in o¤shoring along its intensive margin (value added per o¤shoring
rm), which then declines below and returns to its initial level in the long run. The exten-
sive margin (the number of o¤shoring rms) initially drops, but rises gradually and remains
above its initial level in the long run.
The study of the dynamics of o¤shoring conducted by U.S. rms in Mexico is impor-
tant because the relocation of production generates cross-country links in the form of trade
ows (of intermediate goods shipped from the U.S. to Mexico, and processed goods from
Mexico back to the U.S.) and foreign investment ows (when U.S. rms acquire subsidiaries
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in Mexico).3 Thus, o¤shoring works as a transmission mechanism for business cycle uctu-
ations across the economies involved (Burstein, Kurz and Tesar, 2008), one that enhances
the business cycle volatility in the host economy (Bergin, Feenstra and Hanson, 2008). O¤-
shoring motivated by lower production costs is a particularly strong link between pairs of
economies with di¤erent levels of economic development, such as the U.S. and Mexico, or
the U.S. and economies in Central and South America.4
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes Mexicos maquiladora sector and
the data sources. Section 3 uses unconditional correlations to describe the co-movement
between U.S. manufacturing and o¤shore production in Mexico. Section 4 presents the
identication strategy, the structural VAR specication, and the estimated conditional cor-
relations and impulse responses. Section 5 provides a comparison of the empirical condi-
tional correlations and impulse responses with their theoretical counterparts generated by
the model of o¤shoring in Zlate (2008). Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions of the
paper.
2.2 Mexicos Maquiladora Sector
Mexicos maquiladora sector I study the dynamics of o¤shore production using
quarterly aggregate data for U.S. manufacturing and Mexicos maquiladora sectors, for the
3The maquiladora sector accounts for 50 percent of Mexicos maqufacturing exports; Mexico
maquiladoras exports to the U.S. accounted for 5.3% of U.S. industry shipments over 2000-2003 (Bergin,
Feenstra, Hanson, 2007, 2008).
4Data on the foreign operations of U.S. multinational rms shows that as much as 50 percent of the
manufacturing sales of U.S. a¢ liates in Mexico and 26 percent of the sales of U.S. a¢ liates in Latin America
as a whole were directed towards their U.S. parent rms in 2005, as opposed to only 3 and 5 percent of
the sales of U.S. a¢ liates in Europe and Asia-Pacic (BEA, 2007). The pattern shows the large scope for
o¤shoring motivated by lower production costs by U.S. rms in Latin America. A similar pattern exists
between West European rms and the new member countries of the European Union (Marin, 2006; Meyer,
2006).
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interval between 1990:1 and 2006:4. In particular, the Mexican data allows to compute the
intensive and extensive margins of o¤shore production conducted by U.S. manufacturing
rms in Mexico, which I measure as the real value added per maquiladora plant and the
number of maquiladora plants, respectively.
Mexicos maquiladora sector is an appropriate example to study the o¤shoring oper-
ations of U.S. rms as a plausible transmission mechanism of business cycle uctuations
across countries, for several reasons. One is the strong link between U.S. manufacturing
and Mexicos maquiladora sector, as the majority of the maquiladora plants accommodate
the o¤shoring operations of U.S. rms. Motivated by lower production costs in Mexico,
U.S. rms relocate segments of their production chain to the maquiladora sector through
either vertical foreign direct investment or arms length transactions. Although not all of
the maquiladora plants have U.S. ownership,5 most of the maquiladoras imported inputs
originate in the U.S. (82 percent in 2001, according to Hausman and Haytko, 2003), and
most of the maquiladoras value added is exported to the U.S. (roughly 90 percent, as
documented in Burstein, Kurz and Tesar, 2007).
Another reason is the large magnitude of the maquiladora sector relative to the Mex-
ican economy. The maquiladora sector accounts for approximately 20 percent of Mexicos
manufacturing value added (INEGI, 2009). It is responsible for 24.5 percent of Mexicos
manufacturing employment (as of 2004) and for roughly half of Mexicos manufacturing
exports (Bergin, Feenstra and Hanson, 2007, 2008).
In addition, one advantage of using the maquiladora data set is the availability of high-
5As of March 2002, 61 percent of the maquiladora plants had U.S. ownership, and only 27 percent had
Mexican ownership (Solunet Infomex, 2009).
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frequency time series data for a relatively long period of time (17 years at quarterly fre-
quency). Nonetheless, the data set allows to separate the value added from the imported
components incorporated in Mexicos maquiladora total output.
Data sources Data for Mexicos maquiladora sector (real value added, the number of
plants, hours worked, employment, and remuneration of workers), at monthly frequency and
aggregated at the sectoral level, is provided by Mexicos Instituto Nacional de Estadística,
Geografía e Informatica (INEGI, 2009). The maquiladora data originates from a monthly
electronic survey of the approximately 3,000 establishments (plants) that were part of the
Maquiladora Program, conducted by INEGI between 1990 and 2006.6 I aggregate the data
into quarters and perform the seasonal adjustment using the X-12-ARIMA method of the
U.S. Census Bureau.
Data for U.S. manufacturing is provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and is described into detail in
Appendix 1.
2.3 Unconditional Correlations
In this section I use unconditional correlations of bandpass-ltered data to study the co-
movement between U.S. manufacturing and Mexicos maquiladora activity, where I mea-
sure the latter as the total value added and the number of plants. I nd that Mexicos
6The mandatory survey of Mexicos maquiladora establishments (which had the obligation to participate
stipulated in the maquiladora operation rules) was interrupted in November 2006, when the Maquiladora
Program was replaced by the "Manufacturing Industry, Mquiladora, and Export Services" (IMMEX) Pro-
gram. The introduction of IMMEX, which merges the former Maquiladora Program with the "Temporary
Imports for Exports" (PITEX) Program and regulates roughly 6,500 establishments, has generated conti-
nuity issues in the maquiladora time series data collected before and after 2006 (Durand Alcantara, 2007).
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maquiladora total value added is pro-cyclical with uctuations in U.S. manufacturing out-
put, and also that maquiladoras intensive and extensive margins follow di¤erent dynamics
over time. In particular, uctuations in U.S. output tend to lead the extensive margin of
o¤shore production in Mexico (the number of plants) by as much as four quarters.
U.S. manufacturing industrial production vs. Mexico maquiladora activity
In panels 1 and 3 of Figure 1 (left), I plot the two indicators of Mexicos maquiladora
activity (real value added and number of plants) against the industrial production index
for U.S. manufacturing. I apply the Baxter-King bandpass-lter to the quarterly data in
natural logs for the interval 1990:1-2006:4 in order to eliminate uctuations with periodicity
lower than 18 months and greater than eight years.7
The visual inspection of the ltered data suggests that the U.S. economic expansion
throughout the 1990s, as well as the recession in 2001, were associated with similar devel-
opments in the maquiladora sector. The unconditional correlations of U.S. output with the
maquiladora value added and number of plants, summarized in panels 2 and 4 of Figure 1,
shows that o¤shoring to Mexico is pro-cyclical with the uctuations in U.S. manufacturing.
The unconditional correlations also suggest that a stronger contemporaneous co-movement
exists between U.S. manufacturing output and the total maquiladora value added than be-
tween U.S. output and the number of maquiladora plants: For the former, the contempora-
neous correlation is positive (0:71) and reaches a peak for U.S. output lagged by only two
quarters (0:85). For the latter, the contemporaneous correlation is relatively lower (0:50)
and increases considerably for U.S. output lagged by four quarters (0:82).8 The results
7For a description of the bandpass lter, see Stock and Watson (1999).
8A non-trivial fraction of the maquiladora plants have Mexican ownership (27 percent in March 2002,
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show that the intensive and extensive margins of o¤shoring follow di¤erent dynamics over
time. The fact that U.S. output uctuations lead the number of maquiladora plants by
more than they lead the total maquiladora value added suggests that: (i) the extensive
margin adjustment is relatively slower than the total, and (ii) the contemporaneous ad-
justment in the total value added takes place mostly through the intensive margin (value
added per plant). I explore this hypothesis in the next section, where I use conditional
correlations for country-specic technology shocks to describe the co-movement between
U.S. manufacturing and the two margins of Mexicos maquiladora value added.
U.S.-Mexico relative wage vs. Mexico maquiladora activity The unconditional
correlations in Figure 2 also describe an interesting link between o¤shoring and uctuations
in the relative wage. In panels 1 and 3 (left) I plot the two maquiladora indicators (total
value added and the number of plants) along with the ratio of nominal hourly wages in
U.S. manufacturing and Mexicos maquiladora sector, expressed in the same currency. The
corresponding correlations are summarized in panels 2 and 4 (right).
The correlations between each maquiladora indicator and the past U.S.-Mexico wage
ratios are positive: Past increases in the U.S. manufacturing hourly wage relative to Mexico
maquiladoras wage are followed by the relocation of production from the U.S. to Mexico.
Also, the correlations between each maquiladora indicator and the future wage ratios are
negative: The relocation of production to Mexico is associated with a future decline in the
relative wage ratio, which can be caused by either a U.S. wage moderation or an increase
according to Solunet Infomex, 2009). These plants represent arms length contractors that have the exibility
to enter and exit from outsourcing relationships with U.S. rms over the business cycle. Other maquiladora
plants function on a seasonal basis. Both of these facts explain the relatively short adjustment time (four
quarters after expansions in U.S. manufacturing) for the number of maquiladora plants in Mexico.
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in Mexicos maquiladora wage.9 This empirical result is consistent with the model of en-
dogenous o¤shoring with heterogeneous rms and xed relocation costs in Zlate (2008), in
which the adjustment in the extensive margin of o¤shoring (the number of o¤shore plants)
is driven by uctuations in the relative cost of e¤ective labor.
2.4 Conditional Correlations for U.S. Technology Shocks
This section presents the main contribution of the paper: I examine the co-movement be-
tween output in U.S. manufacturing and the intensive and extensive margins of Mexicos
maquiladora sector, conditional on identied U.S. permanent technology shocks. This ap-
proach contrasts to the one in the previous section, in which I use unconditional correlations
of the bandpass-letered data to study the corresponding co-movements.
2.4.1 Identication strategy
I estimate a structural vector autoregressive (VAR) model in a two-country framework,
using long-run restrictions in order to identify country-specic permanent technology shocks.
My identication strategy relies on the assumption that long-run labor productivity in
U.S. manufacturing responds exclusively to U.S. permanent technology shocks. It does
not respond to technology and non-technology shocks originating in Mexico. Conversely,
long-run labor productivity in Mexicos maquiladora sector responds to both U.S. and
Mexico-specic permanent technology shocks.
The identication assumption is justied by the fact that Mexicos maquiladora program
9The former e¤ect is due to reasons such as higher demand for Mexican labor or higher training expenses
in the maquiladora sector.
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involves operations without ownership of assets: The maquiladora plants in Mexico (with or
without foreign ownership) use production machinery and materials received on loan from
their parent or client companies abroad (Sinclair, 1997), most of which originate in the
U.S.10 In turn, the use of borrowed U.S. production machinery a¤ects labor productivity in
Mexicos maquiladora plants, and justies the assumption that U.S. permanent technology
shocks a¤ect the long-run level of labor productivity in Mexicos maquiladora sector. The
reverse does not happen: Mexican technology shocks do not a¤ect U.S. labor productivity
in the long run.
My work builds on the closed-economy structural VAR framework of Gali (1999), in
which the identication strategy uses the restriction that long-run labor productivity re-
sponds exclusively to a permanent technology shock. I expand the framework to an open-
economy context, and introduce an alternative identication strategy for country-specic
shocks to the one used by Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2006) (CDL). In the open-economy
framework of CDL, the variable assumed to respond exclusively to the country-specic per-
manent technology shock is the (log of) long-run labor productivity in the U.S. measured
in deviation from the (log of) long-run labor productivity in the "rest of the world." In
contrast to CDL, I include the levels of labor productivity for both U.S. manufacturing and
Mexicos maquiladora sector as two separate variables in my structural VAR specication.
10As of March 2002, 61 percent of the 2,762 maquiladora plants surveyed had U.S. ownership, and only 27
percent had Mexican ownership (Solunet Infomex, 2009). MacLachlan and Aguilar (1998) also show that,
as of 1996, less than half (45 percent) of Mexicos maquiladora plants had Mexican ownership.
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2.4.2 Empirical specication
In order to examine the responses of the intensive and extensive margins of o¤shore pro-
duction to U.S. technology shocks, I estimate the following structural VAR model with ve
variables. I use quarterly data for U.S. manufacturing and o¤shore production to Mexicos
maquiladora sector over the period 1990:1-2006:4.
26666664
xUSt
xMext
Zt
37777775 =
26666664
D11(L) D12(L) D13(L)
D21(L) D22(L) D23(L)
D31(L) D32(L) D33(L)
37777775
26666664
"1;t
"2;t
"3;t
37777775 : (2.1)
In the above specication, xUSt denotes (the log of) labor productivity in U.S. manufactur-
ing, which is the variable that responds in the long run exclusively to the U.S. permanent
technology shock ("1;t). Variable xMext denotes (the log of) labor productivity in Mexicos
maquiladora sector that responds in the long run to both U.S. and Mexico-specic tech-
nology shocks ("1;t and "2;t), but not to the structural non-technology shocks ("3;t). In
addition, the 3 1 vector Zt =

intt;extt;h
US
t
0
includes variables intt and extt; which
denote the intensive and extensive margins of o¤shore production in Mexico (measured as
value added per plant, and the number of plants in the maquiladora sector, respectively,
both expressed in logs), as well as variable hUSt , which denotes the log of hours worked
in U.S. manufacturing.11 The structural shocks are not correlated and have unit variance
(E"t"0t = I), where "1;t denotes the technology shock that is specic to U.S. manufacturing,
"2;t is the technology shock specic to Mexicos maquiladora sector, and "3;t is a 31 vector
11 I normalize and take natural logs of each variable. For instance, xUS(t) = 100 + 100 
ln[xUS(t)=xUS(1990:1)]:
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of structural non-technology shocks.
In addition to the ve variables mentioned above, the specication in 2.1 allows to
recover the responses of U.S. manufacturing output (computed as ipUSt = x
US
t + h
US
t ), the
total value added in Mexico (vat = intt+extt), and the number of hours worked in Mexicos
maquiladora sector (hMext = vat   xMext ) to the structural shocks.
The identication strategy with long-run restrictions uses the property that D(1) =
1P
j=0
Dj is the matrix of long-run responses to the vector of orthogonal shocks, where Dj
are the coe¢ cients of the lag polynomial D(L) = D0 +D1L +D2L2 + :::. Thus, imposing
that D12(1) = 0 and D13(1) = 0 reects the identifying restriction that the unit root
in U.S. manufacturing labor productivity originates exclusively in the U.S. manufacturing
technology shock. In addition, identication of the system of equations implied by 2.1 also
requires that the elements of 1 3 vector D23(1) are zero and that the 3 3 matrix D33(1)
is lower triangular (see Appendix 2).
The specication in 2.1 assumes that, with the exception of the intensive margin of
o¤shoring (value added per plant), all other variables (labor productivity in the U.S. and
in Mexico, the number of maquiladora plants, and the number of hours worked in U.S.
manufacturing) have a unit root. Indeed, the standard Dickey-Fuller test for unit root
performed on the data in levels fails to reject the null hypothesis of unit root for all variables
with the exception of the intensive margin (See Table 3 in Appendix 3). The results for the
data in di¤erences reject the unit root hypothesis for all variables. Therefore, I take rst
di¤erences for all variables with the exception of the intensive margin of o¤shore production,
for which I use deviations from a linear time trend. Finally, the results of the Engle-Granger
test do not reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration between labor productivity in U.S.
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manufacturing and labor productivity in Mexicos maquiladora sector (see Appendix 3).
2.4.3 Results
In this section I report the estimates of conditional correlations and impulse responses
to permanent technology shocks in U.S. manufacturing. Following Gali (1999), I use the
estimate of the lag polynomial D(L), which embeds the impulse response coe¢ cients for
the ve variables in specication 2.1 with respect to the structural shocks, to compute the
conditional correlations as:
(xUSt ;exttji) =
1P
j=0
Dx
US ;i
j D
ext;i
jq
var
 
xUSt ji

var (exttji)
; (2.2)
where i denotes that the correlation estimate is conditional on one of the ve struc-
tural shocks (i.e. U.S.-specic technology, Mexico-specic technology, or three other non-
technology shocks); var
 
xUSt ji

=
1P
j=0

Dx
US ;i
j
2
and var (exttji) =
1P
j=0

Dext;ij
2
are
the variances of U.S. labor productivity and the number of maquiladora plants (measured
in growth rates), respectively, each conditional on the shock type i.
Unconditional and conditional correlations
Table 1 reports the unconditional and conditional correlations12 between variables describ-
ing U.S. manufacturing and those describing o¤shore production in Mexicos maquiladora
sector: (a) the intensive margin (value added per maquiladora plant); (b) the extensive
12The (*) and (**) superscripts denote statistical signicance at the 10 and 5 percent levels. Standard
errors for conditional correlations have been computed as in Gali (1999), using a Monte Carlo approach to
sample from the asymptotic distribution of coe¢ cients and the variance-covariance matrix of reduced-form
innovations.
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margin (number of plants); and (c) the total value added. All conditional correlations are
computed for U.S. permanent technology shocks. (The only exception is the correlation be-
tween Mexicos labor productivity and hours worked on the third row of Panel C, which is
conditional on Mexican technology shocks.) The correlations are computed for all variables
measured in growth rates.
Table 1. Unconditional and conditional correlations (with standard errors)
Unconditional Conditional on U.S.
technology shocks
Panel A
(a) U.S. productivity vs. Mexico intensive mg. 0:25 (0:16) 0:64 (0:27)
(b) U.S. productivity vs. Mexico extensive mg.  0:17 (0:22)  0:06 (0:38)
(c) U.S. productivity vs. Mexico value added 0:10 (0:13) 0:50 (0:32)
Panel B
(a) U.S. output vs. Mexico intensive margin 0:29 (0:15) 0:49 (0:30)
(b) U.S. output vs. Mexico extensive margin 0:19 (0:16) 0:33 (0:39)
(c) U.S. output vs. Mexico total value added 0:54 (0:17) 0:82 (0:34)
Panel C
(a) U.S. productivity vs. U.S. hours  0:16 (0:17)  0:67 (0:34)
(b) Mexico productivity vs. Mexico hours  0:71 (0:37)  0:74 (0:32)
(c) U.S. productivity vs. Mexico hours 0:12 (0:15) 0:44 (0:36)
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U.S. manufacturing labor productivity vs. o¤shore production in Mexico
The key results are presented in Panel A of Table 1, which reports the correlations between
U.S. labor productivity and each of the three indicators of o¤shore production. The results
suggest that the intensive margin of o¤shoring adjusts instantaneously when a permanent
technology shock boosts long-run labor productivity in U.S. manufacturing. While the un-
conditional correlations are not statistically signicant, the conditional correlation between
the U.S. technology-driven components of U.S. labor productivity and the intensive margin
of o¤shoring is positive (0:64) and statistically signicant at the 5 percent level. However,
there is no immediate response of the extensive margin to the U.S. technology shock. The
conditional correlation between U.S. productivity and the extensive margin of o¤shoring
is small and not statistically signicant. Overall, the conditional correlation between U.S.
productivity and the total value added o¤shore is positive, and lies at the borderline of
statistical signicance.
Figure 2 provides graphical counterparts to the correlations reported in Table 1 (Panel
A). For each pair of variables, the unconditional correlations correspond to the line charts
and scatterplots of the original data in Figure 2. The conditional correlations correspond
to the line charts and scatterplots of the U.S. technology-driven components of U.S. labor
productivity and o¤shore production recovered from the identied VAR.
The close co-movement between the U.S. technology-driven components of U.S. labor
productivity and the maquiladoras intensive margin is particularly visible in the corre-
sponding scatterplot in Figure 2(b), in which the observation points are concentrated along
the upward-sloping diagonal. In contrast, the scatterplot of the original data in Figure 2(b)
shows no obvious pattern of the observation points.
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U.S. manufacturing output vs. o¤shore production in Mexico Panel B in
Table 1 reports the unconditional and conditional correlations between U.S. manufacturing
output and the same three indicators of o¤shore production in Mexico. The results reinforce
the ndings already presented in Panel A above: The value added per plant in Mexico rises
instantaneously when a positive technology shock causes an expansion in U.S. manufactur-
ing. The conditional correlation between the U.S. technology-driven components of U.S.
output and the intensive margin of o¤shoring is positive (0:49) and statistically signicant.
The unconditional correlation is also positive, but conditioning on the U.S. technology shock
enhances the correlation.
Both the unconditional and conditional correlations between U.S. manufacturing output
and Mexicos maquiladora total value added are positive and statistically signicant, but
conditioning on the U.S. technology shock enhances the correlation. The result shows that,
when a positive technology shock leads to an expansion in U.S. manufacturing output, the
instantaneous rise in the total value added o¤shore in Mexico is due to the intensive margin
adjustment.
Labor productivity vs. hours The specication in 2.1 also allows for an empirical
study of the responses of hours and labor productivity to country-specic technology shocks,
along the lines of Gali (1999). The results in Panel C of Table 1 show that the conditional
correlation between the U.S. technology-driven components of hours worked and labor pro-
ductivity growth in U.S. manufacturing is negative and statistically signicant, a result
which is in line with the ndings in Gali (1999). In Mexico, the conditional correlation be-
tween hours worked and labor productivity for Mexican technology shocks is also negative
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and statistically signicant. In line with the conditional correlations, the scatterplots in
Figure 4(b) illustrate the strong negative relationship between the technology-driven com-
ponents of labor productivity and hours (measured as growth rates) for either the U.S. or
Mexico. Nonetheless, the conditional correlation between U.S. labor productivity and Mex-
ico maquiladoras hours for U.S. technology shocks is positive, although not statistically
signicant.
Impulse responses
Figure 5 shows the estimated impulse responses for the three indicators of o¤shore produc-
tion (the intensive margin, the extensive margin, and total value added, each measured in
levels) to U.S. permanent technology shocks. The gure also reports the +/- 2 standard
error condence intervals.
Following a one-standard deviation positive U.S. technology shock, labor productivity
in U.S. manufacturing increases immediately by almost 0.5 percent and stabilizes at a
permanently higher level. The intensive margin of o¤shoring (value added per maquiladora
plant) exhibits an immediate jump of almost 0.6 percent, followed by an additional increase
until it reaches a peak at 1.3 percent of its initial level two quarters after the shock. The
intensive margin then declines below its initial level (nine quarters after the shock), and
returns to it over time. In contrast, the extensive margin (the number of maquiladora
plants) does not react on impact, but rises above its initial level 4 quarters after the shock,
and stabilizes at a permanently higher level in the long run.
The response of maquiladoras total value added combines the separate adjustments
of the intensive and extensive margins described above. The total value added jumps on
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impact (although the e¤ect is not statistically signicant) and continues to rise afterwards,
eventually stabilizing at a permanently higher level (4.5 percent above the initial level,
statistically signicant) 20 quarters after the shock. Thus, a permanent U.S. technology
shock has a disproportionate long-run e¤ect of on U.S. manufacturing output and on Mex-
icos maquiladora value added: the former rises by a mere 1 percent in the long run, as
compared to 4.5 percent for the latter.
The impulse responses of the intensive and extensive margins of o¤shoring for a U.S.
technology shock explain the di¤erences between their conditional correlations with U.S.
labor productivity. On one hand, the immediate jump in the intensive margin causes
the large and positive correlation between U.S. labor productivity and the intensive margin
conditional on U.S. technology shocks. On the other hand, the lack of an immediate response
of the extensive margin explains the small conditional correlation (and not statistically
signicant) between U.S. labor productivity and the number of maquiladora plants.
2.5 Data vs. Model: Impulse Responses and Conditional
Correlations
In this section I compare the intensive and extensive margin dynamics of the o¤shore pro-
duction undertaken by U.S. rms in Mexico (illustrated by the conditional correlations
and impulse responses above) to their theoretical counterparts generated by the model of
o¤shoring in Zlate (2008), in the presence of country-specic technology shocks.
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2.5.1 Model summary
I study the intensive and extensive margin dynamics of o¤shoring in a two-country (North
and South), dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with endogenous rm entry and
heterogeneous rms (Zlate, 2008). In the model, rm entry in the country of origin (North)
is subject to a sunk cost reecting the regulation of starting a business. Every period, an
unbounded pool of potential entrant rms in the North face a trade-o¤ between the sunk
entry cost (expressed in units of Northern e¤ective labor) and the expected stream of future
prots, as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005). Following entry in the country of origin (North),
each rm is assigned an idiosyncratic labor productivity factor drawn independently from a
common distribution over a support interval, and produces a di¤erent variety of nal goods
under monopolistic competition.13
Every period after domestic entry, each rm in the North chooses between either do-
mestic or foreign inputs (labor) to use in the production of nal goods. The use of Southern
inputs ("o¤shoring") provides the advantage of a lower cost of e¤ective labor,14 but in-
volves a per-period, xed o¤shoring cost (expressed in units of Southern labor) needed to
establish and maintain the o¤shore production plant. (I assume a one-to-one identication
relationship between a rm and a plant throughout the model.15) In addition, o¤shoring
13Following entry, rms keep the idiosyncratic productivity factor for the entire duration of their lives.
Independently of the idiosyncratic productivity, each rm faces the possibility of exogenous exit with prob-
ability  every period.
14 I dene the cost of e¤ective labor as the ratio between the real wage and aggregate productivity (wt=Zt
in the North and wt =Z

t in the South). I derive an asymmetric steady state, in which the di¤erence in the
regulation of rm entry in each economy generates the di¤erence in real e¤ective wages across countries. In
the model, I set rm entry costs to be higher in the South; since less rms enter the more regulated economy,
labor demand and the cost of e¤ective labor are lower in the South.
15 I maintain the assumption of one-to-one identication between a rm, a plant, and a nal good variety,
as in Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2006). Under this assumption, the extensive margin of o¤shoring can be
interpreted as the number of rms or plants every period; the intensive margin is the the value added per
o¤shoring rm or plant.
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involves the so-called iceberg trade cost that reects transportation costs and trade barriers
a¤ecting the shipping of nal good varieties produced o¤shore (in the South) back to the
country of origin (North).
When deciding on where to locate production (domestically vs. o¤shore), each rm
balances the lower foreign costs of e¤ective labor against the xed and trade costs associ-
ated with o¤shore production. Since rms are heterogeneous in productivity, the decision
to produce o¤shore is rm-specic: Ranking rms after their idiosyncratic productivity
factor over the support interval, the marginal rm that lies at the productivity cuto¤ (a
state variable) is indi¤erent between producing domestically or o¤shore. Only the more
productive rms (with idiosyncratic productivity above the cuto¤) can a¤ord the xed cost
of o¤shoring.
Following a positive technology shock in the North, increased domestic rm entry and the
resulting appreciation of the Northern e¤ective wage cause a gradual increase in the number
of o¤shoring rms (the extensive margin). On impact, however, the increased consumption
demand for all nal good varieties - including those already being produced o¤shore - causes
an instantaneous increase in the value added per o¤shoring rm (the intensive margin).
2.5.2 Impulse responses
Using the benchmark specication with nancial autarky and inelastic labor supply, I log-
linearize the model around the steady state and compute the impulse responses to a one
percent-increase in aggregate productivity in the North. I assume that labor productivity
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in the North is described by the univariate process:
logZt+1 =  logZt + ut; (2.3)
in which the persistence parameter  takes the values 0:99, 0:95 and 0:90, and ut is the
technology shock a¤ecting labor productivity. Figure 7 shows the impulse responses of the
model to a one standard deviation technology shock with various degrees of persistence.
For each variable, the horizontal axis shows the number of quarters after the initial shock,
and the vertical axis shows the percentage deviations from the original steady state in each
quarter.
The intensive margin of o¤shoring On impact, the one percent-increase in aggre-
gate labor productivity in the North causes a jump in the intensive margin of o¤shoring
(value added per o¤shoring rm), a result which is in line with the impulse responses ob-
tained from the structural VAR. The spike in the intensive margin is generated by the
increased demand for the consumption basket, which is a C.E.S. composite of the nal
good varieties produced both domestically and o¤shore. The magnitude of the initial spike
varies with the persistence of the technology shock: A more persistent technology shock
leads to a larger increase in the expected stream of future income for the representative
household in the North, and thus to a larger increase in consumption demand.
Following the initial jump, the value added per o¤shore plant declines. The decline
reects the substitution in consumption away from varieties produced o¤shore (which ini-
tially become relatively more expensive due to the scarcity of units of e¤ective labor in the
South) and towards the cheaper varieties produced domestically (which initially are rela-
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tively cheaper due to the increased productivity of Northern labor). The decline continues
until the intensive margin drops below its initial level, after which it recovers and returns
to its initial level in the long run, a result which is consistent with the empirical impulse
response discussed above.
The extensive margin of o¤shoring On impact, the increased demand for all vari-
eties of nal goods - including for varieties produced o¤shore - causes an immediate increase
in the real wage in the South: Since the increase in aggregate labor productivity in the North
is not replicated in the South, on impact there is excess demand for units of Southern e¤ec-
tive labor. As a result, the number of Northern rms that produce o¤shore (the extensive
margin) declines on impact - a counter-factual result - due to: (1) the increase in the e¤ec-
tive cost of producing o¤shore, and (2) the increase in the xed cost of relocation, both of
which are sensitive to the cost of e¤ective labor in the South.
Over the business cycle, as aggregate labor productivity in the North persists above the
initial steady state, the larger market size encourages rm entry (a ow variable), which
causes the total number of rms in the North (a stock variable) to increase gradually over
time. In turn, the gradual increase in the demand for Northern labor causes the real wage
to increase faster than aggregate productivity, and thus the cost of e¤ective labor in the
North to appreciate relative to that in the South (i.e. the "terms of labor" appreciate).16
Due to the gradual appreciation of the terms of labor, more of the Northern rms will
relocate production to the South over time. (The productivity cuto¤ moves downward
along the support interval, so that more of the less productive rms relocate production
16The absence of rm entry would cause the wage to increase just as fast as productivity, which would
leave the cost of e¤ective labor and the number of o¤shoring rms unchanged.
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o¤shore over time). Thus, the extensive margin of o¤shoring rises gradually over time
(rather than instantaneously on impact), a result which is consistent with the empirical
evidence discussed in the previous section.
2.5.3 Conditional correlations
In Table 2, I contrast the conditional correlations17 from the data to their model-generated
counterparts for country-specic technology shocks.
Table 2. Conditional correlations for U.S. technology shocks, data vs. model
Conditional correlations: Data Model
 = 0:90  = 0:95  = 0:99
U.S. output vs. Mex. intensive margin 0:49 (0:30) 0:71 0:85 0:97
U.S. output vs. Mex. extensive margin 0:33 (0:39)  0:61  0:78  0:96
U.S. output vs. Mex. total value added 0:82 (0:34)  0:31  0:48  0:84
First, the model generates a positive and large conditional correlation between output in
the North and the intensive margin of o¤shoring - conditional on a positive technology shock
in the North - a result which is line with the data. The positive conditional correlation in
the model is due to the initial spike in the intensive margin, caused by the increased demand
for nal good varieties produced o¤shore. The correlation increases when a more persistent
technology shock causes a larger initial jump in consumption demand.
17The (*) and (**) superscripts denote statistical signicance at the 10 and 5 percent levels. Standard
errors for conditional correlations have been computed as in Gali (1999), using a Monte Carlo approach to
sample from the asymptotic distribution of coe¢ cients and the variance-covariance matrix of reduced-form
innovations.
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Second, the model generates a negative conditional correlation between output in the
North and the extensive margin, which reects the initial decline in the number of o¤shoring
rms caused by the sudden appreciation of the Southern e¤ective wage. In the data, the
corresponding correlation is positive but not statistically signicant.
Third, the model generates a negative correlation between output in the North and the
total value added of o¤shoring. This counter-factual result is generated by the large initial
decline in the number of o¤shoring rms, which more than o¤sets the initial increase in the
value added per rm. However, following its initial decline, the total value added recovers
quickly and increases above its initial level in the long run, a theoretical result which is
consistent with the empirical impulse response for maquiladoras total value added.
2.6 Conclusion
The conditional correlation and impulse responses for country-specic technology shocks
provide additional insight on the dynamics of o¤shore production undertaken by U.S. rms
in Mexicos maquiladora sector. For instance, the conditional correlation between labor
productivity in U.S. manufacturing and the value added per o¤shore plant in Mexico (the
intensive margin) - conditional on a U.S. permanent technology shock - is positive and
statistically signicant, whereas the unconditional correlation is inconclusive. The result
shows that, when a permanent technology shock boosts long-run labor productivity in
U.S. manufacturing, an instantaneous adjustment takes place along the intensive margin of
o¤shore production in Mexico.
The estimated impulse responses also show that the time pattern of maquiladoras ad-
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justment in response to U.S. technology shocks di¤ers across the intensive margin (value
added per plant) and extensive margins (number of plants). Following a permanent U.S.
technology shock, the intensive margin exhibits an immediate jump, then declines below its
initial level, and nally returns to it over time. In contrast, the extensive margin does not
react on impact, but rises above its initial level and stabilizes at a permanently higher level
in the long run.
The conditional correlations and impulse response estimates for country-specic tech-
nology shocks also constitute useful empirical benchmarks to assess the implications of the
two-country model of o¤shoring in Zlate (2008). The qualitative implications of the model
are consistent with the empirical evidence on the intensive and extensive margins of o¤-
shoring to Mexico described above. In the presence of a positive technology shock a¤ecting
labor productivity in the country of origin, the model generates an immediate increase in
the intensive margin of o¤shore production. The extensive margin declines on impact, but
recovers quickly afterwards and increases above its initial level in the long run.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Data summary
I use quarterly data for U.S. manufacturing and Mexicos maquiladora sector over the period
1990:1-2006:4.
 For U.S. manufacturing real output, I use the Industrial Production index for Manu-
facturing (NAICS), at quarterly frequency and seasonally adjusted, provided by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/default.htm
 I construct the number of employee-hours in U.S. manufacturing from "Average
Weekly Hours: Manufacturing" and "Employees on Nonfarm Payrolls: Manufactur-
ing," provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics through the Federal Reserve Em-
ployment Database, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ I aggregate the seasonally-
adjusted monthly data into quarters.
 Data for Mexicos maquiladora sector (real value added, employee-hours, employment,
the number of establishments), at monthly frequency and without seasonal adjust-
ment, is provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informatica
(INEGI), http://dgcnesyp.inegi.org.mx/cgi-win/bdieintsi.exe. I aggregate the data
at quarterly frequency, and perform the seasonal adjustment using the X-12-ARIMA
method of the U.S. Census Bureau.
 I construct the relative wage in U.S. manufacturing and Mexico maquiladora from
the nominal hourly wage in U.S. manufacturing ("Average Hourly Earnings: Manu-
facturing," provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics through the Federal Reserve
Employment Database) and Mexicos maquiladora sector (from "Remuneraciones >
Nominales por persona ocupada" and "Horas promedio por persona," provided by
INEGI), expressed in the same currency using the nominal exchange rate.
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2.A.2 Structural VAR model and notation
Let Yt be the 5  1 vector

xUSt ;x
Mex
t ; intt;extt;h
US
t
0
: I dene the reduced-form
VAR model as:
A(L)Yt = ut; (2.4)
where A(L) = I A1L A2L2  ::: ApLp is a nite-order polynomial in the lag operator, ut
is the 51 vector of reduced-form innovations, and Eutu0t = u is their variance-covariance
matrix.
The structural VAR model is:
B(L)Yt = "t; (2.5)
where the structural shocks "t are not correlated and have unit variance (E"t"0t = I).
I assume that a matrix R exists (square and invertible), so that the vector of reduced-
form innovations ut spans the space of structural shocks "t:
"t = Rut: (2.6)
The moving average representation of the structural VAR model is:
Yt = A(L)
 1ut = A(L) 1R 1"t = D(L)"t; (2.7)
where D(L) = A(L) 1R 1 = D0+D1L+D2L2+::: embeds the impulse response coe¢ cients
of Yt with respect to the structural shocks "t. The identication strategy based on long run
restrictions uses the property that D(1) =
1P
j=0
Dj is the long-run e¤ect of the structural
shocks "t on Yt.
Next I introduce 
; the long-run variance-covariance matrix of Yt; as:

 = A(1) 1uA(1) 10 = A(1) 1R 1"t"0tR
 10| {z }
u
A(1) 10 (2.8)
= D(1)D(1)0: (2.9)
The structural VAR model is identied if the system of 10 equations (resulting from expres-
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sion 2.8 above) can be solved for just as many unknowns in matrix R, which can be achieved
by restricting the 5  5 matrix to be lower-triangular. The restriction on R implies that
D(1) is also lower-triangular, and thus D(1) can be obtained as the Cholesky factorization
of 
. Finally, R = [D(1)A(1)]  1.
The identication restriction that the long-run labor productivity in U.S. manufacturing
responds exclusively to U.S.-specic permanent technology shocks requires that matrix R
be lower-triangular. Once the long-run variance-covariance matrix of Yt is estimated asb
 = bA(1) 1bu bA(1) 10 based on the estimated parameters of the reduced-form VAR, the
estimate of R is obtained as:
bR = hChol(b
) bA(1)i 1 : (2.10)
2.A.3 Unit root tests for the data in levels and di¤erences
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root The table below summarizes the results of the
Dickey-Fuller unit root test with intercept, trend and one lag performed for the data in
both levels and di¤erences. There were 66 observations for the data in levels (regression
run from 1990:03 to 2006:04) and 65 observations for the data in di¤erences (regression run
from 1990:04 to 2006:04).
Table 3. Dickey-Fuller tests for unit root
(A) T-test statistics for the data in levels
xUSt x
Mex
t
 
xUSt   xMext

intt extt vat h
US
t h
Mex
t gdp
US
t
 2:45  1:81  1:84  5:21  1:40  1:05  1:42  0:89  1:44
(B) T-test statistics for the data in di¤erences
xUSt x
Mex
t 
 
xUSt   xMext

intt extt vat h
US
t h
Mex
t gdp
US
t
 3:62  4:11  4:12  6:55  4:03  5:30  3:29  3:44  3:83
Critical values: 1% =  4:10 5% =  3:48 10% =  3:17
For the data in levels, the test statistics exceed the critical values for the 10 percent
signicance level for all variables - for which I cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit
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root - with the exception of the intensive margin. For the data in di¤erences, the test
statistics do not exceed the critical values for the 10 percent signicance levels for any
variable. (They do not exceed the critical values for the 5 percent signicance levels for
most of the variables). Thus, I reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for the data in
di¤erences.
Engle-Granger test for cointegration I test for the possibility of cointegration
between labor productivity in U.S. manufacturing and in Mexicos maquiladora sector (i.e.
which are two non-stationary variables). The Engle-Granger procedure requires performing
an augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the residual obtained from the OLS regression of one
variable on the other. Under the null hypothesis, the residual is non-stationary. Testing with
one additional lag, there were 66 observations for the residuals obtained from the regression
run from 1990:03 to 2006:04. The test statistic ( 2:46) exceeds the critical value for the 10
percent signicance level ( 3:60). (The other critical values are  3:92 and  4:57 for the 5
and 1 percent signicance levels, respectively.) Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of
non-stationary residuals, and conclude that the two variables are not cointegrated.
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Figure 1. U.S. manufacturing industrial production (IP) vs. offshore production in Mexico  
(bandpass-filtered data in log-levels)  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. U.S.-Mexico relative manufacturing wage vs. offshore production in Mexico  
(bandpass-filtered data in log-levels) 
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Figure 2. U.S. manuf. labor productivity vs. offshore production in Mexico (growth rates) 
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Figure 3. U.S. manufacturing IP vs. offshore production in Mexico (growth rates) 
 
(a) Line charts 
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(b) Scatterplots 
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Figure 4. Labor productivity vs. hours worked, U.S. and Mexico (growth rates) 
 
(a) Line charts 
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(b) Scatterplots 
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Figure 5. Responses to a U.S.-specific permanent technology shock 
U.S. labor productivity
0 5 10 15 20
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Mexico maquiladora labor productivity
0 5 10 15 20
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
Mexico maquiladora intensive margin
0 5 10 15 20
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
Mexico maquiladora extensive margin
0 5 10 15 20
-0.8
0.0
0.8
1.6
2.4
3.2
4.0
4.8
5.6
Mexico maquiladora total value added
0 5 10 15 20
-0.8
0.0
0.8
1.6
2.4
3.2
4.0
4.8
5.6
U.S. Manufacturing Hours
0 5 10 15 20
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
U.S. Manufacturing Output (IP)
0 5 10 15 20
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Mexico maquiladora hours
0 5 10 15 20
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
 
 118 
 
 
Figure 6. Theoretical impulse responses of offshore production  
(total value added, the intensive and extensive margins) 
to a technology shock in the country of origin (North) 
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Chapter 3
Immigration and the
Macroeconomy
by Federico Mandelman (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta) and Andrei Zlate, May 2009 1
3.1 Introduction
Labor migration is sizable and has a non-negligible economic impact on the economies
involved. The number of foreign-born residents is rising worldwide: As much as 12.5 percent
of the total U.S. population in 2007 was foreign born, as compared to less than 6 percent in
1980, a pattern which is also visible in several other OECD countries (Grogger and Hanson,
2008). Labor migration also varies over the business cycle. Jerome (1926) documented
the procyclical pattern of European immigration into the U.S. during the 19th and early
20th centuries, showing that recessions were associated with drastic declines in immigration
ows, while relatively larger inows occurred during the recovery years.2 Adding to this
evidence, in Figure 1 we plot the number of apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border, which
1JEL classication: F22, F41; Keywords: Labor migration, sunk emigration cost, skill heterogeneity,
international real business cycles.
2For instance, the number of arrivals into the U.S. declined by 39.1 percent in the recession year of 1908.
The same was observed during the recessions of 1876-79, 1894 and 1922. During these years, there were
fewer restrictions on European immigration and most of the arrivals into the U.S. were properly documented
(ORourke and Williamson, 1999).
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the existing literature uses as a proxy for attempted illegal crossings into the U.S.,3 along
with the U.S./Mexico ratio of real GDP measured in purchasing power parity terms (both
series logged and HP-detrended). The chart shows that periods in which the U.S. economy
outperformed Mexicos were generally accompanied by an increase in border apprehensions.
The correlations in Figure 3(a) conrm this pattern.4 Evidence of procyclical immigration
also exists for Canada (Sweetman, 2004), the United Kingdom (Gordon et al., 2007) and
Australia (RBA, 2007), among other countries.
Immigrants send remittances to their country of origin on a regular basis. Conservative
estimates indicate that the remittances sent by emigrants from developing economies back
home reached $240 billion in 2007, which was more than double the amount of 2002.5 In
2007, the recorded remittances represented more than 10 percent of the GDP of several re-
ceiving countries,6 while globally they represented the equivalent of two-thirds of the amount
of foreign direct investment received by developing economies, thus becoming a principal
component of their total nancial inows.7 Just like labor migration, the remittance ows
also vary over the business cycle. In Figure 2 we plot the pattern of remittances from the
U.S. to Mexico vis-a-vis the relative performance of these economies. The correlations of
detrended series in Figure 3(b) conrm that periods with faster U.S. economic growth (or
lower Mexican growth) have been associated with larger outows of remittances to Mexico
3See Hanson (2006) for references. Todays legal immigration involves complicated and long admin-
istrative processes which are arguably less related to economic considerations (see Hanson and McIntosh
2007).
4Similarly, Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) nd that a 10 percent relative decline in the Mexican real
wage has been associated with a 6-8 percent increase in U.S. border apprehensions, with this e¤ect being
fully realized within 3 months.
5Due to unrecorded ows through formal and informal channels, the actual numbers are believed to be
signicantly larger than the reported numbers.
6Examples include Moldova (36.2%), Honduras (25.6%), Guyana (24.3%) and Jordan (20.3%), Philippines
(10%), among many others. Remittances account for roughly 2.5 % of Mexicos GDP (World Bank, 2008).
7See Ratha and Xu (2008).
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and vice versa. The combined evidence in Figures 1 and 2 highlights the potential insur-
ance role of remittances in smoothing the consumption path of Mexican households whose
members reside on both sides of the border.
With this evidence in mind, we examine the business cycle uctuations of labor migration
and remittance ows, as well as their propagation to the rest of the economy. In particular,
we study the role of labor migration in explaining the cyclicality of remittance ows over the
business cycle. We also study the e¤ect of immigration policy (reected by the magnitude of
immigration barriers) on the volatility of immigration and remittances. To this end, we use
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE), two-country, real business cycle model
along the lines of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994), in which we allow for endogenous
labor migration and remittances. In order to take skill heterogeneity among the native labor
into account, we introduce two types of labor in the home economy (skilled and unskilled)
while assuming that capital and skilled labor are relative complements as in Krusell et
al. (2000), and that the native unskilled and immigrant labor are perfect substitutes as
in Borjas et al. (2008). We calibrate the model to match the empirical socio-economic
characteristics of labor migration between Mexico and the U.S.
Our methodology bridges the gap between modern international macroeconomic lit-
erature and immigration theory. In contrast to our approach, the workhorse model of
international macroeconomics assumes that labor is immobile across countries. Instead,
labor migration is generally analyzed within formal setups limited to comparisons of long-
run positions or to the study of growth dynamics. These models are not suitable for the
analysis of immigration dynamics at business cycle frequencies. In our model, the incentive
to emigrate depends on the expectation of future earnings at the destination relative to
121
the country of origin, on the perceived sunk costs of emigration, as well as on the return
rate of immigrant labor. This return rate has a non-trivial role, as about 70 percent of
undocumented Mexican immigrants in the U.S. tend to return to their country within ten
years after their arrival (Reyes, 1997). The sunk cost includes the cost of searching for
employment, adjustment to a new lifestyle, transportation expenditures, and in the case of
undocumented immigration, the need to hire human smugglers (also known as coyotes) as
well as the physical risk and legal implications of illegally crossing the border.
In line with the empirical evidence, our model generates immigration and remittance
ows that are procyclical with the relative economic performance of the two economies. Both
of them are procyclical with output in the destination economy, and countercyclical with
output in the country of origin. An additional result consistent with the data is that stricter
border enforcement reduces the volatility of the stock of immigrant labor while signicantly
increasing the volatility of the immigrant wage and remittances.8 In the model, the absence
of labor mobility restrictions implies that the immigrant labor e¢ ciently exploits the ups
and downs of the business cycle. That is, they arrive in large numbers during economic
expansions when are most needed, and promptly return to their country of origin when a
bad shock hits the destination economy. Higher border enforcement breaks this logic, as
the increase in the stock of immigrant labor does not keep up with the increase in labor
demand during expansions. Immigrant labor becomes relatively scarce, receives relatively
higher wages and sends larger remittances to the foreign economy. In turn, the scarcity
of immigrant labor during booms reduces the incentive to accumulate capital, and reduces
8Rodriguez-Zamora (2008) shows that the recent increase in border enforcement resulted in less volatile
migration inows and outows across the US-Mexico border. After growing at double digit rates, remittances
drastically fell in the aftermath of the US nancial crisis.
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the productivity of the destination economy. During recessions, the e¤ect is the opposite.
Established immigrants are deterred from returning to their country of origin, bearing in
mind that future re-emigration when the destination economy recovers would involve a
large sunk cost. Thus, the established immigrant labor remains in the destination economy
during recessions, placing additional extra downward pressure on the wage of the native
unskilled.
When computing the welfare e¤ects of di¤erent enforcement policies, we focus on antici-
pated deterministic shocks with permanent e¤ects on the balanced growth path, in addition
to the stochastic temporary shocks and the associated cyclical considerations. The results
indicate that tighteningthe border to constrain the inow of unskilled labor has a nega-
tive impact on welfare in the destination economy, particularly when the complementarity
between skilled and unskilled labor is relatively higher, and when the share of the skilled
labor in total native labor converges to a relatively higher steady-state level.
This paper is related to existing literature that quanties the e¤ect of migration in both
static (Borjas, 1995; Hamilton and Whalley, 1984; Moses and Letnes, 2004; Walmsley and
Winters, 2003) and dynamic frameworks (Djacic, 1987). Our paper is closely related to
Klein and Ventura (2007) and Urrutia (1998), who use growth models with endogenous
labor movement to assess the welfare e¤ects of removing barriers to labor migration. In the
context of DSGE models of international business cycles, our paper is also related to Acosta
et al. (2007), Chami et al. (2006) and Durdu and Sayan (2008), who include remittance
endowment shocks; to Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2006), who introduce
an endogenous rm entry mechanism subject to sunk costs; and to Lindquist (2004) and
Polgreen and Silos (2006), who use skill heterogeneity and capital-skill complementarity
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with two representative households.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the benchmark
model of immigration and remittances; Section 3 presents the alternative model with skill
heterogeneity in the destination economy; Section 4 discusses the parameterization; Section
5 describes the model dynamics, providing impulse response and quantitative analysis;
Section 6 performs a welfare analysis in the presence of both stochastic and permanent
deterministic shocks a¤ecting the sunk immigration costs and the skill composition of the
native labor force in the home economy; Section 7 presents the main conclusions.
3.2 Model of Labor Migration with Sunk Costs
The model is representative of a standard two-country setup along the lines of Backus,
Kehoe, Kydland (1994, henceforth BKK). Our setup di¤ers from that of BKK in that
we use for simplicity log-CRRA preferences and abstract from government purchases and
time-to-build in capital formation. Each country specializes in the production of a single
(intermediate) good. The nal good is a composite of domestic and foreign goods, and can
be either consumed or invested.
The novel characteristic of our setup is the presence of labor mobility, as we allow
for labor to migrate from the foreign economy to the home one. In the baseline model
specication, native and immigrant labor form a CES aggregate which enters, along with
capital, in a Cobb-Douglas production function in the home economy. In the model with
an alternative production specication (which we describe in the next section) we explore
the asymmetric implications of unskilled immigration on native labor at the destination, by
124
introducing two types of labor in the home economy (skilled and unskilled) in the presence
of capital-skill complementarity as in Krusell et al. (2000), while assuming that the native
unskilled and immigrant labor are perfect substitutes following the ndings in Borjas et al.
(2008).
3.2.1 The Home Economy
Supply of Native Labor The representative home household supplies Ln;t hours of
labor, consumes Ct units of the home composite basket, and invests in physical capital Kt.
It maximizes the inter-temporal utility:
max
fCt;Ln;t;Kt+1g
Et
" 1X
s=t
s tU(Cs; Ln;s)
#
; (3.1)
where the period utility function takes the form
U(Ct; Ln;t) = lnCt   (Ln;t)
1+ 
1 +  
;  > 0 (3.2)
subject to the constraint:
wn;tLn;t + (1 + rt)Kt > Ct +Kt+1: (3.3)
Parameter 1= > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and the inter-temporal elasticity
of substitution in labor supply. Following King et al. (1998), we use separable preferences
and log-utility from consumption in order to obtain balanced growth path in steady state,
i.e. the income and substitution e¤ects of changes in the real wage on hours worked cancel
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out and generate constant steady-state labor e¤ort. wn;t is the domestic wage and rt denotes
the return on capital net of depreciation, all expressed in units of the home composite good.
The usual rst-order conditions with respect to consumption and labor follow:
1 = Et

(1 + rt+1)
Ct
Ct+1

; (3.4)
wn;t
Ct
= (Ln;t)
 : (3.5)
Production of the Home Intermediate Good
In our baseline model specication, total domestic output is dened by the production
of the country specic good, Yh;t; which is a Cobb-Douglas function of capital and a CES
aggregate of immigrant and native labor:
Yh;t = At (Kt)

h

1
 (Li;t)
 1
 + (1  ) 1 (Ln;t)
 1

i (1 )
 1
; (3.6)
where Li;t and Ln;t denote immigrant and native labor;  is the share of immigrant labor
income in Homes total labor income;  is a parameter that reects the productivity of
native labor relative to that of immigrant labor in steady state; and  is the share of capital
in output. Thus, the elasticity of substitution between native labor and capital is the same
as that between immigrant labor and capital. The supply of immigrant labor is a decision
of the foreign household and will be described later.
Competitive rms maximize prots. Thus, the rental rate of capital (plus depreciation)
and the real wages are equal to the marginal products of capital, immigrant and native
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labor, respectively:
@Yh;t
@Kt
= 
Yh;t
Kt
= rt + ; (3.7)
@Yh;t
@Li;t
= (1  ) 1 (Yh;t)
1 
(1 ) (AtK

t )
 1
(1 ) (Li;t)
  1
 = wi;t; (3.8)
@Yh;t
@Ln;t
= (1  ) (1  ) 1 (Yh;t)
1 
(1 ) (AtK

t )
 1
(1 ) ()
 1
 (Ln;t)
  1
 = wn;t: (3.9)
The country-specic good is used both domestically and o¤shore:
Yh;t = Yh1;t + Yh2;t; (3.10)
where Yh1;t denotes the domestic use of the home-specic good, and Yh2;t denotes the exports
of the home intermediate good to the foreign economy. Consumption and investment are
composites of the home and foreign-specic goods:
Yt =
h
!
1
 (Yh1;t)
 1
 + (1  !) 1 (Yf1;t)
 1

i 
 1
; (3.11)
where Yf1;t denotes the imports of Home from Foreign. The demand functions for the home
and foreign-specic goods are:
Yh1;t = ! (ph;t)
  Yt; (3.12)
Yf1;t = (1  !) (pf;tQt)  Yt; (3.13)
where ph;t is the price of the home-specic good in units of the home composite good,
pf;t is the price of the foreign good in units of the foreign composite good, and Qt is the
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real exchange rate. At the aggregate level, the resource constraint takes into account not
only the consumption and investment of the native population (i.e. Ct + It), but also the
consumption of the immigrant labor established in Home:
Yt = Ct + It +
Li;t
L
CtQt: (3.14)
We dene the consumption of the immigrant labor residing in Home as the amount of foreign
consumption Ct that is proportional with the share of immigrant labor Li;t in the steady
state foreign labor supply L, expressed in units of the home consumption basket. (The
optimization problem of the foreign household with respect to labor supply and emigration
will be described shortly.) Finally, the rule of motion for the capital stock is:
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It: (3.15)
3.2.2 The Foreign Economy
We model labor migration from Foreign to Home. To this end, we introduce cross-country
labor mobility with sunk immigration costs: Foreign households have the option to work
in the home economy, where wages are higher. However, labor migration from Foreign to
Home requires a sunk cost per unit of emigrant labor, a cost which in equilibrium equals
the present discounted value of the di¤erence between the future stream of wages obtained
as an immigrant in the home economy and the stream of wages obtained in the country of
origin.
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Location of Labor The foreign household supplies Lt units of labor every period.
They can either emigrate and work in Home, Li;t, or work domestically in Foreign, Lf;t:
Lt = Li;t + L

f;t: (3.16)
As will be discussed later, we calibrate the sunk migration cost so that the stock of
emigrant labor is always lower than the total labor supply in Foreign in any period t, i.e.
0 < Li;t < L

t : The calibration ensures that the immigrant wage in Home is signicantly
higher than the wage in the country of origin, so that the incentive to emigrate from Foreign
to Home exists every period. We also assume that macroeconomic shocks are small enough
for this condition to hold every period. For simplicity, we do not allow for labor to ow
from Home to Foreign.
Every period foreign workers have the option to emigrate to Home. The time-to-build
assumption in place implies that new immigrants start working one period after arriving
at the destination. They continue working in the home economy in all subsequent periods,
until an exogenous return-inducing shock, which hits them with probability l every period,
forces them to return to the country of origin (i.e. the foreign economy). This shock occurs
at the end of every time period, and may be linked to issues such as the likelihood of
deportation, the impossibility of nding employment in the home economy, or the lack of
adaptation to the new country of residence, etc.9
9This endogenous entry-exogenous exit formulation closely follows the model guidelines in Ghironi and
Melitz (2005).
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Thus, the rule of motion for the stock of immigrant labor in Home is:
Li;t = (1  l)(Li;t 1 + Le;t 1); (3.17)
where Le;t is the amount of new foreign labor that emigrates to Home every period (i.e. a
ow variable), and Li;t is the amount of immigrant labor that is located and works in Home
every period (i.e. a stock variable).
Households Problem The representative foreign household has preferences over real
consumption and labor e¤ort.10 It maximizes the inter-temporal utility with respect to total
labor Lt , emigrant labor Le;t and capital Kt+1:
max
fCt ;Lt ;Le;t;Kt+1g
Et
" 1X
s=t
()s tU(Cs ; L

s)
#
: (3.18)
Utility takes the same form as in (3.2), and the budget constraint is:
wt (L

t   Li;t) + wi;tQ 1t Li;t + (1 + rt )Kt > Ct + fewi;tQ 1t Le;t +Kt+1; (3.19)
where wt is the wage in the foreign economy and wt (Lt   Li;t) denotes the total income
from hours worked in Foreign. We dene wi;t as the immigrant wage earned in Home, so
that the immigrantstotal labor income expressed in units of the foreign composite good
is wi;tQ 1t Li;t. Emigration requires a sunk cost of fe units of immigrant labor, equal to
10For simplicity, we do not allow for the possibility in which immigrants are integrated into the societies
were they reside. Here immigrants and natives remain as separate entities when maximizing utility. We
believe that our assumption is reasonable given our emphasis in business cycle implications. In addition, the
fact that return migration is sizable (as explained in the introduction) and immigrantscultural integration
is limited, provides support to our premise.
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fewi;tQ
 1
t units of the foreign consumption basket. Finally, r

t is the return on foreign
capital net of depreciation.
It is useful to re-write the constraint as:
wtL

t + dtLi;t + (1 + r

t )K

t > Ct + fewi;tQ 1t Le;t +Kt+1; (3.20)
where dt is the di¤erence between the immigrant wage in Home and the wage in the country
of origin at time t, expressed in units of the foreign consumption basket:
dt = wi;tQ
 1
t   wt : (3.21)
Potential emigrants face a trade-o¤ between the sunk migration cost, fewi;tQ 1t , and
the present discounted value of the di¤erence between the streams of future wages at the
destination, wi;tQ 1t , and in the country of origin, wt , expressed in units of the foreign
composite good. Using the new budget constraint and the law of motion for the stock
of immigrant labor, Li;t = (1   l)(Li;t 1 + Le;t 1), the optimization with respect to new
emigrant labor Le;t every period implies:
fewi;tQ
 1
t =
1X
s=t+1
[(1  l)]s tEt

Ct
Cs

ds

; (3.22)
which shows that, in equilibrium, the sunk emigration cost equals the present discounted
gain from emigration, measured as the di¤erence between the future expected wages at the
destination and in the country of origin, expressed in units of the foreign composite good.
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Production of the Foreign Intermediate Good Foreign production is a Cobb-
Douglas function of non-emigrant labor, Lf;t; and capital, K

t . Following BKK, the resulting
foreign-specic intermediate good, Yf;t; can be either used domestically, Yf2;t; or exported
to the Home economy, Yf1;t:
Yf;t = A

t (K

t )
  Lf;t1  ; (3.23)
Yf;t = Yf1;t + Yf2;t: (3.24)
The foreign composite good, Y t ; incorporates amounts of both the foreign-specic in-
termediate good, Yf2;t; and the home-specic imported good, Yh2;t:
Y t =
h
!
 1
 (Yf2;t)
 1
 + (1  !) 1 (Yh2;t)
 1

i  1
: (3.25)
This nal good composite can be consumed by the foreign resident labor (i.e. as opposed
to the foreign emigrant labor), can be invested in physical capital, and can be used for
investment in new emigration (i.e. to cover the sunk costs required to send new emigrant
labor abroad):
Y t =

1  Li;t
L

Ct + I

t + fewi;tQ
 1
t Le;t (3.26)
Finally, capital accumulation is described by:
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It : (3.27)
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Optimality Conditions Householdsoptimization problem delivers a typical Euler
equation and pins down the total labor e¤ort:
1 = Et

(1 + rt+1)
Ct
Ct+1

; (3.28)
wt
Ct
= (Lt )
 ; (3.29)
The demand functions for the home and foreign-specic goods are:
Yf2;t = !
 (pf;t)  Y t ; (3.30)
Yh2;t = (1  !)

ph;t
Qt
 
Y t ; (3.31)
where pf;t and
ph;t
Qt
; respectively, are the price of the foreign-specic and home-specic good,
both expressed in units of the foreign consumption basket.
In turn, the net return on capital and local wages are respectively determined by the
marginal product of capital and labor:
rt = 
Yf;t
Kt
  ; (3.32)
wt = (1  )
Yf;t
Lf;t
: (3.33)
3.2.3 Financial Integration
We introduce nancial integration by assuming that: (1) International asset markets are
incomplete, and households in each country issue risk-free bonds denominated in their own
currency, as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005); (2) Each type of bond provides a real return
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denominated in units of that countrys consumption basket. (3) In order to avoid the
non-stationarity of net foreign assets we introduce quadratic costs of adjustment for bond
holdings, a tool which allows us to pin down the steady state and also to ensure stationarity.
The innitely-lived representative agent maximizes the inter-temporal utility subject to
the constraint:
wtLt +

1 + rkt

Kt +

1 + rbt

Bh;t +

1 + rbt

QtBf;t + Tt (3.34)
> Ct +Kt+1 +Bh;t+1 +

2
(Bh;t+1)
2 +QtBf;t+1 +

2
Qt (Bf;t+1)
2 ;
where rkt is the rental rate of capital in Home; r
b
t and r
b
t are the rates of return of the home
and foreign bonds; (1 + rbt )Bh;t and (1 + r
b
t )QtBf;t are the principal and interest income
from holdings of the home and foreign bonds; 2 (Bh;t+1)
2 and 2Qt (Bf;t+1)
2 are the cost of
adjusting holdings of the home and foreign bonds, respectively; Tt is is the fee rebate.11 We
add the two Euler equations for bonds to the baseline model:
1 + Bh;t+1 = (1 + r
b
t+1)Et

Ct
Ct+1

; (3.35)
1 + Bf;t+1 = (1 + r
b
t+1)Et

Qt+1
Qt
Ct
Ct+1

: (3.36)
11 is positive to avoid non-stationarity of the stock of liabilities, but is set close to zero (0.0025) to avoid
altering the high-frequency dynamics of the model. In addition, following Bodenstein (2008), later we will
pick a su¢ ciently high value for the trade elasticity of substitution, ; to avoid the possibility of multiple
equilibria.
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With trade in bonds, the budget constraint of the foreign household becomes:
wt (L

t   Li;t) + wi;tQ 1t Li;t +

1 + rkt

Kt +

1 + rbt

Q 1t B

h;t +

1 + rbt

Bf;t + T

t
(3.37)
> Ct + fewi;tQ 1t Le;t +Kt+1 +Q 1t Bh;t+1 +

2
Q 1t
 
Bh;t+1
2
+Bf;t+1 +

2
 
Bf;t+1
2
;
and the corresponding Euler equations for bonds are:
1 + Bh;t+1 = 
(1 + rbt+1)Et

Qt
Qt+1
Ct
Ct+1

; (3.38)
1 + Bf;t+1 = 
(1 + rbt+1)Et

Ct
Ct+1

: (3.39)
The market clearing conditions for bonds are:
Bh;t+1 +B

h;t+1 = 0; (3.40)
Bf;t+1 +B

f;t+1 = 0: (3.41)
Thus, nancial integration through trade in country-specic bonds adds 6 variables
(Bh;t; Bf;t; Bh;t; B

f;t; r
b
t and r
b
t ) and 6 equations (3.35, 3.36, 3.38, 3.39, 3.40 and 3.41) to
the baseline model with nancial autarky.
3.2.4 Trade Balance and Remittances
From a theoretical standpoint, we dene workersremittances; t; as the di¤erence between
(a) the immigrant labor income and (b) the immigrant labors share in foreign consumption,
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measured as the amount of foreign consumption that is proportional with the share of
immigrant labor in the steady-state foreign labor supply, expressed in units of the home
consumption basket:
t = wi;tLi;t   Li;t
L
CtQt: (3.42)
Thus, the current account balance, measured in units of the home composite good, is:
CAt = ph;tYh2;t   pf;tQtYf1;t   t: (3.43)
Under nancial autarky, the balanced current account condition, CAt = 0, implies that
the trade balance, TBt = ph;tYh2;t   pf;tQtYf1;t; must equal the amount of remittances, t.
Here remittances act as a substitute for contingent claims in smoothing income ows in the
absence of nancial integration.12
Under nancial integration, we replace the balanced current account condition (TBt  
t = 0) from the model with nancial autarky with the expression for the balance of
international payments:
(ph;tYh2;t   pf;tQtYf1;t) + (rbtBh;t + rbt QtBf;t)  t = (Bh;t+1  Bh;t) +Qt (Bf;t+1  Bf;t)
(3.44)
which shows that the current account balance (i.e. the trade balance plus nancial invest-
12 It is useful to show that, using the resource constraint Yt = ph;tYh1;t+pf;tQtYf1;t = Ct+It+
Li;t
Lt
CtQt; we
can re-write the home GDP expressed in units of the home-specic good as ph;tYh;t = Ct + It +
Li;t
Lt
CtQt +
TBt: Similarly, using that Y t = ph;tQ
 1
t Yh2;t + pf;tYf2;t =

1  Li;t
Lt

Ct + I

t + fewi;tQ
 1
t Le;t, we can
write the foreign GDP expressed in units of the foreign-specic good as pf;tYf;t =

1  Li;t
Lt

Ct + I

t +
fewi;tQ
 1
t Le;t  Q 1t TBt:
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ment income minus remittances) must equal the negative of the nancial account balance
(i.e. the change in bond holdings).
3.3 Alternative Model Specication (Skill Heterogeneity)
We allow for skill heterogeneity in Home by introducing two types of native labor: skilled
and unskilled. We also assume that the foreign labor is relatively unskilled and can migrate
to Home, where it becomes a perfect substitute for the native unskilled labor, as in Borjas
et al. (2008). Capital and native skilled labor are relative complements, whereas capital
and unskilled labor (i.e. immigrant and native) are relative substitutes, as in Krusell et al.
(2000).
Native Labor Supply with Two Representative Households While the descrip-
tion of the foreign economy remains identical, the home economy now includes a continuum
of two types of innitely-lived households that supply units of skilled and unskilled labor, as
in Lindquist (2004) and Polgreen and Silos (2006). Every period t, each of the two represen-
tative households consumes cj;t units the home consumption basket and supplies lj;t units
of labor, where subscript j 2 fs; ug denotes skilled and unskilled labor, respectively. Thus,
the planner maximizes the weighted sum of utilities for the two representative households:
max
fcs;t;ls;t;cu;t;lu;t;Kt+1g
1X
t=0
s t fsU (cs;t; ls;t) + (1  ) (1  s)U (cu;t; lu;t)g ; (3.45)
137
where utility takes the log-CRRA form as in (3.2), and the constraint is:
ws;tLs;t + wu;tLu;t + (1 + rt)Kt > Cs;t + Cu;t +Kt+1; (3.46)
where s denotes the fraction of skilled households and 1   s is the fraction of unskilled
households in the total population;  and 1   are the weights of the utility of skilled and
unskilled households, respectively, in the objective function of the planner. Ls;t = sls;t and
Lu;t = (1  s) lu;t are the aggregate amounts of skilled and unskilled labor which rms hire
at the equilibrium wages ws;t and wu;t, respectively. Cs;t = scs;t and Cu;t = (1  s) cu;t are
the aggregate consumptions of the skilled and unskilled households.
The maximization problem for the two representative agents generates the usual rst-
order conditions:

cs;t
=
1  
cu;t
= t; (3.47)
1 = Et

(1 + rt+1)
t+1
t

; (3.48)
ws;t
cs;t
=
s
s
(ls;t)
 s ; (3.49)
wu;t
cu;t
=
u
(1  s) (lu;t)
 u : (3.50)
where j;  j ; j fs; ug represent weights in the utility function and the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of skilled and unskilled labor supply.
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Production of the Home Intermediate Good In the alternative specication,
production function is a nested CES aggregate:
Yh;t = At
n

1
 (1;t)
 1
 + (1  ) 1 (2;t)
 1

o 
 1
; (3.51)
of the following components:
1;t = Li;t + Lu;t; (3.52)
2;t =
h

1
 (Kt)
 1
 + (1  ) 1 (Ls;t)
 1

i 
 1
; (3.53)
where 1;t is a function in which the unskilled immigrant and native labor enter as perfect
substitutes; 2;t is a CES function of capital and skilled native labor;  is the fraction of
unskilled labor in output; =(1  ) is the share of capital in output. Finally,  > 0 governs
the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor, which is the same as the
elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labor;  > 0 is the elasticity of
substitution between capital and skilled labor. Following Krusell et al. (2000), we restrict
 >  under the assumption of capital-skill complementarity.
The prot maximization problem of rms generates the following optimality conditions:
@Yh;t
@Kt
= 1 (At)
 1
 (Yh;t)
1
 (2;t)
 
 (Kt)
  1
 = rt + ; (3.54)
@Yh;t
@Li;t
=
@Yh;t
@Lu;t
= (At)
 1



Yh;t
Li;t + Lu;t
 1

= wu;t; (3.55)
@Yh;t
@Ls;t
= 2 (At)
 1
 (Yh;t)
1
 (2;t)
 
 ()
 1
 (Ls;t)
  1
 = ws;t; (3.56)
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where 1 = (1  )
1
 
1
 and 2 = (1  )
1
 (1  ) 1 :
The rest of the economy is described by the equations of the baseline specication model
outlined in the previous section. The only exception is the resource constraint in the home
economy, which becomes:
Yt = Cs;t + Cu;t + It +
Li;t
L
CtQt (3.57)
3.4 Parameterization
We use the standard quarterly calibration from BKK:  = 1:5 is the elasticity of substitution
between the home and foreign-specic goods in the composite basket of both countries;
 = 0:33 is the share of capital in output;  = 0:025 is the depreciation rate of the capital
stock; ! = ! = 0:85 reects the degree of home bias in each economy;  =   = 0:33 is
the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply. In addition, we set the quarterly return rate
for the established immigrant labor l = 0:07, which reects the ndings in Reyes (1997)
that approximately 50 percent of the undocumented Mexican immigrants return to their
country of origin within two years after their arrival in the U.S. (which corresponds to a
quarterly exit rate of 0.0635), and that 65 percent of them return within four years after
their arrival (i.e. quarterly exit rate of 0.0830).13
Baseline Model Calibration For the baseline model with symmetric elasticity of
substitution between capital and each type of labor (native and immigrant) and interna-
13Using the information that 35 percent of the undocumented Mexican immigrants are still in the U.S.
four years after their arrival, we compute the quarterly exit rate as (1  l;4y)16 = 0:35:
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tional trade in bonds, the calibration parameters are described in Table 1. We are left with
four parameters to calibrate: ; ;  and fe. To this end, we choose four empirical moments
that the model should match within reasonable limits in steady state: (1) The share of
Mexicos labor force residing in the U.S. is 10 percent (Hanson, 2006); (2) Remittances rep-
resented the equivalent of 2:5 percent of Mexicos GDP in 2004 (Bank of Mexico, 2004)14;
(3) The ratio between the average wages of U.S. native and Mexican immigrant labor is
2:115; (4) The U.S.-Mexico ratio of GDP per capita expressed in terms of purchasing power
parity is approximately 3:3, according to IMFs World Economic Outlook data. To this
end, we set  = 0:08 (the share of immigrant labor in total labor income),  = 6:2 (the
relative productivity of native vs. immigrant labor),  = 1:30 (the elasticity of substitution
between native and immigrant labor16), and fe = 4:7 (the sunk cost of labor migration).17
Given the key role of the degree of complementarity between native and immigrant labor,
we perform robustness checks with low and high substitutability between immigrant and
native workers,  = 0:5 and  = 2:5.
14The model generates a more conservative estimate (1 percent) compared to the 2:5 percent recorded
in 2004 (Bank of Mexico, 2004), as remittances to Mexico more than doubled between 1997 and 2004
(Hernández-Coss, 2005).
15For the immigrant wage we use the average hourly wages for immigrant Mexican males in the U.S. (28
to 32 years of age, with 9 to 11 years of schooling completed) provided by Hanson (2006); we also compute
the weighted average hourly wage of the U.S. native labor using data from the U.S. Census Bureau (2007).
16We take the estimate of the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor (1:26) under
the symmetric model setup in Krusell et al. (2000) as a benchmark for the value of  in our baseline model.
17Relative to these targets, the baseline model with trade in bonds generates: (1) the steady state share
of immigrant labor in Foreigns total is Li
L = 0:1; (2) the ratio between the native and immigrant labor is
wn
wi
= 1:63; (3) remittances represent the equivalent of 1:5 percent of the foreign GDP; (4) the GDP ratio
between Home and Foreign is 2:3.
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Table 1. Baseline model calibration
 = 0:08 Share of immigrant labor in total labor income
 = 6:2 Relative productivity of native vs. immigrant labor
 = 1:3 Elasticity of substitution between native and immigrant labor
fe = 4:7 Sunk cost of labor migration
Alternative Model Calibration For the alternative model with two types of native
labor in Home (skilled and unskilled), in which native unskilled and immigrant labor are
perfect substitutes, the calibration is summarized in Table 2. We dene the pool of native
unskilled labor to include the adult population without a high school degree; using data
from the U.S. Census Bureau, we set the share of unskilled labor at (1  s) = 0:08:
We choose values for parameters e; e; e; e and efe so that the alternative model with
trade in bonds comes reasonably close to replicating a set of ve empirical moments from
the U.S. and Mexico in steady state: (1) The share of Mexicos labor force residing in the
U.S. is LiL = 0:1 (Hanson, 2006). (2) Remittances represent the equivalent of 2:5 percent
of Mexicos GDP (compared to which the model generates the more conservative estimate
of 1:5 percent); (3) The ratio between the wages of the native skilled and unskilled labor
in the U.S. is 2:2 (and wswu = 2:2 in the model).
18 (4) Controlling for age and educational
attainment, the ratio between the hourly wage of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. and
the corresponding wage in Mexico expressed in terms of purchasing power parity is 3:64
18We take the weighted average of hourly earnings for the U.S. skilled labor (i.e. high school degree or
more), as well as for the U.S. unskilled labor (i.e. without a high school degree) using data provided by the
U.S. Census Bureau (2006, 2007). We divide the sample into four groups: (a) no high school degree; (b)
completed high school; (c) some college or associates degree; and (d) bachelors degree or higher. Then we
take the average of the respective earnings weighted by their share in the total population.
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(compared to which the model generates wiQw = 1:9, enough to maintain the labor migration
incentive);19 (5) The U.S.-Mexico share of GDP per capita expressed in purchasing power
parity terms is approximately 3:3, according to IMFs World Economic Outlook data (vs.
3:5 in the model). To this end, we choose e = 0:1, e = 1:30, e = 1:07, e = 3:1 and efe = 5:4.
As already discussed, we base the assumption that e > e on the ndings of Krusell et al.
(2000) that skilled labor and capital are relative complements, whereas skilled and unskilled
labor are relative substitutes.20
Table 2. Alternative model calibration
s = 0:92 Share of Home skilled in total households
e = 0:1 Share of native + immigrant unskilled in GDP
e = =(1  e) Share of capital in GDP
e = 1:30 Elasticity of substitution, capital vs. unskilled labor
e = 1:07 Elasticity of substitution, capital vs. skilled labor
e = 3:1 Relative productivity of native vs. immigrant labor
efe = 5:4 Sunk cost of labor migration
 = 0:688 Weight on the utility of skilled labor
Finally, we set the weight on the utility of representative skilled household  = 0:688,
19We build this ratio using wage data provided in Hanson (2006) for (1) the hourly wage of the recent
Mexican immigrants in the U.S., and (2) the hourly wage of those of similar age and educational attainement
that reside in Mexico (i.e. males between 28-32 years of age with 9 to 11 years of schooling), adjusted for
purchasing power parity. The wage ratios for other age and educational attainment groups are similar (see
Hanson, 2006).
20We take the estimates for the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor (1:67) and
that for capital and skilled labor (0:67) from the specication with capital-skill complementarity in Krusell
et al. (2000) as benchmarks for the values of e and e in our alternative model with skill heterogeneity.
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so that the consumption ratio for the home representative skilled and unskilled households
matches the corresponding wage ratio, cscu =
ws
wu
= 2:2: We base our assumption on the
ndings of Krueger and Perri (2007) and Attanasio and Davis (1996) that di¤erences in
the consumption of population groups with di¤erent levels of educational attainment (e.g.
skilled and unskilled) closely reect the income di¤erences between the respective groups.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Impulse Response Analysis
To illustrate the workings of the model, we consider the response paths of key variables
(percent deviations from steady state) to unanticipated productivity innovations in the
home economy for both the baseline and the alternative model (Figures 4-7). We assume
that productivity follows a rst-order autoregressive process that persists at the rate of
0:95 per quarter. We report the responses of the key variables, measured as the percent
deviation from steady state in each quarter after the initial shock, to transitory changes in
productivity.
Baseline Model with Financial Autarky As shown in Figure 4, following a tran-
sitory one percent increase in productivity in Home, the increase in the immigrant wage
premium (d) encourages the entry of new immigrants (Le), entry which is however damp-
ened by the sunk emigration cost. The immigrant wage premium and immigrant entry
persist above their steady-state levels after the initial shock, so that the stock of established
immigrant labor (Li) adjusts gradually over time. The stock of immigrant labor increases by
more in the economy with the relatively low sunk immigration cost (fe = 2:0, dotted line).
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In contrast, immigrant labor becomes relatively more scarce during booms in Home in the
scenario with the higher sunk cost (fe = 4:7, continuos line), thus causing the immigrant
wage to increase by more. Therefore, as foreign households attempt to smooth consumption
across members residing in both countries, remittances increase by more in the model with
the higher sunk immigration cost. The results indicate that a more restrictive immigration
policy and higher immigration barriers enhance the volatility of the immigrant wage and
remittances.
In the foreign economy, output declines by less in the scenario with the higher sunk cost
of immigration. The result is due to the larger amount of resident labor that is forced to
remain in Foreign, which in turn dampens the wage increase and enhances the accumulation
of physical capital in Foreign.
Baseline Model with High Complementarity Due to the complementarity be-
tween capital and immigrant labor, the higher sunk cost of immigration dampens invest-
ment and output growth in Home relative to the scenario with the relatively low sunk cost.
Although small in the baseline calibration, the e¤ect increases with the complementarity
between the native and immigrant labor. The impulse responses in Figure 5 show that a
higher complementarity between the two types of labor ( = 0:5) relative to the baseline
calibration ( = 1:5) makes the barriers to immigration more harmful for the home econ-
omy. The higher complementarity dampens the increase in the demand for native labor
and also capital accumulation in Home, which causes a relatively lower increase in home
output, native wage and consumption than in the baseline calibration case.21
21The case of high immigration barriers and high complementarity between the native and immigrant labor
delivers a paradoxical behavior of the real exchange rate and of the terms of trade. Although the scenario
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Baseline Model with Financial Integration The response paths are similar for
the baseline model with international trade in bonds (Figure 6). In this case, one-period
risk-free bonds constitute an additional instrument - other than remittances - that foreign
households can use to smooth their inter-temporal consumption path. That is, from a risk
sharing perspective, foreign households have the option to lend o¤shore as an alternative to
investing in emigration. Following a transitory one percent increase in home productivity,
nancial integration allows capital to migrate towards the economy with a relatively high
rate of return (Home), whose trade balance becomes negative. In turn, Home becomes
relatively more capital intensive, which improves the productivity of labor and encourages
more immigration over the business cycle (i.e. the entry and the stock of immigrant labor
increase by more for fe = 2:0, dotted line) relative to the case with nancial autarky
(depicted in Figure 4).
Alternative Model with Financial Integration The alternative model with -
nancial integration generates results that suggest a similar link between immigration ows
and remittances. Following a one percent transitory increase in home productivity, the
adjustment in the stock of established immigrant labor is faster and larger in the economy
with the lower immigration cost. In turn, the greater exibility of the supply of immigrant
labor during booms leads to a lower increase in the immigrant wage and the amount of
remittances.
with high barriers to immigration generates a relatively more scarce home output and more abundant foreign
output (becase a larger share of foreign labor remains in the country of origin, as explained above) relative
to the scenario with low immigration costs, higher remittances improve the purchasing power of residents in
Foreign, that have a home bias towards the foreign good. In turn, this leads to an increase in the relative
price of foreign output, so that the real exchange rate Q increases by more (i.e. the real exchange rate of
Home depreciates by more) than in the case with low sunk cost.
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In the presence of skill heterogeneity in Home, the results highlight the asymmetric
e¤ect of unskilled immigration on the native labor. During booms, the relatively quick
adjustment in the stock of immigrant labor in the scenario with a lower immigration cost
dampens the increase in the native unskilled wage, as the native unskilled and immigrant
unskilled labor are perfect substitutes. Conversely, during recessions in Home, the sharper
decline in the stock of immigrant labor allows for a smaller decline in the wage of native
unskilled labor. Thus, a more exible immigration policy reduces the volatility of wages for
the native labor types that are close substitutes with immigrant labor.
3.5.2 Theoretical Moments
In order to test the empirical relevance of our model, we compute the second moments
of migration ows and remittances generated by the baseline and alternative models with
trade in bonds, and contrast them to the corresponding empirical moments. We show that
both models succeed qualitatively in replicating the key cyclical characteristics of labor
migration and remittances which we document using data for the U.S. and Mexico.
As in the standard international real business cycles literature, we assume that produc-
tivity follows an autoregressive bivariate process:
2664 logAt
logAt
3775 =
2664 A AA
AA A
3775
2664 logAt 1
logAt 1
3775+
2664 t
t
3775 ; (3.58)
Following Heathcote and Perri (2002), we estimate its parameters using the seemingly un-
related regression (SURE) method.22 To this end, we use the Solow residual as a measure
22Tipically, international real business cycle models are solved assuming that total factor productivity
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for aggregate productivity in the U.S. and Mexico, computed from quarterly data on GDP,
the capital stock and employment (measured as the number of workers) for the interval
between 1987:1 and 2003:2.23
Our estimates for the transition matrix of the productivity process A and for the
variance-covariance matrix  are given below (with standard errors in parentheses):
A =
26664
0:996
(0:014)
0:003
(0:015)
0:049
(0:040)
0:951
(0:040)
37775 ; =
2664 0:00509392 0:00001898
0:00001898 0:01395702
3775 : (3.59)
We nd that (1) productivity in Mexico shows a lower persistence than in the U.S.; (2)
the spillover estimates are not statistically di¤erent from zero (although the point estimate
of the U.S.-to-Mexico spillover is positive and notably larger than that for the Mexico-
to-U.S. one); thus, we set them to be zero in the model calibration; (3) the productivity
process is notably more volatile in Mexico than in the U.S.; (4) the correlation between the
productivity innovations in the U.S. and Mexico (0:27) is only slightly higher than the one
provided by Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) for the U.S. and Europe (0:26), but lower
than the one they nd for the U.S. and Canada (0:43).
In Table 3 (Panel A) we report the empirical correlations of border apprehensions (which
we use as a proxy for the entry of immigrants) and remittances with (1) the ratio of real
GDP in the U.S. and Mexico adjusted for the real exchange rate, (2) real GDP in the U.S.,
and (3) real GDP in Mexico. In the data, immigrant entry and remittances are pro-cyclical
with the U.S.-Mexico GDP ratio, pro-cyclical with the U.S. GDP, and counter-cyclical with
(TFP) processes are stationarity (See Rabanal et al., 2008). For model comparison we follow these guidelines.
23For Mexico, we use the Solow residual data in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007).
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Mexicos GDP.
Table 3. Correlations of labor migration ows and remittances24
(A) Empirical moments
GDPUS
QGDPMex GDPUS GDPMex
Immigrant entry 0:28 0:28  0:16
Remittances 0:50 0:49  0:35
(B) Baseline model with bonds
GDPh
QGDPf GDPh GDPf
Immigrant entry 0:98 0:22  0:87
Remittances 0:39 0:88  0:05
(C) Alternative model with bonds
GDPh
QGDPf GDPh GDPf
Immigrant entry 0:98 0:03  0:96
Remittances 0:54 0:87  0:19
Both the baseline and alternative models replicate qualitatively the cyclicality of mi-
gration ows and remittances observable from the data (Table 3, Panels B and C). The
models generate labor migration ows (Le) that are pro-cyclical with the GDP ratio be-
tween the two economies, pro-cyclical with the GDP of the destination economy (Home),
and counter-cyclical with the GDP of the economy where the immigrant labor originates
24We report the empirical correlations of series in natural logs and HP-ltered. For each
economy, the theoretical GDP is measured in units of the consumption basket, GDPh = phyh
and GDPf = pfyf : Theoretical remittances are measured in units of the home consumption
basket.
149
(Foreign). The models also replicate the cyclical behavior of the "altruistic" remittance
ows from the U.S. to Mexico. In both models, the remittance ows are procyclical with
the GDP ratio between Home and Foreign, pro-cyclical with the GDP of the economy where
the immigrant labor earns its income (Home), and counter-cyclical with the GDP of the
economy that receives remittances (Foreign).25
Table 4 Theoretical and Empirical Moments of Macroeconomic Variables
Data No migration Labor migration
Correlations: (U.S.-Mexico) (BKK94) Baseline Alternative
GDPh; GDPf 0:16 0:28 0:27 0:26
C; C  0:04 0:43 0:47 0:61
International real business cycle (IRBC) models have di¢ culty in accounting for a set of
empirical patterns visible in cross-country data (Heathcote and Perri, 2002), and our model
of immigration and remittances is no exception. In particular, the empirical cross-country
correlations for consumption are lower than for output, whereas the IRBC framework gen-
erates consumption correlations that are notably higher than the corresponding output
correlations (Table 4). In fact, adding labor migration ows and remittances as an extra
insurance mechanism enhances the correlation of consumption in the baseline and alterna-
tive models with labor migration relative to the model with no labor mobility. This result
25Our measure of remittances inheritsone of the risk-sharing anomalies of the IRBC framework. Namely,
following a productivity increase in Home, the real exchange rate depreciates. Due to the increase in the
foreign price index, the immigrant labor income and remittances decrease when measured in units of the
foreign consumption basket, although they increase when measured in units of the home basket. As a result,
the correlation of remittances measured in units of the home basket (as in Table 5.1) with the foreign GDP
is negative (as in the data), whereas the correlation of remittances measured in units of the foreign basket
with foreign GDP is positive (contrary to the data).
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highlights the insurance role of labor migration and remittances in generating cross-country
consumption smoothing.
3.6 Welfare Implications
3.6.1 Tightening the Border
In this section we analyze the welfare e¤ects of a sudden and permanent increase in the
sunk immigration cost in the baseline setup (from fe = 4 to fe = 5) that could be related
to an increase in border enforcement. The transition paths to a new steady state in Figure
8 show that the declining availability of immigrant labor makes capital less productive and
therefore dampens investment, which leads to a decline in the capital stock. Due to the
higher entry barriers, rms initially substitute the immigrant for native labor. Despite
the lack of increase in native wages, the inter-temporal optimization determines native
households to commit more hours in the present, when wages and the return on capital
(interest rate) are signicantly higher, than in the future. However, as the rate of capital
depletion decreases, the incentive for inter-temporal substitution weakens and labor supply
increases again, however without exceeding the original steady state.
While the impulse response analysis previously done illustrated the workings of the
model, the quantitative welfare analysis needs to take into account that permanent changes
in border enforcement have not only cyclical but also permanent e¤ects on the balanced-
growth path. We solve the model using a second-order approximation to the policy function
around the steady state and consider both temporary stochastic, and permanent determinis-
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tic shocks which are perfectly anticipated by economic agents.26 We study the welfare e¤ect
of the permanent increase in the sunk cost over a wide range of values for the elasticity of
substitution between immigrant and native labor in the baseline model, i.e.  2 [0:5; 2:5].
We dene welfare (Vt) as the present discounted value of the stream of expected utility.
Thus, we compare the welfare of home households in the initial steady-state (V0) with their
welfare as of the period t0 when the increase in the sunk cost of immigration takes place.
The welfare level as of the period t0 takes into account the discounted stream of utilities
that the representative household achieves at all periods during the transition path to the
new steady state after the permanent increase in the sunk cost of emigration:
Vt0 = Et0
1X
v=t0
vU
 
Cv; Lv

: (3.60)
Next we dene the constants C0 and C1 to denote the permanent streams of aggregate
consumption that would generate the welfare values V0 and Vt0 : V0 = 11  ln(C0); Vt0 =
1
1  ln(C1); and compute the consumption-equivalent welfare gain ( > 0) or loss ( < 0)
that corresponds to the permanent increase of the barriers to immigration:  =

C1
C0
  1


100: The results in Figure 9 show that the home economy experiences a consumption-
equivalent welfare loss for the entire range of values  2 [0:5; 2:5] of the elasticity of sub-
stitution between immigrant and native labor. In particular, the loss increases with the
degree of complementarity between capital and immigrant labor.
26We add the future values of the deterministic balanced growth path to the list of state variables (see
Juillard, 2006, for details).
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3.6.2 Alternative Model: Gradual Increase in the Share of Native Skilled
This section explores the impact of immigration barriers on welfare in the presence of a grad-
ual and permanent increase in the share of skilled native labor in Home. In the alternative
model with two types of native labor (skilled and unskilled), we introduce a deterministic
growth path in the share of skilled native labor in the total population, allowing it to in-
crease from 0.90 to 0.97 over 20 years. In our model parameterization this number accounts
for the share of natives without a high school diploma.
We assume that households take into account with perfect certainty the expected growth
path of the share of skilled labor when solving their inter-temporal optimization problem,
and compute the consumption-equivalent welfare gain (or loss) associated with the increas-
ing share of skilled labor relative to the initial steady state. To this end, we compare the
home welfare in the initial steady state:
V0 =
1
1  

sU
 
cs; ls

+ (1  ) (1  s)U  cu; lu	 (3.61)
with home welfare as of period t0 when households learn about the growth path of the share
of skilled labor:
Vt0 = Et0
1X
v=t0
v fsvU (cs;v; ls;v) + (1  ) (1  sv)U (cu;v; lu;v)g : (3.62)
The results in Figure 10 show that an economy is likely to experience a welfare loss
from maintaining immigration barriers for the unskilled when its share of skilled native
labor increases over time. The welfare loss increases with the magnitude of barriers to
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immigration and with the degree of complementarity between capital and immigrant labor.
Although the immigrant and native unskilled labor are perfect substitutes, the welfare loss
su¤ered by the home unskilled households is o¤set by the larger accumulation of capital
which enhances the productivity of the home skilled labor in the presence of immigration.
In particular, for very low values of  (for which it is particularly di¢ cult to substitute away
from unskilled labor), we obtain the paradoxical result that the economy becomes worse o¤
as it limits the inow of unskilled immigrants, despite the accumulation of human capital.
Using the alternative model with two types of native labor (skilled and unskilled), we
repeat the welfare analysis with the share of skilled native labor increasing deterministically
from a lower initial level (i.e. from 0.60 to 0.67 over 20 years). As shown in Figure 11,
in contrast to the previous exercise, we nd that the welfare gain increases with border
enforcement. When a larger fraction of the native labor becomes exposed to competition
from the immigrant labor, the welfare loss of the home unskilled o¤sets the welfare gains
of the home skilled labor that benets from the greater accumulation of capital. This leads
to an overall welfare loss for the home economy.
To sum up, the results indicate that stricter border enforcement reduces welfare for
economies in which unskilled labor is becoming relatively scarce, particularly when it is
hard to substitute unskilled for skilled labor. In contrast, economies with relatively abun-
dant amounts of unskilled labor experience welfare losses from lowering the barriers to
immigration, particularly when it is easy to substitute unskilled for skilled labor.
154
3.7 Conclusion
This paper attempts to bridge the gap between modern international macroeconomics and
immigration theory. In contrast to the former, we allow for labor mobility across countries;
in contrast to the latter, we consider the business cycle dynamics and account for the trans-
mission of aggregate stochastic shocks across countries in the presence of labor migration.
In this context, we study the role of labor migration in explaining the behavior of remit-
tances across the economies involved. Thus, we consider the insurance role of remittances
as a substitute for contingent claims in smoothing the consumption of households in the
country of origin. We also examine the e¤ect of immigration policy on the volatility of labor
migration and remittance ows.
In the baseline model, we introduce labor migration ows within a parsimonious stan-
dard two-country model of international real business cycles. The incentive to emigrate
depends on the di¤erence between the expected future earnings at the destination and in
the country of origin, as well as on the perceived sunk costs of labor migration which reects
the immigration policy at the destination. In an alternative specication, we extend the
baseline model to allow for skill heterogeneity among the native labor in the destination
economy in the presence of capital-skill complementarity.
The impulse responses and theoretical moments show that both model specications
match qualitatively the cyclical dynamics of labor migration and remittances that we docu-
ment using data for the U.S. and Mexico. Restricting immigration dampens the adjustment
in the stock of established immigrant labor during both expansions and recessions in the
destination economy, and thus enhances the volatility of immigrant labor income and remit-
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tances. The welfare analysis also shows that the overall gain from unskilled immigration for
the destination economy increases with the degree of complementarity between the skilled
and unskilled labor, as well as with the share of the skilled in total native labor.
International real business cycle models have di¢ culty in reconciling their risk sharing
implications with the empirical evidence. Recent contributions properly address these con-
cerns while extending the standard setup (see for example, Boz et al., 2008; Corsetti et al.,
2008; Rabanal et al., 2008, among others). Accounting for these contributions can improve
the match between our models implications and the data. Finally, although we acknowl-
edge the importance of the cross-country migration of skilled labor, we do not model it in
this paper. Future research should explore these issues.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Baseline Model of Labor Migration with Financial Autarky, Steady
State
The foreign economy In steady state, A = 1. With the classic Cobb-Douglas
production function Yf = (K)
 
Lf
1 
, it is straightforward to solve for the steady
state in the foreign economy:
r =
1  

; (3.63)
Yf
K
=
r + 

; (3.64)
K =

Yf
K
 1
 1
Lf ; (3.65)
Yf =

Yf
K

K =

r + 

 
 1
Lf ; (3.66)
w = (1  ) Yf
Lf
= (1  )

r + 

 
 1
; (3.67)
I = K: (3.68)
The home economy For the home economy, we solve the steady state numerically
using a system of eight non-linear equations (3.69, 3.70, 3.74-3.79) in eight unknowns (Yh,
K, Li, Yh2, Yf1, ph, pf , Q), as described below.
Equations 1-2: With A = 1, output and the marginal product of capital are:
Yh = K

h

1
 (Li)
 1
 + (1  ) 1 (Ln)
 1

i 
 1 (1 )
; (3.69)
@Yh
@K
= 
Yh
K
= r + : (3.70)
Equation 3: Using the steady-state expression for the present discounted value of the
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future gains from immigration, feQ 1wi =
(1 l)
1 (1 l)d, we obtain:
Q 1wi = w + d; (3.71)
= w +
1  (1  l)
(1  l) feQ
 1wi: (3.72)
Thus, the steady state ratio of the immigrant wage and the wage in in the country of origin
expressed in units of the same consumption basket is:
  wi
wQ
=

1  1  
(1  l)
(1  l) fe
 1
; (3.73)
where  = 1 when fe = 0, i.e. with zero sunk cost of labor migration, the wage ratio is
equal to unit.
Next, we insert wi =
@Yh
@Li
and w = @Yf@L into the previous equation to obtain:
(1  ) (Yh)
1 
(1 ) K
( 1)
(1 )


Li;t
 1

| {z }
wi
= (1  )

r + 

 
 1
| {z }
w
Q: (3.74)
Equation 4: The balanced current account condition implies:
phYh2 = pfQYf1 + Liwi   Li
L
CQ; (3.75)
where wi is given above, and:
Y  =
h
!
 1
 (Yf   Yf1)
 1
 + (1  !) 1 (Yh1)
 1

i 
 1
;
Yf =

r + 

 
 1
(L   Li) ;
Le =
l
1  lLi:
Equations 5-6: We write the demand ratios for the two intermediate goods in each
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economy as:
Yh   Yh2
Yf1
=
!
1  !

ph
pfQ
 
; (3.76)
Yf   Yf1
Yh2
=
!
1  !

pfQ
ph
 
: (3.77)
Equations 7-8: The price indexes for the composite good of each country are:
1 = ! (ph)
1  + (1  !)(pfQ)1 ; (3.78)
1 = ! (pf )1 

+ (1  !)

ph
Q
1 
: (3.79)
3.A.2 Alternative Model of Labor Migration with Financial Autarky,
Steady State
The presence of skill heterogeneity among native labor (skilled and unskilled) in Home
requires several modications in the calculation of steady state relative to the baseline
model. In the system of eight equations in eight unknowns described above, Ln becomes
Ls (i.e. native skilled labor). One must also distinguish between individual vs. aggregate
labor supply (i.e. lj vs. Lj) and consumption (i.e. cj vs. Cj) for the representative skilled
and unskilled households (where j 2 fs; ug). Thus, equations 3.69, 3.70, 3.74 and 3.75 are
replaced by:
(Yh)
 1
 = 
1
 (Li + Lu)
 1
 + (1  ) 1
h

1
K
 1
 + (1  ) 1 (Ls)
 1

i 
 1
 1

;
(3.80)
r +  = 1 (Yh)
1

h

1
K
 1
 + (1  ) 1 (Ls)
 1

i  
( 1)
K
  1
 ; (3.81)

Yh
Li + Lu
 1

| {z }
wi
= (1  )

r + 

 
 1
| {z }
w
Q; (3.82)
phYh2 = pfQYf1 + Li


Yh
Li + Lu
 1

| {z }
wi
  Li
L
CQ: (3.83)
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3.A.3 Labor Migration with International Trade in Bonds, Steady State
The presence of quadratic costs of adjustment for bond holdings allows us to pin down their
steady-state levels. From 1 + Bh = (1 + rb), 1 + Bh = 
(1 + rb) and Bh + Bh = 0; it
follows that:
rb =
2
 + 
  1; (3.84)
Bh =  Bh =
(1 + rb)  1

: (3.85)
Similarly, using that 1 + Bf = (1 + rb), 1 + Bf = 
(1 + rb) and Bf +Bf = 0; it
follows that:
rb =
2
 + 
  1 = rb; (3.86)
Bf =  Bf =
(1 + rb)  1

: (3.87)
Finally, the balanced current account condition (3.75) is replaced by the expression for
the balance of international payments (3.44) in steady state:
phYh2;t   pfYf1Q 

wiLi   Li
L
CQ

| {z }
Remittances
+ rbBh + r
bQBf = 0: (3.88)
The steady state solutions for the remaining variables are as in Appendix A.1 and A.2.
3.A.4 Benchmark Model without Labor Migration (BKK94)
In the model without labor migration, each country specializes in the production of a single
good, labeled Yh;t for home and Yf;t for foreign, as in Backus, Kehoe, Kydland (1994). We
use log-CRRA preferences and abstract from government purchases and time-to-build in
capital formation.
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The model with nancial autarky The home economy is characterized by 11 equa-
tions in 11 variables (rt; wt; Ct; Lt; Yh;t; Yt; Yh;t; Yh2;t; It;Kt; ph;t):
1 = (1 + rt)Et

Ct
Ct+1

; (3.89)
wt
Ct
= L t ; (3.90)
Yh;t = AtK

t 1L
1 
t ; (3.91)
Yh;t = Yh1;t + Yh2;t; (3.92)
(Yt)
 1
 = !
1
 (Yh;t   Yh2;t)
 1
 + (1  !) 1 (Yf1;t)
 1
 ; (3.93)
Yt = Ct + It; (3.94)
Kt = It + (1  )Kt 1; (3.95)
Yh1;t = ! (ph;t)
  Yt; (3.96)
Yf1;t = (1  !) (pf;tQt)  Yt; (3.97)
rt = 
Yh;t+1
Kt
   (3.98)
wt = (1  ) Yh;t
Lt
(3.99)
All equations for the foreign economy are similar. Note that the price of the home
intermediate good expressed in units of the foreign consumption basket is Q 1t ph;t; therefore,
the demand functions for the home and foreign-specic good in the foreign economy are:
Yf2;t = !
 (pf;t)  Y t and Yh2;t = (1  !)
 
Q 1t ph;t
 
Y t , respectively.
Technology follows the process:
logAt =  logAt 1 + et;
logAt =  logA

t 1 + e

t
The real exchange rate Qt is pinned down by the trade balance, measured in units of
the home composite good:
NXt = Yh2;tph;t| {z }
exports
  Yf1;tpf;tQt| {z }
imports
: (3.100)
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Under nancial autarky and without remittances, NXt = 0.
Financial integration, trade in risk-free bonds International trade in risk-free
bonds (with quadratic cost of adjustment of bond holdings) adds 6 extra variables (i.e. the
rates of return of the home and foreign bonds, rbt and r
b
t ; holdings of the home and foreign
bonds by home households, Bh;t and Bf;t; holdings of the home and foreign bonds by foreign
households, Bh;t and B

f;t) and 6 new equations to the model with nancial autarky:
1 + Bh;t+1 = (1 + r
b
t+1)Et

Ct
Ct+1

; (3.101)
1 + Bf;t+1 = (1 + r
b
t+1)Et

Qt+1
Qt
Ct
Ct+1

; (3.102)
1 + Bh;t+1 = 
(1 + rbt+1)Et

Qt
Qt+1
Ct
Ct+1

; (3.103)
1 + Bf;t+1 = 
(1 + rbt+1)Et

Ct
Ct+1

; (3.104)
Bh;t+1 +B

h;t+1 = 0; (3.105)
Bf;t+1 +B

f;t+1 = 0: (3.106)
The expression for the balance of international payments replaces the balanced trade con-
dition from the model with nancial autarky:
ph;tYh2;t   pf;tQtYf1;t + rbtBh;t + rbt QtBf;t = 0: (3.107)
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3.A.5 BenchmarkModel without LaborMigration (BKK94), Steady State
In steady state, A = A = 1: In each country,
r =
1  

; r =
1  

; (3.108)

Yh
K
   = r ! Yh
K
=
r + 

;
Yf
K
=
r + 

; (3.109)
Yh = K
L1  ! K =

Yh
K
 1
 1
L;K =

Yf
K
 1
 1
L; (3.110)
Yh =

Yh
K

K =

r + 

 
 1
L; Yf =

r + 

 
 1
L; (3.111)
I = K; I = K: (3.112)
The symmetric case The solution with symmetric calibration parameters for the
two economies is described by:
ph = pf = Q = 1: (3.113)
Yh1 = Yf2 = !Yh: (3.114)
Yh2 = Yf1 = (1  !)Yh; (3.115)
where (1   !) represents the share imports in GDP. Using that Yh1 = !Yh and Yh2 =
(1  !)Yh,
Y =
h
!
1
 (Yh1)
 1
 + (1  !) 1 (Yf1)
 1

i 
 1
= Yh; (3.116)
C = Y   I: (3.117)
Asymmetric steady state This section describes the steady-state solution for cross-
country asymmetries of the type  6= ;  6= ;  6=  and ! 6= !:The equations
(3.108)-(3.112) still hold. We obtain the steady-state solutions numerically using a system
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of 5 equations in 5 unknowns (Yh1; Yf2; ph; pf ; Q):
Yh1
Yf   Yf2 =
!
1  !

ph
pfQ
 
; (3.118)
Yf2
Yh   Yh2 =
!
1  !

pfQ
ph
 
; (3.119)
1 = ! (ph)
1  + (1  !)(pfQ)1 ; (3.120)
1 = ! (pf )1 

+ (1  !)

ph
Q
1 
(3.121)
In nancial autarky, the balanced trade condition is:
Yh2ph   Yf1pfQ = 0: (3.122)
With nancial integration, balanced trade is replaced by the expression for the balance
of international payments:
phYh2   pfQYf1 + rbBh + rbQBf = 0: (3.123)
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Figure 1. U.S.-Mexico border apprehensions and the U.S.-Mexico GDP ratio 
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Source: Hanson (2007), Haver Statistics, and International Financial Statistics (2008). 
Note: We have seasonally-adjusted the series for border apprehensions using the X-12 ARIMA method 
of the U.S. Census Bureau. The resulting seasonally-adjusted series were logged and HP(1600) 
filtered. The U.S.-Mexico GDP ratio is computed as the ratio between (1) the U.S. real GDP and (2) 
the real Mexican GDP multiplied by the bilateral real exchange rate. 
 
Figure 2. U.S.-Mexico remittances and the U.S.-Mexico GDP ratio 
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Source: Haver Statistics and Banco de México. Remittances are expressed in Mexican pesos at 
constant prices. Series were seasonally adjusted and detrended with the methods described in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 3. Correlations of U.S.-Mexico border apprehensions (left) and U.S.-Mexico 
remittances (right) with the j lags and leads of the U.S.-Mexico GDP ratio 
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Note: correlations are computed based on the data in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. 
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Figure 4. Baseline model with financial autarky 
 
 
 
 
 
Each panel shows the response (percent deviations from steady state) to a transitory 1 percent increase 
in home productivity, for the cases with high sunk cost (solid line) and low sunk cost (dashed line). 
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Figure 5. Baseline model with financial autarky, high complementarity between 
native and immigrant labor 
 
 
 
 
Each panel shows the response (percent deviations from steady state) to a transitory 1 percent increase 
in home productivity, under high complementarity (θ = 0.5) between the native and immigrant labor, 
for the cases with high sunk cost (solid line) and low sunk cost (dashed line). 
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Figure 6. Baseline model with financial integration 
 
 
 
 
 
Each panel shows the response (percent deviations from steady state) to a transitory 1 percent increase 
in home productivity, for the cases with high sunk cost (solid line) and low sunk cost (dashed line). 
The model allows for international trade in risk-free bonds (with adjustment cost parameter π = 
0.0025). 
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Figure 7. Alternative model with financial integration 
 
 
 
 
 
Each panel shows the response (percent deviations from steady state) to a transitory 1 percent increase 
in home productivity in the alternative model (i.e. with skill heterogeneity among the native labor and 
capital-skill complementarity), for the cases with high sunk cost (solid line) and low sunk cost (dashed 
line). The model allows for international trade in risk-free bonds (with adjustment cost parameter π = 
0.0025). 
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Figure 8. Baseline model with financial autarky: permanent increase in border 
enforcement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each panel shows the transition path of the model’s variables with a permanent increase in the sunk 
emigration cost (sudden increase from fe =4 to fe =5). 
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Figure 9. Welfare analysis, baseline model with financial autarky 
 
 
 
 
 
Consumption-equivalent welfare gain/loss with a permanent increase in the sunk emigration cost 
(sudden increase from fe =4 to fe =5). 
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Figure 10. Welfare analysis, alternative model with financial autarky: 
implications of a rising share of skilled labor (1) 
 
 
 
Consumption-equivalent welfare gain/loss from a rising share of native skilled labor (from 0.9 to 0.97 
over 20 years), in the presence of the sunk emigration cost. 
 
Figure 11. Welfare analysis, alternative model with financial autarky: implications 
of a rising share of skilled labor (2) 
 
 
 
Consumption-equivalent welfare gain/from a rising share of native skilled labor (from 0.6 to 0.67 over 
20 years), in the presence of the sunk emigration cost. 
